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ABSTRACT
Most of the modern Web platforms have recognized the demand for resource sharing among
their users and provide powerful tools for upload and sharing of user-generated content and personal
documents. The need for effective information sharing and search within the growing amount of
documents pushed forward further development of search infrastructures for enterprise data man-
agement systems. Applications for creation of the real, as well as, of the virtual communities are
developed and connect people that are working on similar topics or share similar interests. The
power of such tools and the easiness of their use, often make users careless about possible threats
with respects to confidentiality of the information that is disclosed during the sharing. Privacy-
preserving document exchange among collaboration groups in social web and across enterprises
requires efficient techniques for sharing and search of access-controlled information in largely un-
trusted environments. Thus, privacy preservation mechanisms need to be, by design, an inseparable
part in sharing systems and tools. In this thesis we propose solutions for confident information stor-
age, indexing and sharing. In particular, we address: (1) Efficient privacy-preserving indexing and
retrieval of shared documents; (2) Scalable content diversity analysis for large document corpora
suitable for supporting efficient access control for an inverted index; and (3) Privacy-oriented con-
tent analysis of shared content to automatically distinguish public from potentially sensitive content.
First, we introduce ZERBER+R - a facility, which enable indexing sensitive documents in a way
that the information leakage from the index is bounded by a tunable parameter. This facility is able
to efficiently and securely locate and select top-k relevant documents the user is allowed to access
without leaking information about contained documents and their term distribution statistics. To
provide tunable resistance to statistical attacks, ZERBER+R employs a novel term merging scheme
that has minimal impact on the index lookup costs and relies on largely untrusted index servers. Our
experiments have shown that ZERBER+R makes economical use of network bandwidth, requires
minimal key management, and answers queries almost as fast as an ordinary inverted index. Sec-
ond, we develop two novel, efficient algorithms for content analysis of large document collections
to estimate their topical diversity with probabilistic guarantees. Among many application scenarios,
this measure is potentially useful to improve access control properties by supporting the index par-
titioning. Whilst state-of-the-art diversity measurement algorithms require quadratic computational
time with respect to the dataset size, our methods, called TrackDJ and SampleDJ, can be executed in
linear time and constant time, respectively. Finally, we present a framework for privacy degree esti-
mation and corresponding classification of photographs as they are shared and published by the users
of social web applications. The system supports users in selecting adequate privacy settings. To this
end we trained classification models on a large-scale dataset obtained in a social annotation game.
We analysed the usefulness of textual and visual information in the context of privacy-oriented im-
age classification. In addition, we developed privacy-oriented search and privacy-based search result
diversification techniques. Our classification and ranking experiments have shown excellent perfor-
mance for textual, and visual information and their combinations.
The results presented in this thesis can be directly applied in various privacy-aware data shar-
ing scenarios and Web applications such as Flickr, Facebook or Twitter and due to high efficiency
the developed algorithms can be integrated in large public and enterprise search engines. Addition-
ally, our theoretical findings open a number of research directions such as studying the efficiency
of secured indexes, intelligent index partitioning according to access rights, and sensitivity degree
estimation of personal text and multimedia objects like videos or emails.
Keywords: privacy preserving content indexing, scalable content diversity analysis, privacy
oriented content analysis
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Das heutige Web bietet Benutzern eine Vielzahl von Applikationen zu Veröffentlichung und
zum Austausch von Bildern, Texten, und Informationen. Dies resultierte in der Entwicklung leis-
tungsstarker Werkzeuge zur Veröffentlichung und gemeinsamen Nutzung von benutzergenerierten
Inhalten und persönlichen Dokumenten. Um effektiven Informationsaustausch und Suche für die
stark anwachsende Datenmenge zu gewährleisten, wurden Suchinfrastrukturen und Datenmanage-
mentsysteme sowohl in dem Bereich Industrie, als auch im Web-Umfeld entwickelt. Zusätzlich
verbinden Applikationen für reale, oder virtuelle Arbeitsgemeinschaften Gruppen von gleichgesin-
nten Nutzern auf der ganzen Welt. Die Leistungsfähigkeit solcher Werkzeuge und die Einfachheit in
deren Anwendung, führen jedoch häufig zu leichtfertigem Umgang mit vertraulichen Informationen.
Dies macht eine Berücksichtigung von Datenschutzmechanismen bereits in der Systemdesignphase
notwendig.
In dieser Arbeit beschreiben wir Lösungen zum Schutz der Privatsphäre der Benutzer in gemein-
schaftlich genutzten Systemen. Insbesondere schlagen wir Lösungen für sichere Informationsspe-
icherung, Indizierung und den Austausch von Dokumenten vor. Dabei fokussieren wir uns auf:
(1) Effiziente und sichere Indizierung und Suche auf gemeinsam verwendeten Dokumenten, (2)
Skalierbare Analyse der inhaltlichen Vielfalt für große Dokumentenkorpora, sowie (3) Datenschut-
zorientierte Inhaltsanalyse von gemeinsam genutzten Inhalten mit automatischen Methoden zur Un-
terscheidung zwischen öffentlichen und potenziell vertraulichen Inhalten.
Zunächst stellen wir ZERBER+R vor - ein System, das die Indizierung vertraulicher Doku-
mente ermöglicht und dabei den Informationsverlust in dem Index je nach Parametereinstellung
unterschiedlich stark begrenzt und verhindert. Unser System ermöglicht effiziente und sichere
Suchvorgänge, sowie die Auswahl der relevantesten Dokumente unter der Berücksichtigung der
Zugriffsrechte für den Benutzer, ohne dass dabei Informationen über diese Dokumente für poten-
tielle Angreifer sichtbar werden. Des Weiteren entwickelten wir effiziente Algorithmen zur In-
haltsanalyse von großen Dokumentensammlungen um ihre Themenvielfalt abschätzen zu können.
Dies kann, unter anderem, zu Partitionierung einer Indexdatei hinsichtlich der Zugangsberechtigun-
gen einzelner Benutzergruppen verwendet werden um die Leistungsfähigkeit des Systems weiter
zu steigern. Schließlich präsentieren wir ein Framework, das den Benutzer automatisch bei der
Auswahl der adäquaten Datenschutzeinstellungen für seine Dokumente, und insbesondere Bilder
unterstützt. Dabei untersuchen wir die Verwendbarkeit von ausgewählten Text- und Bildinformatio-
nen zur Bildklassifizierung im Kontext des Schutzes der Privatsphäre. Unsere Experimente zeigen,
dass unsere Modelle, unter Benutzung sowohl textueller als auch visueller Merkmale, qualitativ
hochwertige Klassifikationsergebnisse liefern.
Die in dieser Arbeit entwickelten Methoden und effizienten Algorithmen ermöglichen
sowohl die direkte Anwendung in verschiedene datenschutzrelevante Nutzungsszenarien und Web-
Anwendungen wie Flickr, Facebook oder Twitter, als auch die Integration in hochskalierbare öf-
fentliche und industrielle Suchsysteme. Darüber hinaus eröffnen unsere theoretischen Erkenntnisse
eine Reihe von möglichen Forschungsrichtungen in den Bereichen Indexeffizienz, Zugriffsrechtev-
erwaltung, und automatische Klassifikation von persönlichen Daten.
Schlagwörter: Datenschutz bei Indizierung und Suche, Skalierbare Analyse der Themenvielfalt,
Automatische Unterstützung bei Datenschutzeinstellungen
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1
Introduction
In the last years, popularity of systems for collaborative work and content sharing increased
significantly. Large amounts of data are shared among people in social networks as well
as working groups in professional industry, cooperative working teams and Web 2.0 com-
munities. Most of the Web platforms recognized the demand for resource sharing among
their users and provide powerful tools for upload and sharing of the user generated content.
The need for effective information distribution and search within the growing amount of
documents in this context pushed forward further development of search infrastructures for
enterprise data management systems. Special software supports the creation of the real, as
well as of the virtual communities connecting people working on similar topics or sharing
interests. However, state-of-the-art systems increasingly face challenges related to scalable
and privacy preserving analysis, indexing and retrieval of shared content.
First, the power of content sharing tools and the easiness of their use often makes users
careless about possible threats with respect to confidentiality of the information that can
be disclosed through sharing. Thus, privacy preservation mechanisms need to become
an inseparable part in all kind of sharing systems and tools. Supporting privacy preserving
interconnections and confidential information exchange within enterprises, working groups
and web communities in general remains a challenging research topic. User access levels
and access control have to be reflected in the index structures and retrieval algorithms,
as well as in ranking of search results. Therefore, one of the development goals of such
systems is to consider privacy issues already during the design phase in order to hinder or
even avoid data protection infringement already by design [Sch10].
Second, the rapidly growing amount of shared content makes it necessary to develop
scalable algorithms that enable efficient analysis and retrieval of shared content. In this
context, one important research direction towards scalable content analysis is automated
partitioning of large-scale shared document collections and their indexes to create coherent
subsets of manageable size. In order to estimate a number of possible clusters, techniques
for scalable content diversity analysis need to be developed. Analyzing diversity of Web
collections and in other large-scale text corpora as a whole enables estimation of the num-
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ber of possible clusters in an inverted index with respect to the covered topics and access
control policies. Partitioning the index according to such clustering is a promising way to
further increase retrieval efficiency.
Finally, content sharing systems need to assist users in making informed decisions
about the content to be shared and warn them about possible privacy breaches. In particu-
lar, young users often underestimate the consequences of their sharing behaviour [Bar06,
SH10]. Also multimedia documents uploaded in large batches can contain sensitive data
that require particular care. However, the amount of shared data (especially photos) oft
makes it impossible for the users to analyse manually. Therefore, automatic decision sup-
port with respect to content sharing becomes crucial for privacy-protecting content sharing
systems. Therefore, such systems require efficient algorithms that perform privacy-oriented
content analysis automatically and warn users about potentially sensitive content, that ei-
ther should not be shared at all, or requires increased protection.
1.1 Problems Addressed in this Thesis
In this thesis we address the problems related to scalable and privacy preserving analysis,
indexing and retrieval of shared content.
Problem 1 How to build an indexing facility that can quickly locate relevant documents
that a user is allowed to access, without: (1) leaking information about the remaining
documents, (2) imposing a large management burden as users, groups, and documents
evolve, and (3) requiring users to agree on a central completely trusted authority?
The number of sensitive documents shared over social networks and enterprise intranets
is growing rapidly. Sharing of access-controlled documents has traditionally been accom-
plished through point to point sharing techniques such as email, or through centralized
repositories such as shared file directories on intranet servers, access-controlled web pages,
wikis, and even source code control systems. Each of these approaches has drawbacks with
respect to security, management overhead and usability. Point-to-point sharing techniques
do not scale up well: emailing new versions is awkward when more than a handful of
collaborators are reading and updating a document. Centralized techniques address these
problems but place too much trust in the administrator controlling the central server; in
a large enterprise, conflicting interests make it unlikely that everyone will be willing to
give their sensitive documents to a particular superuser. Further, if the central server is
compromised, all the documents stored there are also compromised.
Another option is for each user to publish their own documents on access-controlled
web pages on their own web server, whose administrator they presumably trust. Alterna-
tively, a document can be placed on a public server after encrypting it with a key known
to all members. In both cases, just securing the documents is insufficient, as they need
to be indexed to support efficient search and retrieval. We describe this data structure in
1.1 Problems Addressed in this Thesis 3
more detail later in background Section 2.1.1. The index contains sufficient information
not only to locate relevant documents, but also to reconstruct the set of words in a sensi-
tive document, so it needs to be protected against unauthorized access. It is unlikely that
all project groups can agree on a single trusted central authority to enforce access control
on index entries; even if they can, centralized indexes are attractive targets for attack and
will need additional protection. For example, even if the exact content of the elements is
obscured, the lengths of the posting lists can tell an industrial spy which compounds are
used in the development of a new chemical process [BC05]. Protecting an inverted index
is a challenging problem when there is no single trusted central authority to enforce access
control on posting list elements - as is the case in the project group scenarios we target.
One possible solution is for each document owner to keep an inverted index over the
documents it owns locally. Then a user’s query for the term “ImClone” can be broadcast
to all document owners, and the resulting answers can be collected by the user and, if
desired, ranked. Each document owner retains absolute control over her index as well as her
documents, and can enforce access control on each index lookup. However, this shotgun
approach to querying is relatively slow, and wastes network bandwidth and computing
power, since most document owners will not have posting list elements matching most
queries.
Another potential solution is for the document owner to encrypt any sensitive infor-
mation in each posting list element, and insert the element in a global inverted index
[cCM05, SWP00]. Encryption schemes usually have complex key management schemes
that make the system hard to use and administer, and can compromise its effectiveness.
Further, in practice, each element includes a term score, reflecting importance of that term
for that document. If the index provides ranked query answers, term frequencies must not
be encrypted, as they are a major factor in the relevance score computed by the ranking
algorithm. But from plain-text term frequencies, one can reverse-engineer the terms them-
selves [BC05].
In Chapter 3 we introduce a solution for securing inverted index and at the same time
keeping its major properties like efficiency and top-k retrieval.
Problem 2 How to provide a data analytics facility for estimation of the number of struc-
tural elements in datasets that scale to Web size?
Topical diversity of user generated content on the Web is typically very high, as meta
data schema and sharing conditions in social application are relaxed to a large extend.
Openly available content spans from public (like photos of landscapes and blog reports
about sport events) up to highly sensitive objects such as family photos, personal diary en-
tries and so on. Topical diversity value of a data corpora can provide insides into its struc-
ture and especially can be used to estimate a number of possible clusters in this dataset.
It has been studied in different disciplines and contexts for decades. The diversity of a
population can reveal certain cultural properties of a country [Lie69, Fea03], e.g. with
respect to religion, ethnic groups, or political orientations. In the area of ecology, biodiver-
sity is used as a measure of the health of biological systems [LM03]. Recently, diversity
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also drew the attention of scientists in the database and Information Retrieval communi-
ties. For instance, Vee et al. [VSS+08] use the sum of similarities of all object pairs to
measure diversities of relational records, while Ziegler et al. [ZMKL05] employ a simi-
lar measure for diversifying items in a recommender system. In the area of search result
diversification [GS09, ZMKL05], inter-object similarity is used to obtain a subset of the
most dissimilar results, providing an overview over the result space. However, due to the
quadratic computational complexity, the mentioned approaches are applied on relatively
small sets, limited to the number of life forms in a biosystem, or top-k objects selected in
the context of search result diversification. In contrast, in this chapter, we focus on analyz-
ing diversity on Web collections and in other large-scale text corpora as a whole to be able
to estimate a number of possible clusters in an inverted index with respect to access control
policies. Portioning the index according to such clustering is a promising way to increase
retrieval efficiency.
Whilst inverted index information leakage and topical diversity can be objectively mea-
sured, the notion of privacy of a specific textual or multimedial object is rather subjective.
Photos taken at a beach, personal wedding or sport event photos have different sensitivity
degree and thus obviously, topical diversity will have an important influence on what can be
considered sensitive by a crowd. This issue will be considered in the next problem, where
we exploit image features to distinguish such diverse classes of photos and identifying
private/public images in social photo streams.
Problem 3 How to support users in estimating sensitivity degree of textual or multimedia
documents and enable systems to automatically determine adequate privacy settings for
these documents?
As discussed previously, security in an inverted index comes to the price of efficiency.
In practice, however, it is not necessary to secure all the documents to the same degree, even
a large portion of documents often does not have to be secured at all. A mechanism to accu-
rately judge the degree of document sensitivity can further increase retrieval efficiency by
adaptable document securing. Such mechanism can contribute in scenarios where textual
and multimedia content needs to be shared. Furthermore, with increasing availability of
content sharing environments such as Flickr and YouTube, the volume of private multime-
dia resources publicly available on the Web has drastically increased. In particular, young
users often share private images about themselves, their friends and classmates without be-
ing aware of the consequences such footage may have for their future lives [Bar06, SH10].
Photo sharing users often lack awareness of privacy issues. A recent study revealed that
more than 80% of the photos publicly shared by young people are of such a private nature
that they would not show these images to their parents and teachers [SH10]. The popular
Facebook platform allows its users not only to publish photos, but also to mark the names
of the depicted people. In this way, even people who did not publish any compromising
information, can leave discoverable footprints on the Web.
Existing sharing platforms do not support users in making adequate privacy decisions in
multimedia resource sharing. On the contrary, these platforms quite often employ rather lax
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(a) Top-3
public photos
(b) Top-3
private photos
Figure 1.1 Top-3 search results with original Flickr ids for the query “Ronaldo” (a) in
the original ranking, and (b) obtained through our privacy-oriented search method (status:
Oct. 2010).
default configurations, and mostly require users to manually decide on privacy settings for
each single resource. Given the amount of shared information this process can be tedious
and error-prone. This problem will be tackled in Chapter 5.
1.2 Contributions of the Thesis
In this thesis we address the problems presented above and describe three major contribu-
tions in embedding security and privacy protection mechanisms in distributed Information
Retrieval systems, namely:
• First, to address Problem 1 we show how efficiency properties of an inverted index,
such as fast location of relevant documents and top-k retrieval from large document
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corpora can be ensured without violating privacy constrains. To achieve this goal, we
propose r-confidentiality as a measure of the degree of information that can leak from
an index about inaccessible documents, given an adversary’s background knowledge
of the corpus or language statistics. We use this measure to build ZERBER - an
r-confidential global inverted index for sensitive documents. This index employs a
novel term merging scheme that has minimal impact on index lookup costs and re-
lies on a centralized set of largely untrusted index servers, encryption and k out of n
secret sharing scheme [Sha79]. Following that, for effective and efficient retrieval of
the top-k documents most relevant to a given query from an r-confidential global in-
verted index, we present ZERBER+R , a novel ranking model and a relevance score
transformation function which minimizes information leakage by top-k retrieval from
a confidential outsourced inverted index. The proposed solution provides tunable re-
sistance to statistical attacks, guarantees freshness of shared documents at low cost,
makes economical use of network bandwidth, requires no key management, and an-
swers most of the queries almost as fast as an ordinary inverted index.
• Second, to address Problem 2 we develop efficient and scalable algorithms for esti-
mation of document diversity in large corpora. In particular, to solve the diversity
computational problem, we propose two novel algorithms which make use of ran-
dom sampling and Min-wise independent hashing paradigms. More specifically, we
propose two fast approximation algorithms for computing the average pair-wise Jac-
card similarity of n sets with probabilistic accuracy guarantees, coined as SampleDJ
and TrackDJ. Jaccard similarity is one of the most popular measures in Information
Retrieval due to its simplicity and high applicability [MRS08], and provides intu-
itive and interesting results in our example studies. While the proposed approach is
generic and can be applied to many dimensions of diversity, in the context of this the-
sis we are particularly interested in its capability to estimate the number of clusters in
an inverted index according to the topical dimension and document access policies.
• Finally, we address Problem 3 and show that sensitivity of a particular document,
and thus adequate privacy settings including both textual and multimedia objects,
can be estimated using machine supervised learning techniques. This estimation can
directly support users in their content sharing decisions and help to make adaptable
anonymisation, in systems that make use of the trade-off between privacy protection
and retrieval efficiency. Furthermore, we use automatically determined document
sensitivity information to develop privacy-oriented search and privacy-based diver-
sification algorithms. Privacy-oriented search allows users to systematically search
for private content and obtain an overview of relevant sensitive resources about them-
selves published by third parties at an early stage. Privacy-based diversification al-
lows search engine to retrieve a “mixture” of private and public content to minimize
the risk of user dissatisfaction in cases where queries are ambiguous with respect to
the privacy aspect of the information need.
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1.3 Thesis Structure
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows:
In Chapter 2 we discuss selected general background techniques and algorithms that
build a basis to achieve the goals conducted in this thesis. In particular, we focus on se-
lected techniques from the areas of Machine Learning, Information Retrieval, similarity
and diversity approximation as well as index security and privacy protection.
Following that, in Chapter 3 we discuss Problem 1 of confidential document indexing
and sharing. This chapter is structured as follows: First, in Section 3.1 we briefly present
the contributions of this chapter. Then, Section 3.2 describes the collaboration scenar-
ios we want to support and presents the characteristics of the ideal indexing scheme for
confidentiality-aware document sharing environments. Following that in Section 3.3 we
describe a scenario for confidentiality-aware top-k retrieval in a collaborative environment.
Section 3.4 introduces the security model. In Section 3.5 we present our approach - ZER-
BER - an r-confidential inverted index. Then, we discuss the problem of enabling top-k
retrieval from an r-confidential inverted index in Section 3.6 and present a design refine-
ment to support top-k retrieval - ZERBER+R - in Section 3.7. Following that, we discuss
practical aspects of using the resulting system in Section 3.8. In Section 3.9 we evaluate
the performance of the system with real-world data and queries. Finally, we discuss the
evaluation results and the overall contributions of this chapter in Section 3.10.
Then in Chapter 4 we discuss Problem 2 of diversity degree estimation in large datasets.
This estimation can help to optimize index partitioning with respect to topical dimension
and access control policies and thus to improve the retrieval efficiency. First, in Section 4.1
we briefly present the contributions of this chapter. Second, Section 4.2 introduces the di-
versity index used throughout the chapter. Third, in Section 4.3, we describe algorithms for
efficiently computing the diversity index values, and prove accuracy and efficiency prop-
erties. We verify our theoretical findings using both real and synthetic data in Section 4.4.
Finally, as application examples, we show results of various corpora studies conducted on
various corpora in Section 4.5.
Next, in Chapter 5 we tackle Problem 3 of the sensitivity degree estimation for textual
and multimedia documents. First, in Section 5.1 we briefly present the contributions of this
chapter. Second, in Section 5.2 we describe our data collection and labeling method which
enabled us to obtain a large dataset for the privacy-based image classification. Third, we an-
alyze visual and textual image features in Section 5.3. Forth, in Section 5.4 we describe the
classification approach, and present ranking and diversification techniques which provide
an overview of the available search results taking into account their privacy as estimated by
the classifier. Finally, we evaluate our techniques for privacy-based classification, ranking
and diversification in Section 5.5.
Finally, we discuss the contributions of this thesis and point out directions for future
research in Chapter 6.

2
General Background
In this chapter we briefly introduce general background techniques and algorithms that
build a basis to achieve the goals conducted in this thesis. In particular, we focus on se-
lected techniques from the areas of Information Retrieval (IR), sampling and similarity
approximation, Machine Learning (ML) as well as index security and privacy protection.
First, we present relevant Information Retrieval techniques including indexing, ranking
and diversification of search results. Second, we discuss relevant similarity and diversity
approximation techniques for working with large-scale data, including Locality Sensitive
Hashing, Min-wise independent hashing, sampling and diversity indexes. Following that,
we discuss the selected aspects of supervised Machine Learning, such as image classifica-
tion, feature selection methods and evaluation metrics. Finally, we discuss relevant index
security and privacy protection aspects including index security and confidentiality, data
encryption, anonymization, document sensitivity and access policies.
2.1 Relevant Information Retrieval Techniques
In this section we provide an overview of Information Retrieval techniques related to Prob-
lem 1, namely how to build an index that enables privacy-preserving document indexing
and search. In particular, this includes indexing documents using inverted indexes and rank-
ing of search results. Furthermore, we discuss techniques of search result diversification
related to Problem 3.
Information Retrieval techniques concentrate on obtaining information relevant to the
user information need from an information source (a larger set of documents). The user
information need is typically represented as a set of keywords and the result is a ranked
list of relevant documents likely to satisfy that need. One of specific problems in the area
of Information Retrieval is system efficiency dealing with obtaining relevant information
in a minimum of time, which is typically addressed through indexing. Indexes are data
structures containing information useful to efficiently locating of the relevant documents
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given user query. Obtained documents are ranked according to their estimated relevance
for the user information need. Additionally the list can be diversified to reflect aspects of
information need reflected in the result set.
2.1.1 Inverted Indexes
Inverted Indexes are the standard choice for keyword (full-text) search of documents. An
inverted index is a sequence of posting lists, each of which contains the identifiers (IDs)
of all documents containing one particular term and a score reflecting the relevance of the
document to the corresponding term. Figure 2.1 illustrates an inverted index with three
posting lists and nine posting list elements (elements for short).
Figure 2.1 Inverted Index with 9 Elements
In order to obtain a list of documents containing a specific term (e.g ”Martha”) it is
sufficient to locate corresponding posting list. This can be done efficiently using data struc-
tures such as tree-structure (O(log(n))) or a Hashtable (O(1)) [MRS08]. The objects in a
tree are sorted such that, in binary trees when touching a particular node, the larger valued
node are contained to the left, and the lower valued to the right. Searching in the tree turns
into descending to the corresponding node, or noticing its absence. Search trees, be B-Tree
an example, are able to balance themselves and (since the pointer to the documents are con-
tained in leaves - nodes in the lowest level) the number of comparison operations to obtain
the search node is bounded by their height. Hash-table is a fixed array of lists of objects
where the index (position) of the element in the array was calculated using a specific hash
function involving the value of that object. Objects with the same hash value are chained
in the list. In order to find an object in a hash-table, its hash value needs to be computed
first. This value corresponds to the index in the table where the list containing the object is
located. Finally, this list has to be scanned. The complexity of the latter procedure can be
reduced when the hashtable is of sufficient length and the lists contain a minimum number
of elements. Search Trees are more complex in execution compared to hash-tables, but
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the former are far more efficient for updates and deletes and are typically used in dynamic
contexts.
Although inverted index is a very efficient data structure for document retrieval, it rep-
resents the summary of the collection and can leak sensitive information about containing
documents. We propose a solution of this problem in Chapter 3.
2.1.2 Document Ranking
After obtaining the relevant posting lists from an inverted index, the containing posting
elements needs to be examined. In case of the multi-term query the corresponding posting
lists are intersected and the matching documents in this intersection are ranked using one
of the state-of-the-art functions. Typically the documents that are more similar to the query
are ranked higher. There are different ways for computing those similarity, one of the most
simplest ones is Jaccard coefficient, where the similarity is defined as intersection of terms
in two documents (document and query in our case) divided by their union. The query and
the document can also be represented as vectors in multidimensional vector space (having
terms as dimensions). The smaller the distance between those vectors the more similar is
the document and the query. Since query is typically much shorter than a document, not
the absolute distance is considered, but the angle between those vectors. Unfortunately,
the exact scores of the posting elements can be term specific sensitive and leak information
even if the terms in the posting lists are encrypted or the posting lists are mixed.
We discuss this problem and propose a solution in Chapter 3.
2.1.3 Search Result Diversification
The result list of documents from a search engine can be very lengthy and typically a large
portions of the documents within the list can be very similar to each other or even redun-
dant. At the same time only a few results can find space on the users’ screen following,
instead of ordering the results by relevance, modern search engines can extract a represen-
tative subset of it, providing the overview over the whole result set. As a simplified method,
the result set documents are clustered according to their position in the term vector space
and only a documents from each cluster center is shown in the result list.
In order to perform search result diversification, first of all the most important topics
- information nuggets - are identified for each document. Next, a subset of documents is
extracted were information nugget diversity (novelty) is traded against the relevance of the
documents.
The diversification quality can be measured in terms of (new) Information Gain, ob-
tained by viewing a particular document subset. A trade-off between document relevance
and its novelty is typically controlled by the α parameter. More formally, the following
objective function is maximized:
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G(D, q) = α ∗ (
∑
d∈D
relq, d) + (1− α) ∗ (
∑
a∈S(q)
weight(s, q) ∗ cov(s,D)),
whereG(D) is the information gain obtained by a given set of documents the first summand
represents the relevance of the subset and the second the topic coverage in this subset. More
specifically, rel(q,D) is the relevance score of the document d for the query q, weight(s, q)
is the importance of the topic s for the query q and, finally, cov(s,D) is the topic s coverage
by the subset.
In Chapter 5 we consider the problem of providing an overview of the available search
results, while taking into account their privacy by developing specific diversification tech-
niques for this task.
2.1.4 Evaluation Measures for Search Result Diversification
The relevance of a search result is typically evaluated using the standard nDCG mea-
sure [JK02] that accumulates the gain of each individual search result throughout the result
set. α-nDCG [CKC+08] is a standard evaluation measure to balance relevance of search
results with their novelty. α-nDCG views a search result (i.e. an image or a document)
as a set of mutually independent binary information nuggets. Each nugget represents the
presence of a different aspect of the user’s information need, such as a fact, or topicality of
the document [CKC+08].
Compared to the standard nDCG measure, the computation of the gain G[k] of a search
result at rank k in α-nDCG is extended with a parameter α ∈ (0, 1] to trade off relevance
and novelty of a search result:
G[k] =
∑
ni∈N
J(dk, ni)× (1− α)
∑k−1
j=1 J(dj ,ni), (2.1)
where N = {n1, . . . , nm} is the space of the possible information nuggets, J(dk, ni) is
a binary user judgment of containment of nugget ni in the result dk, and
∑k−1
j=1 J(dj, ni)
is the number of higher ranked results judged to contain nugget ni. The resulting gain
G[k] is discounted by its position k, and accumulated over the positions [1, k] to obtain the
discounted cumulative gain DCG[k]:
DCG[k] =
k∑
j=1
G[j]
log2(1 + j)
. (2.2)
Finally, the DCG[k] is normalized by the ideal discounted cumulative gain vector
DCG′[k]: nDCG[k] = DCG[k]
DCG′[k] .
In Chapter 5 we consider the problem of adaptation of α-nDCG to the privacy-based
diversification.
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2.2 Similarity and Diversity Approximation Methods
In this section we provide an overview of techniques related to Problem 2, namely how to
provide data analytics for estimation of the number of structural elements in datasets that
scale to the size of the Web. In particular, this includes methods for similarity and diversity
approximation, including hashing-based methods, sampling and diversity indexes. We also
discuss the relation to the work on diversity in search and query result diversification.
2.2.1 Hashing-Based Methods
Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) [IM98, DIIM04] is a family of approximation algo-
rithms used for indexing high dimensional data points. Usually, in order to preserve the
original properties, the value for each dimension would need to be stored for later recov-
ery, which requires a large storage space on one hand and large times for comparing two
data points dimension-wise on the other hand. Instead high dimensionality can be reduces
by arithmetic operations summarizing (projection) the values of particular dimensions, re-
sulting in a low-dimensional space. LSH has the property that two objects with a smaller
distance in the resulting space are more likely to have a hash collision. The distance/simi-
larity is measured by the Lp norm (e.g. Euclidean or Hamming distance of vectors). There
are various LSH implementations with different properties proposed in the literature. Ap-
proximation of cosine similarities of vectors can, for example, make use of hash functions
with the LSH property [Cha02b].
Min-wise independent hashing is a technique originally proposed for finding near
duplicate documents [Bro00a]. It can be considered as a variation of LSH and shows
properties of Jaccard coefficient. This technique was initially used in the Web to determine
web page duplicates in a result set, but can also be applied to measure the similarity of two
document sets. Whilst there exist a number of variations of the algorithm, in this thesis
we employ a particular implementation - with many hash functions. A hash function is a
mapping function of an arbitrary original data into a value with a fix size. The algorithm
runs as follows: Having two sets of objects it computes hash values for each object and
compares the minimal values from both set. Having done it for a set of k hash functions,
the probability of collisions (where both minimal values equal each other) divided by k
equals the Jaccard coefficient. We use this property in Chapter 4 to reduce the number of
pair-wise comparisons while estimating the Jaccard coefficient.
Different from the existing applications, we are the first to use Min-wise independent
hashing as a building block for efficient diversity index estimation. In particular, we use
Min-wise independent hashing in our algorithm for approximating Jaccard coefficient in
Chapter 4.
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2.2.2 Diversity Indexes
Diversity indexes were proposed in ecology [Sim49, Kre89] decades ago; they assume
that objects are classified into groups. For example, Simpson’s diversity index [Sim49], a
well-known diversity index in ecology is defined as follows: D =
∑Z
i=1 pi
2
i , where pii is the
fraction of individuals belonging to group i and each individual in the population belongs to
one of Z groups. Note that Simpson’s index can just be employed in the special case where
objects belong to one of a discrete set of categories. Diversity indexes were also proposed
in various areas focusing on different applications. For example, Stirling [Sti07, RM10]
proposed a general diversity index trying to measure diversities in different areas in science,
technology and society. The general Stirling index is defined asD =
∑
ij(i 6=j)(dij)
α(pipj)
β ,
where dij is the distance between object i and j; pi, pj are the relative occurrences of object
i and j in the whole dataset. The diversity measure used in this work for text collections
can be interpreted as a special case of the Stirling index.
None of the mentioned works deals with the efficiency problem of computing diversity
measures for whole data collections, which is the main focus of Chapter 4.
2.2.3 Sampling
Sampling is a technique that finds a wide range of applications, such as auditing of large
databases and query optimization in databases [Olk93]. The basic idea is, that by selecting
a large enough set of samples from a population, the basic properties of a distribution in
this population can be approximated. Although sampling techniques deliver inexact (or
error bounded) results, their execution usually requires only a fraction of time of an exact
computation algorithm. A prominent example is Monte-Carlo sampling for estimation
the integral of a curve, by considering few randomly selected intervals [Sob74]. A more
theoretical example related to our work is the application of random sampling to estimate
the average value (or sum) of a set of numbers, for which it is known to be difficult to
bound the relative error without having prior knowledge about the input data [DKLR00].
More research on sampling can be found in the survey of Babcock et al. [BBD+02] and
in [Olk93].
As discussed in Chapter 4, we are the first to use random sampling as an underlying
technique to solve the problem of efficiently computing diversity indexes.
2.2.4 Diversity in Search and Query Result Diversification
There is a plethora of work on diversifying query or search results and adaptation of eval-
uation schemes in this context - see e.g. [CG98, CKC+08, GS09, AGHI09, CK06, WZ09].
Search engines, recommender systems and databases have the need to return diverse re-
sults to users in order to include answers for different user needs in the result set. This is
especially important if the query is ambiguous. Several of these papers perform diversifica-
tion of search results as a post-processing or re-ranking step of document retrieval. These
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methods first retrieve the relevant search results, and then filter or re-order result lists to
achieve diversification. Vee et al. [VSS+08] use the sum of similarities of all object pairs
to measure diversities of relational records, while Ziegler et al. [ZMKL05] apply a similar
measure for diversifying items in a recommender system. Gollapudi and Sharma [GS09]
make use of inter-object similarity in their axiomatic search result diversification approach.
In their recent work [MSN11] Minack et al. deal with efficiently diversifying search re-
sults for large data streams; note that obtaining a diverse top-k list from a large dataset
corresponds to an entirely different problem setting than the one studied in this work.
In general, work on search result diversification is about diversifying small top-k sets
of query results. In contrast the problem of efficient computation of diversity indexes for
whole data collections discussed in Chapter 4 has not been addressed sufficiently in the
literature.
2.3 Index Security and Privacy Protection
In this section we provide an overview of security and privacy protection techniques re-
lated to Problem 1, namely how to build an index that enables privacy-preserving indexing
and search. In particular, this includes related work on index security and confidentiality,
as well as data encryption and anonymization. Following that, we discuss existing work
related to document sensitivity and access control policies related to Problem 3, namely
how to support users in estimating sensitivity degree of the documents and enable systems
to automatically determine adequate privacy settings.
2.4 Image Classification Using Machine Learning
In this section we provide an overview of Machine Learning techniques related to Prob-
lem 3, namely how to support users in estimating sensitivity degree of documents, and
in particular images, to (semi-)automatically determine adequate privacy settings. In par-
ticular, techniques related to this problem include aspects of image classification, feature
selection and quality evaluation.
Machine Learning deals with the development and evaluation of computer systems that
are not explicitly programmed to achieve a particular goal, but can learn from given data
examples. The algorithms that learn functions using labeled training data are typically
referred to as supervised ML algorithms, whereas the algorithms that use predefined func-
tions to directly learn from unlabeled data are commonly known as unsupervised ML al-
gorithms. The commonly used methods in the respective areas include: 1) Classification,
where a known set of labels can be assigned to a given data object using supervised ML
techniques; and 2) Clustering, where the system leverages the underlying structure of a
given dataset to automatically identify groups of similar data objects without labeled train-
ing data. Also a mixture of the both paradigms exists. One of the most important aspects
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for the effectiveness of a ML algorithm is the selection of features that represent data ob-
jects in the learning process. These features enable ML algorithms to compare the objects,
to learn specific feature patterns and to assign the objects represented by the features to
categories.
In Chapter 5 we analyse how a supervised Machine Learning classification method
can be adapted in the context of privacy-oriented content analytics to determine sensitivity
degree of images.
2.4.1 Image Classification with Support Vector Machines
Classification is a well-studied area of supervised Machine Learning with a variety of prob-
abilistic and discriminative models [Cha02a]. Given a number of class labels and sufficient
amount of example objects for each class, a classification algorithm can learn the specific
feature patterns for each class and create a model, able to assign a right label to an unseen
object based on its features. Specifically, a Support Vector Machine (SVM) binary clas-
sification model can efficiently construct a hyperplane −→ω ∗ −→x + b = 0 that separates the
set of positive training examples from a set of negative examples in a feature space, with
a maximum margin. SVMs have been shown to perform very well for various classifica-
tion tasks [MRS08]. In this thesis we use a popular SVMlight software package [Joa99]
that provides various kinds of parameterizations and variations of classification techniques
(e.g., binary classification, SVM regression and ranking, transductive SVMs, etc.).
In the context of image classification, there are three basic types of features, namely:
• Ratio / numeric (continuous numbers, such as brightness, or colorfulness);
• Ordinal (quantities with natural ordering, such as classes in an ontology or scales of
a rating); and
• Nominal, i.e. categories such as tags (i.e. descriptive terms assigned by the users)
and colors.
Typically, for a classification task, each nominal value is represented as a separate dimen-
sion in a multidimensional vector space; the numeric values represent the value of the
feature for the given dimension and ordinal data can be used for both1.
To give an example, assume there are two classes of photos, public and private in our
case. We also define two features (a) the presence or absence of human faces in the im-
age, and (b) the average color saturation of all pixels in the image. We will further take
10 images of each class, extract their features as 2-dimensional vectors and position the
items in the 2-dimensional feature space as shown in the Figure 2.2. In this figure, the
axes represent both feature dimensions, green crosses correspond to private images (pos-
itive examples) and red dashes to the public images (negative examples). The task of the
1For engineering reasons, it is common practice to convert numeric values into ordinal by grouping the
intervals (e.g. in an histogram) or to consider ordinal data as categorical/nominal.
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Figure 2.2 Separating private (positive) and public (negative) image examples in a
2 dimensional feature vector space using face presence (on the Y -Axis) and color
saturation (on the X-Axis) of the images as features.
SVM algorithm is to compute a hyperplane (a line in the 2-dimensional case), which can
separate the positive from the negative examples, while maximising the margin between
both classes. In this example we can observe that private photos are mostly located in the
left top corner - the area representing photos containing faces and having lower color satu-
ration. Intuitively, lower color saturation can correspond to the low cost cameras, privately
used. In contrast, the color saturation of the public images (mostly located at the top right
in Figure 2.2) is generally higher in this example.
As all supervised ML algorithms, SVM operates in two phases: 1) the training phase,
where the algorithm learns and validates a function from the labeled data instances, and 2)
the classification phase, in which unlabeled data instances are classified using this function.
During the training phase, the task of the SVM algorithm is to find a hyperplane separating
the two groups of labeled images in the vector space, such that the margins between those
classes (more specifically between the data points nearest to the hyperplane) and the sep-
arating hyperplane are maximized. This training requires solving a quadratic optimization
problem whose empirical performance is somewhere between linear and quadratic in the
number of training images [Bur98]. However, in real life, the positive and negative training
data are not always linearly separable. To deal with such tasks, SVM provides non-linear
kernels as well as a so-called kernel trick to map the input in a more dimensional space
where the problem becomes linearly separable again. In addition, SVM introduces slack
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variables to relax the constraints. After the training has been completed, for a new previ-
ously unseen object (an image in our case), the SVM has to decide whenever the image
belongs to the ”positive” side or the ”negative” side of the separating hyperplane. This is
efficiently done through considering the sign of the scalar product of the both vectors - the
hyperplane and the image.
SVMs have been shown to perform very well for various classification tasks (see, e.g.,
[DC00]). In Chapter 5 we analyse the applicability and efficiency of the SVMs for pri-
vate/public image classification tasks.
2.4.2 Feature Selection using Mutual Information
The effectiveness of a ML classification algorithm like SVM depends, to a large extent, on
the selection of discriminative features that can be used to separate images belonging to
different classes. In this context, we rely on the Mutual Information (MI) [MRS08]. Given
two variables, the Mutual Information measures the dependency of these variables on each
other. Using the MI measure we can compute, how much a joint distribution of objects
within categories deviates from a hypothetical distribution, in which objects and categories
are independent of each other. The least dependent objects in each of the groups can be
seen as a representative for this group. As an example, consider two sets of documents, one
about winter sports, another one about summer sports (Table 2.1).
Winter Sports Summer Sports
Doc1 Doc2 Doc3 Doc4 Doc5 Doc6
sun sun ice sun sun ball
ski bob hockey speed rocket player
snow ice player bicycle ball hot
cold speed cold warm grass goalkeeper
speed goalkeeper player
Table 2.1 Example: Typical Terms in the Documents about Winter Sports and
Summer Sports
As Table 2.1 illustrates, whilst the terms ”sun” and ”player” will appear in the both
datasets, the terms ”snow”, and ”warm” are more common in the winter and summer set,
respectively. A special case of MI is a TF-IDF measure, which, given a set of documents,
prefers the terms that are frequent in a particular document and infrequent in all others. In
this work we employ the MI measure to calculate the most representative textual and visual
features, for either ”public”, or ”private” class of objects (images in our case).
In Chapter 5 we analyse effectiveness of selected textual and visual features in the
context of private / public image classification tasks using Mutual Information.
2.4 Image Classification Using Machine Learning 19
2.4.3 Quality Evaluation for Machine Learning Algorithms
After a Machine Learning model has been trained it is important to evaluate the model and
assess its quality. In a perfect case, example instances provided to train the model form
a representative sample for the particular classification problem. This sample also needs
to be large enough, such that the main feature characteristics can be captured over the
noise. In the real world a model often can be undertrained - meaning that the number of the
training instances is not sufficient to capture the classification problem. Another extreme
is overfitting, when the model learns the training examples rather then the classification
problem itself. In both extremes such models are not generalizable, meaning that the model
will only work on the training data rather than for the previously unknown instances.
Accuracy and Precision
Typically, to evaluate the quality of classifier prediction, the sizes of the four main classes
produced by the model are captured:
• True Positive (TP) - positive objects that are correctly classified by the model.
• False Positive (FP) - negative objects that are wrongly classified by the model as
positive.
• True Negative (TN) - negative objects that are correctly classified by the model.
• False Negative (FN) - positive objects that are wrongly classified by the model as
negative.
Different classification models can perform better for different tasks and the quality
measures can make them comparable. In the following we describe some of the established
quality measures used in this work.
The most simple way to access the quality of a model on a test set is to measure its
accuracy. The accuracy is defined as the proportion of correctly classified instances in the
test set:
accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
Although this measure is simple, it fails in case the test set is imbalanced (the number
of positive and negative instances is not equal). For example, if the number of sensitive
documents in a company database is very small, a model which classifies every document
as non-sensitive will be considered as accurate.
Precision is another measure, which takes into account the prediction quality, only for
the examples classified as positive by the model. It measures the portion of correctly clas-
sified instances among all instances classified as positive by the model:
precision =
TP
TP + FP
.
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Recall measures the portion of correctly classified positive instances to all positive in-
stances in the test set:
recall =
TP
TP + FN
.
Usually, there is a trade-off between precision and recall. F -measure combines both as
a weighted average (or harmonic mean):
F1 = 2 ∗ precision ∗ recall
precision+ recall
.
Precision-Recall Curves
The precision and recall measures represent averaged values and do not reflect all prop-
erties of the model performance. Therefore, in this thesis we use precision-recall curves
to measure the performance of generated models. A precision-recall curve shows the pre-
cision (on the Y -Axis) over recall levels (on the X-Axis). More precisely, in order to
construct a precision-recall curve, in the first step a dataset consistent of 50% positive and
50% negative examples is classified and instances are sorted by their classification values
in descending order. In the second step, the head of this sequence is separated such that
it contains exactly a certain percentage (e.g. 10%) of the positive instances (which cor-
responds to 10% recall). Finally, precision value in the resulting subset is calculated as
the first point of the curve and this procedure is continued for further recall levels (20%,
30% and so on). The higher the curve, the better is the performance of the examined clas-
sifier. The precision-recall graph gives insights in how much precision it is possible to
gain in case only a certain amount of recall is required. Typically, the head of the distri-
bution achieves better precision due to the fact that higher classification values correspond
to the higher confidence of the classification model. Figure 2.3 depicts three examples
of precision-recall curves illustrating different classification properties of the underlying
models.
Cross Validation
One of the possible issues in classification is overfitting, which occurs in cases where, in-
stead of capturing a classification problem, the training dataset is "overlearned". In such
cases the classifier performs very well on the training examples, but fails for the unseen in-
stances. In the public/private classification application it would mean that classifier learns
feature distribution of concrete photos instead of typical features reflecting the public/pri-
vate context of the photos.
A general way to asses the generalizability of a particular classification model is to
randomly partition a large set of labeled instances into two complimentary subsets and
perform training on one subset and testing on the other. This can be done in multiple
rounds using different partitions. The most common is the 10-fold cross validation, where
the model is trained on the 90% of the data and tested with the remaining 10% in 10 rounds.
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Figure 2.3 Examples of precision-recall curves. The first curve 2.3a fluctuates
around the value of 0.5, indicating that the classification ability of the model is
very low and is close to random. The curve 2.3b depicts a limited classification
ability. Around 50% of the dataset was classified with around 80% precision,
followed by a sharp decrease. Finally, Figure 2.3c shows a typical classification
curve which starts high, lowering only slowly.
The results of the individual rounds are averaged and the average precision can be taken as
a measure of quality.
In Chapter 5 we apply the evaluation techniques discussed above in the context of
private/public image classification tasks.
2.4.4 Related Work on Image Classification
Analysis of visual and textual image (meta-)data is applied to tackle a variety of problems,
such as determining attractiveness [SPS09] or quality [YHBO10] of photos, identification
of landmarks [ACN+09], search result diversification [vLGOvZ09], and others. Figueiredo
et al. [FBP+09] analyze the quality of textual features available in Web 2.0 systems and
their usefulness for classification.
In comparison to these works, in Chapter 5 we apply classification techniques in a novel
context to automatically determine image privacy and study textual and visual features in
the context of privacy-oriented classification and search.
2.4.5 Index Security and Confidentiality
Index security has been addressed by many techniques designed for the outsourcing threat
model, where the goal is to secure the index from tampering by the untrusted storage server.
These techniques store the index in plain text, and so do not address confidentiality. For
example, Merkle hash trees let one verify the authenticity of any tree node entry by trusting
the signed hash value stored at the root node. Authenticated dictionaries [BG05, GTS01]
support secure lookup operations for dictionary data structures. Encryption is a standard
22 Chapter 2 General Background
technique for storing data confidentially [Bla93, GTS01, KRS+03]. [BCF01, MS03] pro-
vide a framework for policy-based protection of XML data by encryption. Other techniques
include suppressing and/or generalizing released data into less specific forms, so that they
no longer uniquely represent individuals [FWY05, Iye02]; k-anonymity is one popular
form of generalization (e.g., [BA05, LDR06, MKGV07]). Unfortunately, it is not possible
to directly apply these techniques to secure an inverted index. Even if posting list entries
are encrypted, they can leak critical statistical data.
The research most relevant to our problem is µ− Serv, a system developed at IBM to
index distributed access-controlled documents [BBAV09]. µ−Serv has a centralized index
based on a Bloom filter; it responds to a keyword search by returning a list of sites that have
at least x% probability of having documents containing one of the query keywords, where
x is a preset parameter. Users then repeat their query at each suggested site. The lack of
precision in results from the central index represents a trade-off between search efficiency
and confidentiality preservation. This approach lengthens the querying process and wastes
cycles at sites that do not contain query-relevant entries. For example, if x = 5%, the user
must query 20 times as many sites to get the relevant results. Further, µ − Serv does not
support centralized ranking; the user must get ranked search results from individual sites
and combine them.
In our approach ZERBER proposed in Chapter 3, the centralized indexes direct users
to documents that definitely satisfy the user’s query, and provides a level of confidentiality
equivalent to µ−Serv at much lower query cost: because ZERBER provides exact search
results, users can rank their search results locally and visit only the top-k document server
sites to obtain document snippets.
While many other researchers have addressed aspects of data confidentiality, none of
their schemes are intended for an environment with many dynamic collaboration groups.
For example, researchers have suggested ways to search encrypted text or tables stored on
a remote untrusted server (e.g., [BCOP04, cCM05, HILM02, SWP00]). In a situation with
many collaboration groups with dynamically changing membership, these approaches are
not easy to use or manage. Document owners and/or project group managers must generate
and distribute keying material for all group members, so that they can encrypt keywords
and decrypt search results. If a key is lost, stolen, or even published, the index entries
encrypted with it are compromised. When a key is compromised or a member leaves a
group, the key must be revoked and all the content associated with that key must be re-
encrypted and re-indexed. Modern group key management schemes, such as logical key
trees [CLK04] and broadcast encryption, reduce the costs associated with giving keys to
members, but still require content re-encryption. Some approaches also require that the
entire index for a particular collection of documents be regenerated by the collection owner
every time an entry is added to or deleted from the index.
Our approach ZERBER proposed in Chapter 3 does not use keys. Distributed indexes
such as Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs) are popular for P2P networks [BMT+05]. ZER-
BER distributes complete instances of an encrypted index to multiple servers for security
reasons, while in DHTs each peer typically stores only a fraction of the index. An applica-
2.4 Image Classification Using Machine Learning 23
tion of r-confidential indexing to a DHT-based infrastructure was also considered in our
research [ZPD14].
2.4.6 Data Encryption
Encryption is a most natural technique to secure data. It is a transformation of the input
data (plain text) into encrypted form (chiffre) using a key, such that original contents can
not be directly recovered without the knowledge of the key. More formally:
plaintext = dec(enc(plaintext, key), key),
where enc and dec are encoding and decoding methods, respectively.
Both, plain text and chiffre are basically byte arrays and so is also the key. There
is a large number of encryption techniques varying in terms of strength (the more effort is
needed to recover the plain text, the stronger is the technique) and efficiency. Generally, the
key is not always needed and strength of the technique can be concentrated in the method
alone, but common assumption is that it is improbable that the method can be kept secret
for a long time. Usually, the method can be made public and security should rely alone in
the knowledge of the key.
Although, strong encryption techniques and secure key exchange algorithm have been
well developed for texts, they can not always hold their security properties on (semi-
)structured data such as inverted indexes (we will discuss this issue in Chapter 3) and
database tables.
2.4.7 Data Anonymization
Companies and institutions, where a large amount of data is produced, often do not have
enough expertise or resources to process, mine and analyse this data. Similarly, centralized
inverted indexes (that can be considered as a subset of the data, required to navigate through
the whole corpora) for big datasets can be typically located on external servers that are
optimized for the Information Retrieval tasks. (This is also the case for the popular search
engines). However, outsourcing of datasets containing sensitive information is not possible
in such cases. The IT area of information outsourcing is dealing with the problem of data
anonymization, transforming the data into a form, where desired analytics are possible, but
neither relations to concrete persons can be identified, nor other sensitive information is
contained in its clear form.
A naive solution for data anonymization in these scenarios would be encryption of the
sensitive attributes and person names in the outsourced dataset. For structured data, such
as a set of database records with person specific data, even encryption of the plain names
of the persons is not always sufficient to prevent their re-identification. This problem is
tackled in the area of information outsourcing. Each tuple in a relational database has (to
some extend) recognizable signature in terms of its attribute combination and their values.
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Encryption of those values does not not always help as sometimes even a presence of an
attribute value leaks information about the person. Furthermore, encryption can make the
data unusable for further analytics.
To deal with this problem, the notions of k-anonymity was introduced [BA05, LDR06,
MKGV07]. The idea is to make each record in the database indistinguishable from at
least k-other records in the same set using suppression - selective removal of attributes
and generalization - binning ranges for attributes (e.g. age, location), and generalization
of user categories (e.g. occupation of users, type of diseases). Such anonymized dataset
keeps general properties and blurring the details that are not important for the analytics at
the same time. Each of the clusters obtained this way is called an equivalence class.
l-diversity additionally strengths the k-anonymity defining that at least l values of a
sensitive attribute in each equivalence class of should not be identical, more specifically,
ensuring that the most common value does not appear too often and less common values
are not appearing too infrequently in the batch. t-closeness additionally generalizes this
notion by ensuring that the distribution of the values in each equivalence class does not
vary more than a threshold t.
In Chapter 3 we propose a posting list merging techniques, where each merged list can
be seen as an equivalence class.
2.4.8 Document Sensitivity and Access Policies
Document sensitivity There are several works studying user privacy attitudes in social
networks, privacy decisions upon sharing multimedia resources, and possible risks. In their
early work [GA05], Gross and Aquisti studied privacy settings in a large set of Facebook
users, and identify privacy implications and possible risks. Lange [Lan08] studied user
behavior with respect to revealing personal information in video sharing. In [SH10] photo-
sharing habits of young people in Germany have been analyzed. All of these papers point
out lack of user awareness regarding the exposure of the aggregated contextual information
arising from users’ resource sharing habits.
In Chapter 5, we provide a way to automatically identify privacy-relevant content of
images to increase user awareness and support privacy-related decisions.
Access policies There is a plethora of work dealing with the problem of establishing
suitable access policies and mechanisms in social web environments. Caminati and Fer-
rari [CF08], for example, proposed collaborative privacy policies as well as techniques for
enforcing these policies using cryptographic protocols and certificates. Felt and Evans [FE08]
suggested to limit access to parts of the social graph and to certain user attributes. Squic-
ciarini et al. [SSP09] introduced privacy mechanisms in social web environments where
the resources might be owned by several users. In [AGS09], the authors discussed the
problem of defining fine-grained access control policies based on tags and linked data. The
user can, for instance, create a policy to specify that photos annotated with specific tags
like “party” can only be accessed by the friends specified in the user’s Friend-of-a-Friend
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(FOAF) profile. In this work, we do not focus on access mechanisms or policies. Instead,
we concentrate on the automatic identification of private resources (more specifically, pho-
tos) and on privacy-oriented search. Vyas et al. [VSCY09] utilized social annotations (i.e.
tags) to predict privacy preferences of individual users and automatically derive personal-
ized policies for shared content. These policies are derived based on a semantic analysis
of tags, similarity of users in groups, and a manually defined privacy profile of the user.
Ahern et al. [AEG+07] studied the effectiveness of tags as well as location information
for predicting privacy settings of photos. To this extent, tags are manually classified into
several categories such as Person, Location, Place, Object, Event, and Activity.
In comparison to the existing works, our approach presented in Chapter 5 does not
require manual steps, and, in addition, makes use of the image content, which allows us to
utilize visual features to determine adequate privacy settings even for resources that do not
have any associated tags.
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Privacy Preserving Content Indexing and Retrieval
In this chapter we target Problem 1 of supporting efficient indexing and top-k retrieval
for sensitive unstructured documents shared within collaboration groups. These groups
can reside within a large enterprise, or may even span multiple enterprises, so there is no
central authority that all members trust with the content of their documents. Nevertheless,
members are willing to trust the enterprise’s authentication facilities. Such environments
are common in large companies, large universities, and large government groups.
3.1 Contributions
The contributions presented in this chapter address Problem 1 and cover multiple aspects
of privacy-preserving indexing and retrieval, as follows:
i First, we propose r-confidentiality as a measure of the degree of information that can
leak from an index about inaccessible documents, given an adversary’s background
knowledge of the corpus or language statistics.
ii Second, we propose ZERBER 1, an r-confidential global inverted index for sensitive
documents. ZERBER relies on a centralized set of largely untrusted index servers
that hold posting list elements encrypted with a k out of n secret sharing scheme
[Sha79], which provides complete resistance against inappropriate information dis-
closure regarding pre-existing documents even if k-1 index servers are compromised.
To provide tunable resistance to statistical attacks, ZERBER employs a novel term
merging scheme that has minimal impact on index lookup costs. ZERBER guaran-
tees freshness of shared documents at low cost, makes economical use of network
bandwidth, requires no key management, and answers most of the queries almost as
fast as an ordinary inverted index.
1A mythical three-headed watchdog.
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iii Third, for effective and efficient retrieval of the top-k documents most relevant to a
given query from an r-confidential global inverted index, we further enhance our ini-
tial ZERBER approach and present ZERBER+R , a novel ranking model which mini-
mizes information leakage by top-k retrieval from a confidential outsourced inverted
index by supporting sorted indexes which do not exhibit additional information to
a potential adversary. We propose a novel relevance score transformation function,
RSTF for short, a heuristic which hides term specific distribution of relevance score
values, making scores of different terms indistinguishable. This heuristic enables
inclusion of (transformed) relevance scores in the posting elements on an untrusted
server to allow the server answering top-k queries efficiently.
iv Finally, we demonstrate retrieval effectiveness and efficiency of ZERBER and ZER-
BER+R on two real-world datasets.
3.2 The Ideal Solution
The content of the shared documents evolves over time, as does the group membership.
Groups come and go relatively quickly, as projects start and finish. As each person can
only accomplish a certain amount of work, in practice she will belong to a limited number
of collaboration groups.
Given a keyword query, the ideal indexing scheme’s answer will be identical to that of
a trusted centralized ordinary inverted index that incorporates an access control list check
on the ranked document list just before returning it to the user. In general there is a trade-
off between retrieval effectiveness of the index and confidentiality it can provide. On the
one hand in order to effectively answer a query, an index server requires possibly complete
ranking information enclosed in its posting elements. On the other hand this information
gives undesirable insights into the content of the indexed documents. The ideal system
should enable the user to control such trade-off through some tunable parameter. The ideal
indexing scheme will answer queries and handle updates as fast as an ordinary inverted
index, and with no greater network bandwidth or storage usage. Changes in group mem-
bership will be immediately reflected in the query answers of the ideal indexing scheme.
The ideal indexing scheme will impose no management burden on group members, beyond
the requirement that the group coordinator maintain a list of the identities of the people in
the group, the group members know how to authenticate to those identities, and the group
members have trusted desktop or local web servers where they can upload their sensitive
content into appropriate access-controlled directories and have a daemon automatically en-
sure that the corresponding index updates are carried out quickly. If the server or servers
containing the ideal scheme’s index are compromised, no information about the content of
the documents should be revealed. No user or superuser on a non-trusted machine should
be able to obtain any information about the content of sensitive indexed documents that
they are not authorized to access.
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The ideal indexing scheme will be unattainable in practice, but we can quantify the
degree to which any proposed approach falls short. We can also provide schemes that
provide tunable trade-offs between the confidentiality guarantees provided by the index
and its query and update processing overhead.
3.3 Scenario
PCC (Production Control Company) creates adaptive solutions for production process con-
trolling in manufactures. These solutions include special soft and hardware which is adapted
according to the needs of every specific customer. A lot of electronic documents such as
project and scientific documentation, stuff management, e-mail correspondence, presen-
tations, collaborative documents and others have to be shared among the partners in the
specific projects of PCC.
John is a leader of several projects within PCC. Each project corresponds to a customer
manufacture. In order to always obtain up-to-date documents for his projects and share
appropriate information with team members of a specific project, John requires a privacy-
preserving centralized sharing and search facility. Because of the very sensitive nature of
shared data, the advisory board of PCC decides to use ZERBER as the indexing system.
ZERBER supports selectively sharing of access-controlled documents and delivers precise
search results and at the same time preserves the r-confidentiality of the shared data.
As John has access to a huge number of documents, he is not interested in obtaining
all the documents containing query terms, but rather a few documents most relevant to the
query. An ordinary search engine can pre-select such documents using relevance score
values attached to each posting element. However, these scores are calculated based on
sensitive statistical information such as e.g. term frequency. A term frequency distribution
is sufficient to characterize the subject matter of a lengthy document, and the likely content
of a short email, giving adversary insights in the content of the indexed documents. To
avoid this problem ZERBER stores encrypted relevance values in the posting elements and
returns references to all the documents matching a query, such that only an authorized user
can decrypt and rank posting elements on the client side.
Due to the nature of his job John has to travel a lot and uses ZERBER search interface
with help of a PDA and GPRS internet connection. As this kind of connection is very
slow the data volume transmitted over it needs to be minimized. To reduce data transfer
the server needs some means to identify the best documents that match Johns’ query and
return only the best top-k search results.
In the following, we show how to construct a server-side index which supports top-k
retrieval while preserving the given confidentiality guarantees.
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3.4 Threat Models
In this section we first discuss possible attacks on the inverted index. Then, we discuss
additional attacks that can become possible if the index structure provides additional infor-
mation to support top-k retrieval.
3.4.1 Attacks on the Inverted Index
To give a sense of the set of potential dangers, consider the following three goals of a
potential attack on an index.
A1. Reconstruct the exact content or the term frequencies of an inaccessible document.
Exact reconstruction is clearly undesirable. The term frequency distribution, i.e., the num-
ber of occurrences of each term in the document, is sufficient to characterize the subject
matter of a lengthy document, and the likely content of a short email.
A2. Determine the aggregate term/document frequencies for the set of inaccessible doc-
uments at a participating site.
The document frequency is the number of documents at a site that contain a particular term.
In an ordinary inverted index, the length of a term’s posting list is its (global) document
frequency. These frequency distributions will often suffice to characterize the nature of
a project that the site’s owner is participating in. For example, one might be able to tell
that the CEO is considering a buyout offer from a particular suitor, or tell what solution
approach the smartest project group in a course has adopted. Document frequencies can
also tell an industrial spy which compounds are used in the development of a new chemical
process [BC05].
A3. Determine whether a particular term appears in a particular inaccessible document at
a particular site, or at any indexed site.
For example, curious employees may want to know whether Mildred Hesselhofer of IBM
is a finalist for the CEO job at HP. Rare terms like “Hesselhofer” especially need this
protection.
The conflicting interests of enterprise project groups make it hard for them to trust a
centralized corporate index server. Even with a distributed index, an attacker Alice will
already have some background knowledge about the possible contents of a document col-
lection. We will restrict Alice’s ability to increase this knowledge, even if she takes over an
index server and can examine the contents of that server. More formally, we will bound the
ability of an adversary to make probabilistic claims about the contents of a document
collection. From her background knowledge B and the parts of the index structure I that
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she can access, Alice will know a-priory that a term t is contained in document d with a
probability P(t is in d). For example, for a set of emails, B should include P(“Subject” is
in d) = 1, for all d and I. We cannot control the probability estimate P(X|B) about fact X
that Alice can make based on B, but we can limit her ability to refine that estimate when
she computes P(X|I,B). In the remainder of the chapter, we will consider only facts X of the
form “term t is in document d" and “term t is not in document d”.
Definition 3.1 (r-Confidential Indexing Scheme) An indexing scheme is r-confidential iff
P (X|B, I)
P (X|B) ≤ r. (3.1)
Here, r is the factor of maximal probability amplification for term t in d given I. In other
words, P(t is/is not in d | B) ≤ α implies P(t is/is not in d | B, I) ≤ r ∗ α. The indexing
scheme offers maximal protection when P(X|B) = P(X|I,B), i.e., I does not provide any
additional knowledge about X. r-Confidentiality focuses on document content confidential-
ity. In addition, secure communication channels such as https should be used to provide
confidentially for the content of queries and updates. If no one should be able to tell that a
particular user sent a request to an index server, we recommend the use of MIX networks
and other standard techniques from network security that foil traffic analysis attacks. An
attacker could compromise a non-index site so that it, for example, gives query results
or actual documents to unauthorized parties. Such attacks should be guarded against using
standard techniques, and we do not consider them further, as our goal is to secure the index.
To execute a keyword query, the user first authenticates herself to an index server and
supplies the query terms to the server as well as k - the desired number of the top-k docu-
ments. The index server determines users’ access rights, identifies posting list containing
query terms and returns the highest ranked elements from the requested list.
3.4.2 Additional Attacks on the Index for Top-k Retrieval
In order to enable the server to identify the top-k elements relevance scores of each posting
element must be visible to the index server. This additional knowledge can compromise
confidentiality of the index. Specifically, we want to bound the ability of an adversary to
perform the following attacks:
A4. Identify terms represented by the posting elements by analyzing relevance score val-
ues stored in the index. Posting List ID Posting Elements.
An adversary Alice could use relevance score distribution statistics to extract specific fea-
tures like score ranges, or score distribution patterns for each particular term. Alice could
compare extracted features with the relevance score distribution in the posting lists to find
correlations. If the terms are encrypted Alice could use these statistics to break the encryp-
tion. In a merged index, in case a simple term frequency based scoring function is used,
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she could claim that “frequent terms are more probably located in the head of the merged
posting list” and even undo the posting list merging.
A5. Determine query terms of other users by observing queries and query results.
In case of a merged ordered posting list, the number of requests required for obtaining top-
k elements for a rare or a frequent term may differ. Alice can also know the k-value which
is requested by the client application. As document frequency is term specific, Alice could
guess the term by observing the number of follow-up requests required to fill the top-k
results.
To guard against these attacks ZERBER+R proposes novel techniques making rele-
vance scores and number of follow-up requests for different terms indistinguishable for the
server while preserving retrieval accuracy of server-side top-k processing.
3.5 ZERBER Design
ZERBER is an r-confidential inverted index that incorporates secret splitting and term
merging. After a quick overview of the reasons for these choices, we discuss each feature
in detail.
As mentioned earlier, encryption is the classic way to protect information on an un-
trusted server, but has significant drawbacks with respect to key compromise, revocation,
and manageability. We avoid the need to distribute any keys to group members by applying
a k out of n secret sharing scheme [Sha79] to posting list entries. Each entry is divided into
n shares, such that any k of the shares can be used to reconstruct the entry, and one share is
given to each of the n index servers. Each non-compromised index server authenticates the
user and ensures she belongs to the right group, before giving her an element in response to
her query. Even if an index is designed and implemented perfectly, the platform it resides
upon is still vulnerable to compromise; one can bribe the sysadmin, measure radiation, take
over root, etc. If one server is compromised, its secret shares do not provide enough infor-
mation to decrypt any element-k secret shares from k different servers are required. Thus,
at least k servers must authorize a user before she can decrypt any posting list element.
Each index server should be owned and managed by a different part of the enterprise.
With this setup, no person in the enterprise can decrypt an index entry she is not authorized
to see, unless she can find colluders from k-1 other factions, or compromise that many
index servers. In other words, at least k index servers must be compromised to decrypt an
index entry that should remain inaccessible. This minimizes the amount of trust that project
groups must place in the n “centralized” index servers.
The n server boxes can provide extra resilience to attack by running only the index and
no other services; providing only a narrow interface to the outside world (i.e., only insert,
delete, and look up posting list elements); and using different hardware, operating systems,
and systems software versions. Without this diversity, a successful attack on the underlying
platform of one server may succeed against all n servers.
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Algorithm 1: Compute k-out-of-n Secret Shares
Input: posting element a0, prime p
Output: Encrypt a posting element (run by the document owner)
begin
1. Select random coefficients a1, . . . , ak−1 ∈ Zp
2. Create a polynomial of degree k-1, e.g.,
f(x) = ak−1xk−1 + . . .+ a0 mod p, where a0 is the secret
3. Take the xi-coordinate of each of the n servers, xi ∈ Zp
4. For each xi compute yi = f(xi)
5. Send the resulting yi-coordinate to server i
3.5.1 Encryption of Posting Elements
Each posting list element in ZERBER is encrypted using Shamir’s k out of n secret sharing
scheme [Sha79]. According to this scheme, all the operations described later in this section
are carried out in the finite field Zp. The secret splitting algorithm starts by choosing a
large prime number p, such that any element (secret) to be shared is in Zp. In addition,
each server i is assigned a unique random value xi in Zp. We call this the x-coordinate of
the server. These numbers p and xi are made public, so all users know them.
To index a document, its owner first parses the document and computes its elements.
For each element a0 (viewed as an integer), she generates a pseudo-random polynomial f
of degree k-1 of the form f(x) = ak−1xk−1 + ...+a0 mod p, with coefficients ai (except a0)
randomly picked from field Zp. The number of random bits required for each coefficient is
the number of bits in a0. The secret share given to the ith server is f(xi). k such shares are
enough to reconstruct the polynomial. The encryption procedure is outlined in Algorithm 1.
The owner repeats this process to split all the elements for the document across the
n servers. She also tells the servers who can access this document. Algorithm1 has a
computational complexity ofO(nN), where n is the number of servers and N is the number
of distinct terms in the document. For example, creation of the secret shares for one server
for a document with 5,000 distinct terms requires only 33 msec on the platform described
in Section 3.9.4.
To decrypt an element, a user must obtain k of its secret shares and determine the
coefficients of the polynomial f by solving a system of k linear equations. This is presented
in Algorithm 2.
The k linear equations can be solved inO(k3) time with Gaussian elimination methods,
which is affordable given that k is quite small in practice. For instance, on the platform
described in Section 3.9.4, we can decrypt 700 elements in 1 msec on average.
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme allows dynamic extension of the number n of servers
without recalculating the existing secret shares, by just selecting additional points on the
polynomial curve. Moreover, if an adversary learns some of the shares, proactive sharing
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Algorithm 2: Compute Secret from k Shares
Output: Decrypt a Posting Element (performed by the querying user)
begin
1. Gather at least k shares of the element from any of the n servers
2. Recover a0 by solving the following system of k linear equations:
yi = ak−1xk−1i + . . .+ a0 mod p, i ∈ [1, k]
techniques can be used to prevent the adversary from getting k shares [HJKY95]. With this
technique, the shares are updated so that those she already knows become useless.
Just splitting the elements across n servers does not secure the documents against all the
threats discussed above. For example, the number of elements in a term’s posting list
is its document frequency. Exploiting this, the adversary can learn about the presence
(and even the exact number) of documents containing sensitive terms. The server cannot
obfuscate the mapping of terms to posting lists on its own, as an adversary who takes
over a server will be able to learn the mapping. Document owners could encrypt all terms
before building posting elements for them; but then the other group members must know
the encryption/decryption function, and we have already said that we want to free users
from key management and from re-encrypting documents as groups shrink. Fortunately,
there is a better way to increase security.
Figure 3.1 Merged and Unmerged Unencrypted Posting Lists
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3.5.2 ZERBER Merged Posting Lists
To prevent the adversary on a compromised index server from learning a term t’s docu-
ment frequencies, we combine t’s posting list with the posting lists for several other terms,
as shown in Figure 3.1 for an unencrypted posting list (term frequencies are not shown).
An additional encoding is stored with each element to identify the term for that element.
This encoding is encrypted along with the document ID and term frequency TF, using the k
out of n secret sharing scheme described in Section 3.5.1. An unencrypted element hence
contains three fields:
secret = [documentID, termID,TF ]
With this scheme, the adversary on a compromised index server only sees the combined
posting list length of the merged terms and cannot determine an individual term’s document
frequencies. Further, the elements for a document are encrypted separately, so the adversary
cannot determine which elements correspond to the same document. We formally analyze
this below. Suppose the posting elements of terms t1, . . . , tn have been merged into one list.
Upon examining an element in the merged list, an adversary can deduce only the following:
• Some document contains one of the terms t1, . . . , tn.
• That same document can be read by users u1, . . . , un.
Although the adversary cannot determine the exact term in an element, she can make prob-
abilistic claims about it using her background knowledge, e.g., general language statistics.
The probability pt of occurrence of a term t in the document corpus D is represented by
its normalized document frequency:
Pt = nd(t)/
∑
ti∈D
nd(ti), (3.2)
where nd(t) is the number of documents in D containing term t. The probability of
the posting element containing a particular term tu, given that it is one of the terms in the
set S = t1,...,tn , is the ratio of the normalized frequency of that term to the sum of the
normalized frequencies of all the terms in the set S:
ptu/
∑
ti∈D
pti . (3.3)
For a scheme to be r-confidential, this probability should not exceed r times the probability
of tu occurring in a document according to the adversary’s background knowledge:
∀tu ∈ S : (ptu/
∑
ti∈D
pti) ≤ r ∗ ptu . (3.4)
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Intuitively, r measures the additional information the adversary can extract from the in-
dex, beyond her background knowledge. Thus, for the merging scheme to be r-confidential,
we must have: ∑
ti∈D
pti ≥ 1/r. (3.5)
The r-confidentiality definition also encompasses the ability of the adversary to make
claims about the absence of a term tu in a document. Given an element for a merged set
of terms S, the probability that it is not an element for term t ∈ S is 1 − (ptu/
∑
ti∈S Pti).
This probability is smaller than the original probability 1 − ptu in the document corpus.
Hence our objective is to find a merging strategy that satisfies Formula 3.5 and minimizes
the expected query cost. In Section 3.5.3 we present several merging strategies that trade
off between the degree of confidentiality r and the index size. Note that in the remainder of
the chapter, all posting lists are merged.
3.5.3 Merging Heuristics
This section explores posting list merging heuristics that limit query processing costs while
preserving r-confidentiality.
Suppose that all the posting lists are merged into M lists L1, . . . , LM . The total work-
load cost Q for a set of queries is:
Q =∼=
∑
Li∈M
[length(Li)× (
∑
j∈Li
qj)], (3.6)
where qj is the query frequency of term j, and length(Lj) is the number of elements
in the merged posting list Li. An efficient posting list merging heuristic must satisfy the
r-constraint and minimize the expected workload cost. In other words, the optimization
problem is to choose M lists such that Q is minimal and the r-confidentiality constraint on
each list is satisfied. This problem can be shown to be NP-complete by reduction from the
minimum sum of squares [CK97]. Thus we look for merging heuristics that are good in
practice.
We first consider a uniform term probability distribution. It can be shown that the r
(confidentiality) value in this case is equal to the number of merged posting lists. For ex-
ample, if all terms are merged into one posting list, then r = 1 and no information about
the keywords’ document frequencies can be extracted from the index, beyond the adver-
sary’s background knowledge B. With two posting lists, r = 2 and we have half as much
confidentiality.
In general, an index I with M posting lists increases the P(DocumentFreq = DF | B,I)
probability by a factor of M.
The document frequency distribution in real documents is usually Zipfian, as in Fig-
ure 3.13. This suggests two strategies for merging. Given an r-value, we can merge terms
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into posting lists so as to minimize Q while maintaining r-confidentiality. Or, given a max-
imum value for M (the number of merged posting lists), we can try to maximize r. We
consider three such approaches.
During merging, we create a publicly available mapping table that maps a term to the
ID of its posting list. The three algorithms differ in the way this table is initialized. All the
algorithms base merging decisions on keywords’ document frequencies. Though basing
merging decisions on query term frequencies is more effective at reducing the total work-
load cost [MKGV07], use of query frequencies would violate our confidentiality goals.
Figure 3.2 Mapping Table Construction for Posting List Merging
Depth First Merging (DFM)
DFM assigns the most frequent terms to separate posting lists, using a predetermined value
of M (the number of merged posting lists) as the table size (see Figure 3.2). This exploits
the fact that frequently occurring terms are also queried more often. DFM fills the cells of
the table from top to bottom with terms sorted by document frequency in rounds until the
r-condition in each cell is satisfied. Algorithm 3 gives the DFM procedure.
Breadth First Merging (BFM)
The Breadth First Merging heuristic (Algorithm 4) sorts terms on document frequency,
then assigns successive terms to the first posting list until the r-condition is met. Then
BFM moves to the second posting list, and so on until all terms are assigned to a list. BFM
does not require us to predetermine M.
Uniform Distribution Merging (UDM)
UDM is a variation on DFM in which terms are assigned to lists in rounds as in Algorithm 3,
but without considering the resulting accumulated probability value. Once all terms are
assigned to posting lists, we calculate the resulting confidentiality value as:
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Algorithm 3: Depth First Merging
Output: Depth First Merge of Posting Lists (terms [], M, r)
begin
1. Calculate probability pt for each term t in terms, the array of all terms
2. Sort terms into descending order, based on pt
3. Set the number of posting lists to M, and mark all of them as unfilled
4. while some term is not yet assigned to a posting list
5. go to the next posting list that is not marked as filled
6. if sum of the pt of terms assigned to this list exceeds 1/r
7. then mark the posting list as filled and go to the next list
8. else assign term t to this posting list
Algorithm 4: Breadth First Merging
Output: Breadth First Merge of Posting Lists (terms [], r)
begin
1. Calculate probability pt of each term t in terms (the array of all terms)
2. Sort terms into descending order, based on pt
3. while more terms need to be assigned to a posting list
4. create a new empty posting list 5. while more terms need to be
assigned and the sum of the pt of terms assigned to this posting list is less than
1/r 6. assign the next term to this posting list 7. if the r-condition is not
satisfied for the last posting list
// there are not enough terms left to reach a good r-value for this list
8. then delete the last posting list and randomly distribute its terms among the
other posting lists.
1/r = minL∈M(
∑
u∈L
Ptu), (3.7)
where M is the number of posting lists in the mapping table. DFM and UDM allow
us to create an index with a predetermined number of posting lists, and compute the final
confidentiality value after merging. BFM allows us to specify the confidentiality value, but
the resulting number of posting lists is unknown until the merging is finished. We compare
the query workload efficiency achieved by different merging heuristics in Section 3.9.6.
Additional Hash-Based Merging
An adversary can inspect the mapping table and see whether a term is not included in any
indexed site. Also, if a rare term is subsequently added to the mapping table, an adversary
who has taken over a server can see which site requested the term’s inclusion. To avoid
this, we use hash-based merging for rare terms that do not significantly change the total
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probability mass for a specific posting list. We consider a term rare if its original probability
was below a certain cut-off threshold.
Hash-based merging works by assigning rare terms to posting lists using a public hash
function, so that rare terms never appear in the mapping table. Therefore by inspecting
the mapping table an adversary cannot find out whether a rare term appears at any indexed
site or not. As the index does not contain any empty posting lists after its start-up period,
an adversary cannot use emptiness of a posting list to check whether terms appear at any
indexed site. Hash-based merging is also used to distribute the new terms randomly over
the index.
3.6 Enabling Top-k Retrieval from an r-Confidential In-
dex
In order to allow for efficient top-k retrieval and to support index updates in a collaborative
environment, relevance score needs to be included in each posting element in a way the
index server can access. In this section we provide a definition for scoring function, and
discuss its factors relevant to confidential ranking.
3.6.1 Problem Statement for Top-k Retrieval from an r-Confidential
Index
ZERBER+R targets the problem of providing confidential top-k retrieval from an out-
sourced inverted index. In the ideal case the server can order posting elements regarding to
their relevance without violating the confidentiality of the index.
In an r-confidential index the probability of a particular element in the posting list
of being related to a specific term is r-bounded. A scoring function will order the terms
according to their relevance and may increase the probability of a specific term being within
particular positions or intervals of the posting list, given the adversary has knowledge of
specific TF distribution as well as the public scoring function.
The ideal indexing scheme restricts an adversaries’ ability to increase her available
knowledge, even if she takes over an index server and can examine the ranking information
of posting elements and the stream of incoming queries and updates. Assuming posting
elements contain relevance scores and they are accessible by the index server, then the el-
ements can be ordered (sorted) by the server in order to retrieve top-k results for a given
query. In the following, we refer to a merged index whose posting elements contain rele-
vance score values as an ordered index. An ordered posting list is a merged posting list in
an ordered index.
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The ordered index offers maximal protection in case relevance score values does not
reveal any additional knowledge about the index content.The ideal ordered index will be
unattainable in practice, but we can identify the factors which have impact on the confiden-
tiality of an ordered index and quantify the degree of their impact.
3.6.2 Relevance Score Function for Top-k Retrieval
Powerful top-k server-side ranking techniques were introduced in the literature [Sin01].
The Vector Space Model is the most widely used model in IR for determining document
relevance within a collection. In this model, a document d is represented as a vector, where
each term is assigned a specific weight indicating the importance of the term in representing
the semantics of the document. Two factors are of importance in the weight assignment:
the normalized term frequency, which is the number of term occurrences in the document
divided by the document length, and the inverse document frequency ( IDF) which repre-
sents the query term selectivity. At the query time the relevance score (rscore hereafter)
of a document d for a query Q is computed using one of the standard techniques. As an
example the computation using TFxIDF technique is performed as follows:
rscore(Q, d) =
∑
q∈Q
(
TFq
|d| − IDFq
)
=
∑
q∈Q
(
TFq
|d| − log
∑
ti∈D nd(ti)
nd(q)
)
, (3.8)
where: TFq is the number of occurrences of the query term q in d, |d| is the document
length measured in terms and nd(t) is the number of documents containing term t. The
term frequency based weighting factor is responsible for the correct ordering of documents
with respect to a single query term. Normalization applied to the term frequency in Equa-
tion 3.8 prevents longer documents from being highly ranked just because of their length.
IDF is responsible for making relevance scores of different terms comparable in case of
multi-term queries. Unfortunately, IDF calculation requires knowledge of collection statis-
tics, such as total number of documents as well as the number of documents containing
particular query term. As the global index contains posting elements with different access
rights, revealing such global IDF in the relevance score leaks critical statistical data about
inaccessible documents [BC05]. Therefore, in ZERBER+R we focus on confidential top-k
query processing for single-term queries. In this case IDF factor is constant and relevance
score calculation can be calculated as:
rscore(q, d) =
TFq
|d| . (3.9)
Results of a single-term query can be accurately ranked based only on the information
contained in a single document using Equation 3.9. Processing of multi-term queries can
then be performed by executing a number of single-term queries.
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3.6.3 Outsourcing Relevance Scores for Top-k Retrieval
A naive approach to provide confidential ranking in an outsourced index would be to ar-
range posting elements in the posting list on the client side before outsourcing them. For
instance, an inserting client could ensure that the most relevant top-k posting elements are
contained in the head of the posting list. However, this approach is not suitable for the
collaboration groups scenario, as the index contains posting elements with different access
rights and therefore cannot be rearranged by a single user. Moreover, the whole process
would need to be repeated whenever the document collection changes, rendering it imprac-
tical in case of frequent index updates.
To allow for top-k retrieval in an ordinary inverted index, relevance scores of posting
elements are made available to the server. However, the scores increase the amount of infor-
mation available to the server and thus decrease confidentiality provided by the outsourced
inverted index, like it will be shown in the Section 3.6.4.
Scoring information is typically term specific and can allow adversary to reverse-engineer
the terms.
In case of probabilistic-based index protection (e.g. [BBAV09]) an index contains a
controlled amount of false positive elements. Adding relevance scores to the posting ele-
ments in this case would require generation of the realistic relevance scores for the false
positive elements to prevent statistical attacks.
Sorting posting elements by their relevance score in a ZERBER ’s merged posting list
(Figure 3.3) may amplify the probability of a particular posting element to be related to
a specific term, violating the r-confidentiality guarantees provided by the index. In the
worst case it may allow an adversary to overcome the merging i.e. to find out which of
the merged terms corresponds to a particular posting element. Consider a merged posting
list containing terms “and” and “imClone”. By sorting posting elements according to their
term frequency, “extended version” would more probably appear in the tail of the list, as
its term frequency is lower for all (or nearly all) documents.
Figure 3.3 Merged Posting Lists sorted by Term Frequency
3.6.4 TF Distribution
Confidential document ranking is a challenging task. On the one hand, encrypting rel-
evance scores to protect them on an untrusted index server does not allow the server to
perform any ranking. On the other hand, if accessible to the index server, the term fre-
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.4 Log-Log Plot of Term Frequency Distributions
(a) (b)
Figure 3.5 Log-Log Plot of Normalized Term Frequency Distributions
quency information required for the computation of relevance scores is term specific, and
therefore can reveal the actual term in an index even if the term itself is encrypted, hence
breaking confidentiality guarantees provided by the index.
Term frequency distribution among the documents in a collection follows a power law
distribution (as shown by a log-log plot). Figure 3.4 shows the term frequency distributions
for a frequent term (in German language) “nicht” and a less frequent term “management”
in the test collection described in Section 3.9.1.
Terms can be differentiated by slope and value range of their TF distribution. State-of-
the-art IR techniques mostly use term frequency normalized by document length [Sin01]
in order to avoid that large documents are ranked higher simply because they contain more
terms.
Normalized TF represents the frequency fraction of a term in a document, which de-
pends on the document topic, assigning higher ranks to the specific terms. Normalized TF
distributions, as extracted from our study on our test collections (Figure 3.5 illustrates an
example for the aforementioned terms), are not power law but still term specific. An at-
tacker knowing these typical term distribution patterns could derive the indexed terms from
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the TF distribution found in the inverted index.
Since most state-of-the-art IR techniques use normalized TF for ranking [Sin01] our
aim is to store the relevance scores accessible to the untrusted server while hiding the term
specificity of the normalized TF distribution, therefore making posting elements represent-
ing different terms indistinguishable in a merged posting list. At the same time we need to
preserve the relevance order of posting elements in a merged list to allow for top-k retrieval.
3.6.5 Confidentiality Preservation for Top-k Retrieval
Server side top-k processing requires the server to access relevance scores of each post-
ing element. However, as explained before, the distribution of posting elements within a
merged posting list according to their plain relevance scores can reveal the corresponding
term of the posting element (as shown on Figure 3.3). Since the scoring function pre-
sented in Equation 3.9 is monotonic, it is possible to make transformations to such function
without affecting the ranking process as long as the ordering within posting elements rep-
resenting each particular term is preserved. This section introduces the requirements for
building a relevance score transformation function ( RSTF hereafter), which makes rel-
evance score distributions of different terms indistinguishable. Specifically, it uniformly
distributes posting elements representing different terms within the merged posting list
while the order of posting elements related to each single term remains unaffected. This
transformation function assigns a transformed relevance score ( TRS for short) to each
posting element, therefore replacing the original relevance score. To preserve confidential-
ity of the index a posting element related to any term t in an ordered posting list should
have equal probability to obtain a given TRS score.
RSTF has to fulfil the following properties:
• RSTF maps the relevance scores of different terms to a range R, which will be the
same for all RSTFs.
• RSTF uniformly distributes the TRS values over R.
• RSTF preserves the order of the relevance score values.
In the Section 3.7 we propose a heuristic for the construction a RSTF for arbitrary term
independent of its score distribution.
3.7 Design Refinement for Top-k Retrieval in ZERBER+R
Processing in ZERBER+R can be split in two phases: an offline pre-computing phase
performed once at the time of index initialization and an online insertion and query phase.
In the pre-computing phase, ZERBER+R initializes and publishes the RSTF for each term
in the training document set, such that in the online insertion phase this function can be
used by an inserting client. To index a document, its owner extracts the documents’ terms,
builds their elements, encrypts them, calculates TRS values, and sends encrypted posting
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elements to the server along with the IDs of the merged posting list that the new element
belongs to, the documents’ group and the TRS value. The index server authenticates the
user, checks his group membership and accepts the update if appropriate. Finally, the server
inserts posting elements into the specified merged posting list. Upon query the server has
access to the TRS values and can identify the top-k most relevant query answers.
3.7.1 RSTF Construction
We define the target RSTF range to map the relevance score input values (calculated using
Equation 3.9) as R = [a1, a2].
In order to explain our approach, we first consider the case where the input values are
already uniformly distributed over some range [b1, b2]%. In this case RSTF is a straight
line with slope (b1 − b2)/(a1 − a2) and offset -b1, and is a projection of [b1, b2] on R.
For example, Figure 3.6 shows how f(x) = 2.5 ∗ x − 1.25 maps a range [0.5, 0.9] to
[0, 1]. The slope of the projection function is responsible for the scale of the input range in
the output range. Given an input range, the greater the slope of the projection function, the
wider is the output range. Unfortunately, the relevance score distribution in the document
set is not uniform and a linear projection does not change the distribution of the input
relevance score values. To uniformly distribute the input values over the output range, the
slope of the RSTF at each particular point has to reflect the probability density of the
relevance score values at this point, i.e. it should create a wider output range in the more
crowded areas. Thus the probability density function of the relevance score values is a
derivative of the RSTF and respectively the RSTF is an integral over the probability
density function of the relevance score values.
Figure 3.6 Relevance Score Transformation: Linear Projection
The values of the integral over a probability density function are always contained
within the common range [0, 1]. Moreover, an integral is monotonically increasing, which
preserves the ordering of the input values. Thus an RSTF created in this way would
possess the first and third required properties discussed above.
In the following we model the probability density of the relevance score distributions
and compute a RSTF that approximates the relevance score distribution to a uniform
distribution.
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3.7.2 Modelling Relevance Score Distribution for Top-k Retrieval in
ZERBER+R
To model the relevance score distribution, ZERBER+R requires as input a training set of
documents. This set must be a representative sample of the corpus, such that the distribu-
tion of the relevance scores will hold for the whole corpus as well. From the training set
ZERBER+R extracts the relevance scores for each term-document pair. Terms found later,
which were not contained in the training set are assumed to be rare and can therefore be
assigned a random TRS. We base our model on the central limit theorem [Ric01] stat-
ing that the sampling distribution of the sample mean is approximately normal, even if the
distribution of the population from which the sample is taken is not normal.
We consider each relevance score value from the training set to be a sample mean of
the relevance score. The continuous probability density function of the normal distribution
is the Gaussian function. We model the probability distribution of the relevance score
values around each sample mean as a Gaussian curve. We take the sum of the Gaussian
curves over all samples as an approximation of the relevance score distribution for a given
term over the whole document corpus. Thereby we make use of the fact that a probability
density function can be arbitrarily closely approximated by a weighted sum of Gaussian
curves [AS72].
A Gaussian function can be defined by two parameters, location and scale: the mean
(“average”, µ) and variance (standard deviation squared) σ2, respectively. The probability
density of a term t over the whole document corpus given N training points is calculated
as:
f~µ,σ =
1
N
N∑
i=0
(
1
σ
√
2pi
e
(x−µi)2
2σ2
)
, (3.10)
where µi is the ith value from the training set and σ is the scale of the Gaussian function.
A more frequent term results in several training values. In this case the sum of the
Gaussian bells, one for each input value, will reflect the probability distribution over the in-
put interval. The probability of unseen values being in particular region is reflected through
the density of training points in that region.
Figure 3.7 shows the sum of the probability density functions over five input values. The
X-Axis shows the relevance score of a training value. The Y -Axis shows the probability
density. Solid lines represent probability density of each training value. The dashed line
represents the probability density accumulated using several training values.
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Figure 3.7 Probability Distribution from 5 Training Values
3.7.3 Calculating the RSTF
RSTF(x) is an integral of the probability distribution of the input training values within
the range [−∞, x].
Given N training points RSTF(x) can be calculated as:
f~µ,σ =
N∑
i=0
1
σ
√
2pi
∫ x
−∞
e
(u−µi)2
2σ2 du, (3.11)
where x is a relevance score to be transformed, µi is the ith value from the training set, N
is a number of the values in the training set and σ is the scale of the Gaussian function.
Therefore, RSTF(x) represents a projection of the relevance score distribution that
approximates the relevance score distribution into a uniform distribution over the range
[0, 1]. An integral of the Gaussian function within the range [−∞, x] can be estimated with
the standard error function:
1
σ
√
2pi
∫ x
−∞
e−
(u−µ)2
2σ2 du ≈ 1
1 + e−σ(x+µ)
. (3.12)
Thus the RSTF can be calculated as:
RSTF~µ,σ(x) ≈ 1
N
N∑
i=0
[
frac1(1 + e−σ(x+µi))
]
(3.13)
Using training set from our datasets (see Section 3.9.1), Figure 3.8 illustrates an ex-
ample RSTF function for the German term ”Vergütung” (reimbursement). The X-Axis
shows the input relevance score, the Y -Axis illustrates its output TRS value computed us-
ing Equation 3.13.
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Figure 3.8 An Example RSTF Function for the German Term ”Vergütung”
3.7.4 σ Parameter Selection
In order to ensure the uniformness of the TRS distribution on the whole corpus it is needed
to ensure the correct prediction of the relevance score distribution during the RSTF com-
putation. Correctness of the prediction depends on the representativeness of the training set
as well as on the correct σ selection.
The σ parameter represents the scale of the Gaussian function reflecting the generality
of the RSTF. σ is responsible for the learning/memorizing effect. Smaller σ means a
broader Gaussian bell and thus a more general prediction. Higher σ value means a narrower
bell, meaning a less general function which represents the particular training point (also
known as overfitting).
To select an optimal σ value we use the cross-validation technique to measure the uni-
formness of the TRS distribution in a control set. As a basic measurement for uniformness
we compute the variance in the distribution of the TRS values of a particular term in the
control set with respect to a uniform distribution, that is, how far the TRS distribution is
from a uniform distribution.
Figure 3.9 presents the TRS variance in the control set dependent on the σ value.
The X-Axis shows the σ value, the Y -Axis shows the variance within TRS values in the
control set. At first, the TRS values are distributed more uniformly with an increasing σ.
However, after reaching the minimum (an optimal σ), the overfitting effect appears and the
uniformness is destroyed. An optimal σ for a particular term is the infimum of the variance
function. As Figure 3.9 depicts, a good selection of σ provides a variance of smaller than
0.00002 (standard deviation of 0.0044, that is, 0.44% of the range [0, 1]).
The process of cross-validation is time consuming. Finding a method for directly de-
termining an optimal σ value is an interesting direction for future research.
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Figure 3.9 TRS Variance Depending on the Selected σ Parameter
3.8 Using ZERBER and ZERBER+R
In this section, we describe access control, indexing and querying in ZERBER and ZER-
BER+R .
3.8.1 Access Control
To answer user queries, each ZERBER index server enforces access control on its posting
elements. Upon query, the server authenticates the user and determines the groups the
user belongs to. For this purpose, each index server records which users belong to each
group, and which posting elements are accessible to each group. We do not consider this
information sensitive here, given that we can bound the ability of the adversary to extract
document contents from the inverted index. (If this information is sensitive, it can be
blinded and/or stored on a separate server.)
The structure of a ZERBER index server is shown in Figure 3.10. The architecture
supports dynamic changes in group membership. To add or remove a user from a group,
only the table containing the user-group metadata needs to be updated. (The metadata that
controls who can update a group is not shown in Figure 3.10, and that process is outside
the scope of this thesis.).
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Figure 3.10 ZERBER Index Server
3.8.2 Indexing a Document
To index a document, its owner extracts the document’s terms, builds their elements, en-
crypts them with Algorithm 1, gives each one an ID that will be globally unique within its
posting list, and sends an element share to each of the n servers, along with the IDs of the
merged posting list that the new element belongs to, the document’s group, and the element
ID. The index server authenticates the user, checks his group membership and accepts the
update if appropriate. The element IDs help an index recover after failure, and tell users
which shares to merge together.
Index updates in ZERBER can be performed in batches that insert or delete posting
elements for multiple documents. Batching can reduce index freshness2, but also reduces
the average network and disk overhead per update (each append to a posting list incurs
a random I/O). If Alice has compromised an index server, then batching also reduces the
information she gets by watching updates. For example, if Bob inserts into the posting lists
for Martha, P and Ralph, Q, Alice can guess that “Martha” and “Ralph” occur in the same
document (if P and Q are unlikely to occur with the other terms). Inserting elements from
several documents in one batch makes it hard for Alice to guess which terms co-occur. Bob
can also pool his updates with other people’s, or send his through a MIX network, to give
2Delaying index updates for some of the terms in an updated document does not affect document fresh-
ness: only the most recent copy of the document on a site will ever be retrieved.
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himself anonymity and improve index freshness. If the user trusts that no index servers
are compromised, then the indexes can be updated whenever a shared document changes,
rather than in batches.
Batch size, frequency, and other batch parameters can be tuned by each document owner
to trade off security and index freshness, based on the elapsed time since the last batch,
term frequency, vocabulary changes, or query volume [BNST05]. ZERBER runs a client
program at the document owner that tracks local changes and performs only the necessary
updates at the central indexes.
3.8.3 Query Answering using ZERBER
To execute a keyword query, the user first authenticates herself to k or more index servers.
The index servers rely on an enterprisewide authentication service, such as one normally
finds in today’s large enterprises; Kerberos or any other approach to authentication in dis-
tributed systems can be adopted here. The index servers determine her groups by consulting
the group table. This can be done in O(N) time, where N is the number of groups. The
user tells the servers which posting lists she wants (she does not divulge which terms she
is querying), and each server returns a share of each posting element that she is allowed to
access: PL_ID, [{{g_id1, e(doc1, term1, tf1)}, . . . , {g_idj, e(docj, termj, tfj)}], where
PL_ID is a posting list ID; e returns a secret share; and g_idi, doci, termi, and tfi are the
global element ID, document ID, term ID, and term frequency of the ith element, respec-
tively. The document ID must identify both the machine on which the document is hosted
and the document within that machine. Based on the global posting element ID, the client
determines the corresponding element shares from the different servers, decrypts the ele-
ment with Algorithm 2, then filters out false positives, i.e., elements for terms not queried.
The client then ranks the results using any modern document ranking technique [Sin01].
ZERBER uses client-side ranking with personalized collection statistics obtained from
the set of all documents accessible to the user. We use a modification of Fagin’s Threshold
Algorithm [CK97] that lets one obtain the top-k ranked results in time
O(PLLength
QT−1
PLLength ∗K 1QT )
, where PLLength is the length of the posting list and QT is the number of terms in the
query. Search engine results usually include a document ID and also a small portion of the
document content surrounding the query term. Such context information cannot be stored
on the index servers due to security and space concerns. ZERBER clients request snippets
from the peers hosting the top-k documents before presenting the search results to the user.
Finally, the user chooses among the top-k documents and clicks on those that are to be
fetched from the hosting peers. Algorithm 3.1 summarizes query processing in ZERBER .
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Listing 3.1Query Processing in ZERBER
begin func main( )
Server Servers[]:= getAvailableZerberServers();
RankedPostingElements[]:=
User.search(auth_token, query, Servers);
//Display top-k elements
for i:=1 to K begin
url:= toUrl(RankedPostingElements[i]);
snippet:= getSnippet(url);
print snippet+url;
end for
end func
begin class User
//Process user query on the client side
begin func search(query, Servers[])
//PL_IDs: merged posting list IDs to retrieve
PL_IDs[]:=mapQueryTerms(query);
for i:=1 to Servers.length begin
serverAnswers[i]:= Servers[i].
getPostingLists(PL_IDs);
end for
PlainList[]:=decodeShamirsScheme(serverAnswers);
//Remove false positive posting elements
PostingElements[]:=
filterElements(PlainList, query);
return rank(PostingElements);
end func
end class
begin class Server
//Retrieve the posting lists on the server side
begin func getPostingLists(auth_token, PL_IDs)
userID:=authenticateUser(auth_token);
if userID=false, then
return error;
end if
//Select group indexes accessible to the user
GroupIDs[]:=DB.execute
("SELECT groupID FROM groups WHERE userID = "+userID);
//Retrieve accessible parts of requested posting lists
PostingLists[]:=
DB.loadPostingLists(GroupIDs, PL_IDs);
return PostingLists;
end func
end class
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3.8.4 Query Answering using ZERBER+R
To execute a keyword query, the user first authenticates herself to an index server and
tells the server which posting list she wants to query as well as the k-value. The index
server determines users’ access rights and returns a number of highly ranked elements from
the requested list. The client decrypts posting elements and filters out elements for terms
not queried. If the client did not obtain the desired number of elements belonging to the
queried term it sends a follow-up request to the server. Dependent on the response size, the
number of follow-up requests for rare and frequent terms can differ, leaking information
to the adversary. In the following we discuss heuristics reducing the number of follow-up
requests.
Suppose that all the posting lists are merged into M lists L1, . . . , LM .
The total workload cost Q for a set of queries for retrieving the top- k elements can
be calculated as:
Q ∼=
∑
Li∈M
[
N(Li)×
(∑
j∈Li
qj
)]
, (3.14)
where qj is the query frequency of term j, and N(Lj) is the number of elements to be
retrieved from the merged posting list Li.
Posting elements in each merged list are sorted based on their TRS. Following the
uniform distribution, the first position pos1 of the term t in the list can be approximated
as:
pos1(t) ≤ 1
pt
=
∑
ti∈L nd(ti)
nd(t)
, (3.15)
where pt is the probability of term t and nd(t) is the document frequency of the term
t in a merged list L. In order to obtain the top- k elements of the term t the total number
N of elements to be retrieved from the list L is:
N(L) = k · pos1(t) = k
pt
= k
(∑
ti∈L nd(ti)
nd(t)
)
, (3.16)
where nd(t) is the document frequency of the term t in a merged list L. In order to
retrieve the top-k elements from the merged list without knowing which particular term is
queried, the number of retrieved elements should be sufficiently large to include the top-k
elements for all merged terms in the posting list L.
However, this is impractical in case a posting list contains very rare terms. For instance,
for a list with terms for which nd(t)= 1 (term t is contained only in one document), the
whole posting list will be returned in response to the query. Thus we need a heuristic
to determine the query response size that reduces the total workload cost. This heuristic
3.9 Evaluation 53
should minimize the used bandwidth while including the top-k answers in the first response
to most of the received queries.
From query load logs described in Section 3.9.1 we know that the most frequent queries
constitute nearly the whole query workload (Figure 3.12). Thus to reduce the total work-
load cost, the query answering heuristic should provide high efficiency for the most fre-
quent queries. Due to confidentiality concerns we can not use query frequency directly.
However, document frequencies and query frequencies are correlated, though some fre-
quent terms are rarely queried (e.g., “although”) [MHW06]. To provide efficient query
answering for the most frequent queries while reducing the bandwidth, ZERBER+R puts a
bound b on the initial response size, such that only sufficiently frequent terms with proba-
bility pt ∗ b >= 1 are necessarily returned within the first query response. We discuss the
choice of the initial response size in Section 3.9.7.
In case a rare term t with probability pt ∗ b < 1 is requested the user sending the query
might need to issue several follow-up requests to obtain the top-k results. This can give an
adversary the possibility to infer a rare term has been requested, therefore allowing her to
distinguish between two merged terms in case one is frequent and the other rare. In order
to prevent this situation, ZERBER+R makes use of the BFM index (using the Breadth
First Merging of posting lists) described in Section 3.5.3, which ensures that the terms
merged in a posting list have similar frequency distributions. Therefore even if retrieving
top-k results from a merged list containing rare terms could require a number of follow-
up requests, this number will be similar for all terms contained in the list, avoiding that
an adversary is able to infer any additional information. An adversary could also try to
estimate the position of a queried term in the posting list based on the querying behaviour
of the user. ZERBER+R reduces the information leakage in this case by progressively
increasing response size for follow-up requests. Assuming that the user can process at
least the amount of data she already obtained ZERBER+R doubles response size for each
follow-up request until the user is satisfied with the result or obtains the whole list.
3.9 Evaluation
In this section, we discuss ZERBER ’s and ZERBER+R security guarantees and evaluate
their storage requirements, query performance, and network bandwidth usage compared
with an ordinary inverted index, using a real-world web search query log. We also evaluate
the effectiveness of the proposed merging heuristics.
3.9.1 Experimental Setup
This section provides details about our documents and workload. We used two datasets,
from the Stud IP Learning Management System and Open Directory Project crawl data.
We used a web search engine query log as the workload, computed as follows. The time to
scan a posting list is the sum of the seek time (to position the disk head at the start of the
posting list) and the transfer time (the time to read the posting list). The total seek time for
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a given query workload is a constant, independent of the merging heuristic. The transfer
time for a posting list is proportional to its length. Equation 3.6 is the sum of the posting
list lengths, weighted by their query frequencies. Thus the total transfer time (and hence
the total workload cost, since the seek time is constant) is proportional to Equation 3.6,
which we use as the workload cost in the experiments that follow. All experiments ran on
a 2-processor 2.0 GHz Intel CPU T2500 with 2 GB RAM.
Algorithm 5: HierarchyConstruction
input : tables T , ontology o
output: hierarchy of concepts H
begin
establish child relations, set depth
C ←− BottomUp(T , o)
establish parent relations
H ←− TopDown(C)
Stud IP Data
The Stud IP Learning Management System [Stu] allows sharing of access-controlled ma-
terials within groups of students and teachers. We had access to the Stud IP documents
at four universities. Figure 3.11 provides insights into these datasets. For example, the
installation at “University 1” has over 3,300 courses and 6,000 registered students. Most
users belong to at most 20 groups and can access fewer than 200 documents. The amount
of material stored for each course increases uniformly during the semester (Figure 3.11). A
mid-semester snapshot used for our experiments contained 8,500 documents with 570,000
terms. At the time of writing, Stud IP did not provide full-text search capabilities and thus
we did not have an associated query log.
ODP Data
We used a collection from the Open Directory Project (a human edited directory of the
Web) crawled in 2005, with 237,000 documents and 987,700 distinct terms. The crawler’s
strategy was to find pages on a variety of topics [KCN06], such that 100 topics were ran-
domly selected; we used the set of documents on one topic as the set of documents of one
group.
Web Search Engine Query Log
Our query log has 7 million queries and 135,000 distinct query terms. Figure 3.12 shows
the correlation of the query frequency and the corresponding cumulative query workload
(computed using Equation 3.6).
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(a) Documents per Group (b) Document Uploads
(c) Users per Group (d) Documents Accessible per User
Figure 3.11 Statistical Profile of the Stud IP Dataset
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Figure 3.12 Cumulative Query Workload Cost for a Search Engine Query Log
The log-scale X-Axis shows the query terms in decreasing order of frequency. The
most frequent queries constitute nearly the whole query workload. Thus to reduce the total
workload cost, the merging heuristic should provide high efficiency for the most frequent
queries. As explained earlier, confidentiality concerns require us to base merging decisions
on document frequencies rather than query frequencies. These are correlated, though some
frequent terms are rarely queried (e.g., “although”). The X-Axis in Figure 3.12 lists the
terms ordered from most to least popular.
3.9.2 Security Guarantees
If an adversary Alice compromises an index server, she can attempt to amplify her knowl-
edge in many ways. For example, she can issue arbitrary queries and updates and scrutinize
the responses. With ZERBER , she cannot learn anything this way that violates the prin-
ciple of r-confidentiality. If Alice takes over a server, she can learn who sends each new
query/update to that server; to prevent this, one would need to extend ZERBER to include
only opaque user IDs in requests and in the user-group mapping.
Alice can see which posting lists each user queries at her compromised server, and see
the (opaque) answers. We expect that in practice, the posting list query frequencies she
learns will be consistent with her background knowledge. In other words, she will not
be able to use this information to violate r-confidentiality by improving her guesses about
which terms are in each document.
On her compromised server, Alice can see which posting lists are affected by each new
update. By monitoring the sequence of updates, Alice can guess that a set of new posting
elements refers to the same document. This lets Alice make correlation attacks. For ex-
ample, suppose that an email contains terms from posting lists p1 and p2 and that the only
two terms from p1 and p2 that are likely to co-occur are t1 and t2, respectively. Then Alice
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can guess that the email contains these two terms, even though the posting elements are en-
crypted. Thus Alice may be able to violate r-confidentiality for newly created documents,
though in general she cannot be sure of the exact contents of an element. However, Al-
ice cannot violate r-confidentiality for documents committed before she compromised the
server, as she cannot tell which preexisting posting elements refer to the same document.
Alice can collude with others to jointly take over multiple index servers, and pool the
resulting knowledge. If the colluders take over fewer than k servers, they will not be able
to violate r-confidentiality for documents committed before the attack.
In ZERBER+R , Alice can also examine the unencrypted TRS values attached to
the posting elements in an index but ZERBER+R should ensure that she can not learn
anything in order to preserve our concept of r-confidentiality. To achieve maximal security
effectiveness the RSTF needs to distribute the relevance scores of each term from the real
dataset equally well as it is achieved in the training set values. Otherwise, term specific
distribution patterns would be introduced allowing Alice binding posting elements within
specific posting list areas to their corresponding terms with higher probability. In case
the document training set is a representative sample of the corpus and if value is selected
properly, all terms will have equal probability to obtain a given TRS value, such that using
TRS does not introduce any additional attack possibilities. Alice can also observe user
queries and query responses. As discussed in Section 3.8.4 it is impractical to include top-
k results into the initial query response for all possible terms3. Thus for rare terms which
top-k elements are not contained in the initial response Alice could observe an increased
number of follow-up requests and conclude that a rare term has been requested. However,
as a ZERBER+R BFM index contains terms of similar probability inside of a posting list,
the number of requests observed by Alice will not differ for the terms contained in one
merged list, such that r-confidentiality of the index will not be affected. Alice could also
try to estimate a position of such a rare (unknown) term based on the number of returned
posting elements. Thereby growing response size for follow-up requests will reduce the
total number of such requests and introduce an increasing degree of uncertainty in Alices’
claims regarding the position of the (unknown) rare queried term.
3.9.3 Storage Overhead
The number of posting elements that ZERBER maintains per index server is the same as in
any conventional inverted index. However, ZERBER posting elements include additional
fields to identify the term in the merged set and the global element ID, which increases
element size by about 50%. Encryption under Shamir’s k-out-of-n scheme does not change
the element size. Hence, each ZERBER index server uses about 50% more space than an
ordinary inverted index. Since ZERBER replicates the index on n servers, the total index
space required is 1.5n times more than for an ordinary inverted index.
3In this work we focus on a fixed result set size in the initial response to a query. However, we leave
for further work optimizations where this size could vary depending on the frequency of the terms of each
merged posting list.
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Each document server maintains an inverted index (also useful for local search) of its
local shared documents, to support efficient updates. This index includes the global ID of
each element.
To allow for top-k processing an ordinary inverted index typically contains relevance
score information attached to each posting element. ZERBER+R attaches a transformed
relevance score TRS to each posting element, which is sufficient for effective posting ele-
ment ranking on the server side. Thus it does not introduce any storage overhead compared
with an ordinary inverted index.
3.9.4 Network Bandwidth
Insertion and deletion. To index a document, the owner sends its elements to n servers,
so ZERBER uses 1.5n times more network bandwidth for this operation than an ordinary
inverted index does.
Deletion from an ordinary inverted index can be implemented by sending the ID of the
document to be deleted to the index server. ZERBER elements (and hence the document
ID field) are encrypted, so the server cannot determine which posting elements have the
same document ID. To delete a document, its owner must delete each element separately.
The document deletion network cost is thus the same as its insertion cost.
Query processing. ZERBER query processing is performed in two steps: (1) the client
sends the query to k index servers and retrieves the IDs of matching documents, and (2) the
client requests the snippets for the top-k documents from their owners. Step (1) queries k
index servers, requiring k times as much bandwidth as a traditional lookup. Moreover, a
traditional inverted index might return only top-k search results, but ZERBER must return
all of the elements accessible to the user. On the other hand, ZERBER uses no additional
bandwidth to retrieve lower-ranked search results, while traditional inverted indexes do
revisit the server for each page of results.
For our calculations, we assume the following intranet setup: users connect over a 55
Mb/s wireless LAN, while servers use 100 Mb/s LAN connections. We use 2-out-of-3
secret sharing. The document snippets arrive in XML format.
We use a real-world query workload and the Open Directory Project (ODP) data de-
scribed in Section 3.9.1. For our experiments we assume the worst case: the user has
access to all 100 document collections in the ODP data. In this workload, about 2700 el-
ements are returned from the ODP index per query term on average. Assuming that each
posting element is encoded using 64 bits, this is approximately 170 Kb (21.5 KB) per query
term response. The queries in the workload contain on average 2.45 terms, which allows
for execution of up to 35 queries/second per user and about 200 queries/second answered
by each server on average. We expect that the number of queries answered by a server
can be increased in an enterprise setting as users typically belong to a smaller number of
groups (see Section 3.11). On average, each snippet contains about 250 B including XML
formatting, which yields 2.5 KB for the top-10 snippets. Thus average total response size
for the top-10 results is 24 KB.
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In contrast, an initial response of ZERBER+R contains b elements and the total re-
sponse size including follow-up requests required to obtain top- k elements is calculated
using Equation 3.19. We use initial response size b, k=10. In this workload, about 85
posting elements are returned from the ODP index per query term on average. Assuming
that each posting element is encoded using 64 bits, this is approximately 5.3 Kb (0.7 KB)
per query term response. The queries in the workload contain 2.4 terms on average, which
allows a server for the execution of about 750 queries per second. On average, each snip-
pet contains about 250 B including XML formatting, which yields 2.5 KB for the top-10
snippets. Thus average total response size for the top-10 results is 3.5 KB.
In comparison, Google’s response for the top-10 results is about 15 KB, including the
snippets as well as information used for presentation purposes (HTML, CSS, etc.), which
is 1.6 times less than the ZERBER response size. Altavista returns 37 KB and Yahoo re-
turns 59 KB of top-10 results, which are comparable to or bigger than ZERBER . However,
ZERBER ’s element shares are almost random, so standard HTML compression is ineffec-
tive. The compressed responses of Google, Altavista and Yahoo are 3, 2.4 and 1.6 times
smaller than ZERBER responses, respectively. (Of course, a ZERBER response contains
all answers.) The compressed responses of Google, Altavista and Yahoo are comparable
to ZERBER+R responses. Further optimization can be achieved by adding search result
checksums and caching them on the client, as defined in HTTP 1.0.
3.9.5 Selection of the Confidentiality Level r
As described in Section 3.5.3, ZERBER ’s merging heuristics support a trade-off between
query efficiency and confidentiality level r. Whether a particular value for r is appropri-
ate depends on the (typically collection specific) document frequency distribution. In this
section, we examine the choices for r for the test datasets.
We learned the document frequency distribution from the first 30% of the documents
in the two datasets. In ODP this subcollection contained 70,000 documents and 500,000
terms. As document frequencies follow a Zipfian distribution, this should be sufficient
to learn the most frequent terms in the collection. (Terms introduced later should be less
frequent, and we assigned them uniformly to the existing posting lists.) Since the central
indexes contain documents from many collections on a variety of topics, and we did not
remove stop words, the most frequent terms are not specific to any particular collection
and the adversary should already know their occurrence probabilities from her background
knowledge. Under this assumption, the most frequent terms are least in need of the pro-
tection that comes from merging, and our goal is to make it impossible for the adversary
to distinguish elements containing the rarer terms from elements containing more frequent
terms.
We used the term occurrence probability distribution (pt in Equation 3.2) to help us
set target values for r. Figure 3.13 shows pt for the Stud IP and ODP datasets. The X-
Axis shows the terms in descending order of frequency. The horizontal lines show the 1/r
values for 1,024, 2,048, 4,096, and 32,768 posting lists. Both subfigures show that the term
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(a) Web data (b) University data
Figure 3.13 r-Parameter Selection
probability distribution is Zipfian, with the top few percent of terms far more frequent than
others. 10−6 is the smallest value of pt among the 10% most frequent terms. When we
merge posting lists, we would like the aggregate term probability of every merged list to be
at least this big.
From Figure 3.13, we concluded that our test data sets should have at most 32K merged
lists, because with 65K or more lists, the merging heuristics would not be able to attain
our target r-value of 10−6. With 32K merged lists, every term with original probability
pt < 16.09 ∗ 10−6 will reside in a posting list with aggregate term probability exceeding
that of any but the 1.83% most frequent terms. In Figure 3.16a, these protected terms reside
to the right of the intersection of the 32,768 line with the term probability distribution curve,
projected onto the X-Axis. Each term to the left of this point will have a posting list of
its own under BFM and DFM, and each term to the right will be merged with at least one
other term. Methods of choosing a target value for r that adapt to the characteristics of the
document frequency distribution are an interesting direction for future work.
Table 3.1 r-Parameter Value for 3 Merging Heuristics
# of Posting Lists 1/r for BFM, DFM 1/r for UDM
1,024 9.30*10−4 7.86*10−4
2,048 4.45*10−4 3.57*10−4
4,096 2.07*10−4 1.58*10−4
32,786 16.09*10−6 9.60*110−6
We used the DFM and UDM algorithms to create 1K, 2K, 4K, and 32K posting lists,
and then computed the resulting r values using Equation 3.7 for the minimal sum of proba-
bilities accumulated in a merged posting list. We tweaked the input value of r given to the
BFM algorithm so that it would also produce the same number of lists. Table 3.1 presents
the resulting r values for the web dataset. For a given number of posting lists, BFM and
DFM produce the same r value. Table 3.1 shows that UDM offers less confidentiality on
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average (see also Figure 3.15).
Figure 3.14 shows the correlation between r and the number M of merged posting lists
for ODP and BFM/DFM. As M increases, the confidentiality level decreases according to
the Zipfian term probability distribution in the underlying data (see also Figure 3.13).
Figure 3.14 Correlation Between r and M for ODP & BFM/DFM
3.9.6 Comparison of Merging Heuristics
In this section, we analyze the security and the query efficiency provided by the different
merging heuristics with the ODP data. Figure 3.15 shows the amplification r of the original
term occurrence probability with different merging heuristics, for ODP data. To improve
visibility, we show only the top 1000 terms in the 1,024 index. UDM’s curve deviates from
the DFM curve and exceeds its r-value in several places. However, UDM is comparable to
DFM on average, and has the advantage of giving higher confidentiality to very common
terms. DFM and BFM give the top 1.83% of terms their own individual posting lists, but
UDM merges even these most popular terms.
We conducted extensive simulations to evaluate the effects of the merging heuristics
on query efficiency. For each dataset, we merged the posting lists using BFM, DFM, and
UDM for 1,024, 2,048, 4,096 and 32,768 merged posting lists.
Figure 3.16 shows the average ratio of the total workload cost QRatio(t) due to term t in
its merged posting list L, versus the workload cost attributable to t with unmerged posting
lists. The curves in the figures correspond to terms with document frequency DF of 1,
1000, and 3500. The X-Axis gives the number of posting lists in the index, and the Y -Axis
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Figure 3.15 Term Probability Amplification with 1,024 Posting Lists and Differ-
ent Merging Heuristics
shows the workload cost ratio, calculated as:
QRatio(t) =
∑
U∈LDFu ·
∑
u∈L qfu
DFt · qft , (3.17)
where qfx is the query frequency of term x.
Figure 3.16 shows that as expected, merging mostly affects the costs of queries with
rarer terms. Overall, increasing M significantly improves the cost ratios for terms with
low and medium DF. In the 32,768 index with BFM/DFM, queries over terms with high
and medium DF are nearly unaffected by merging. Queries over high-DF terms perform
well already with only 4K lists. UDM query performance for high- and medium-DF terms
is comparable to that of BFM/DFM for 32K posting lists; However, UDM slows down
queries over low-DF terms more than the other schemes do.
Comparing Figures 3.13 and 3.16, we also see that there is a trade-off between the abil-
ity of the index to hide the occurrence of the most frequent terms, and the query processing
overhead.
We calculated the efficiency in query answering QRatioeff introduced by different
merging heuristics as the ratio between the number of posting elements that correspond to
the query term t and the total number of posting elements in its merged list L:
QRatioeff (t) =
DFt∑
u∈LDFu
. (3.18)
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Figure 3.16 Ratios of Workload Cost for BFM, DFM and UDM
Figure 3.17 plots the efficiency in query answering QRatioeff for indexes with 32K
merged posting lists. In this figure, the Y -Axis shows QRatioeff and the X-Axis repre-
sents the query terms in the workload (in %), ordered by QRatioeff .
The best query efficiency distribution among the merging heuristics is attained using
the DFM/BFM index with 32K lists. In that index, the longest running 70% of the queries
in the workload have an efficiency value QRatioeff > 0.96 and the next 10longest-running
queries have QRatioeff = 0.75 on average. The shortest running 20% of the queries have
average QRatioeff = 0.2.
Figure 3.18 plots the response size from the DFM index with 32K lists. The X-Axis
shows the posting lists ordered by the number of elements they contain, and the Y -Axis
shows the total number of posting elements in the posting lists, computed as the sum of
document frequencies of the terms in a merged posting list. Figure 12 shows that only 40%
of the posting lists have a response size exceeding 100 posting elements.
The largest response obtained from the ODP test collection using a DFM-32,768 index
contains 10K posting elements. On the platform described in Section 3.9.1, 700 posting
elements are decrypted in 1 msec on average. Thus only 14.3 msec are needed to decrypt
the search results from one server for this response.
The simulation results described above have shown that BFM and DFM heuristics offer
very reasonable query performance. Our experiments show that the query workload cost
ratio for long and middle-size posting lists in the central indexes can be kept comparable
to a conventional inverted index while providing security guarantees for 98% of the terms
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Figure 3.17 Efficiency in Query Answering for Merged Posting Lists
in the dataset (with 32K posting lists). The remaining 2% of the terms are common words,
which are usually not collection specific (e.g., “remaining”) and do not require protection
in the global index containing documents from a number of collections.
This performance can be achieved without learning query statistics, which is important
for query confidentiality. BFM is more straightforward to implement given an r-parameter
value, as it does not require pre-estimation of the mapping table size.
One of our research questions was the preferable heuristic for posting list merging.
In general, there were no significant differences between the BFM and DFM heuristics.
In contrast, UDM requires increased bandwidth by queries over low-DF terms and slows
down their processing at user peers.
3.9.7 Selection of the Initial Response Size for Top-k Retrieval
As discussed in Section 3.8.4 ZERBER+R increases its response size progressively de-
pending on the number of follow-up requests to a query. The initial response size should
be selected in a way to minimize the number of follow-up requests and the bandwidth
overhead for the majority of the queries in the workload.
We denote the number of posting elements in the first response as initial response size
b and the accumulated number of posting elements in a sequence containing n follow-up
requests as a total response size TRes. Given the number of follow-up requests, the total
response size can be calculated as:
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Figure 3.18 Response Size for the DFM Index with 32K Lists
TRes = b ·
n∑
i=0
22. (3.19)
Figure 3.19 presents an average bandwidth overhead AvBO over the set of queries
Q in the query workload calculated as the ratio between the total response size TRes of
ZERBER+R required in order to obtain the top-k elements and k elements returned by an
ordinary inverted index in response to a top- k query:
(a) (b)
Figure 3.19 Average Bandwidth Overhead of ZERBER+R
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.20 Average Number of Requests for ZERBER+R
AvBO =
∑
q∈Q
(
TRes(q)
k
)
|Q| . (3.20)
The X-Axis of Figure 3.19 show the number of posting elements in the initial query
response. The Y -Axis shows an average bandwidth overhead in both test collections cal-
culated using Equation 3.20 for k=1, 10 and 50.
Figure 3.19 shows that the minimal bandwidth overhead for a top- k query in ZER-
BER+R can be achieved with b=k, i.e. by returning around k elements. Further enlarge-
ment of the initial response size leads to an increased bandwidth overhead.
Figure 3.20 shows an average number of requests required in order to obtain the top- k
elements dependent on the number of elements in the initial response for k=1, 10 and 50
in both test collections. The X-Axis shows the number of elements in the initial response.
The Y -Axis shows an average number of requests required to obtain the top-k elements for
the queries in the workload.
Figure 3.20 also illustrates that with an initial response size of approximately 10 ele-
ments most of the query terms return the top- 10 results within 2 requests (returning 30
posting elements in total). In order to further reduce the number of requests, the initial
response size needs to be significantly increased. However this is not desirable because of
the significant increase in the bandwidth overhead. Thus for our further experiments we
selected k as the preferable initial response size for a top- k query.
3.9.8 Query Performance for Top-k Retrieval
We calculated the efficiency in query answering QRatioeff introduced by different sizes
of the initial response as the ratio between k and the total ZERBER+R response size:
QRatioeff = frackTRes. (3.21)
Figure 3.21 plots the efficiency in query answering QRatioeff for the top- k request
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Figure 3.21 Efficiency in Query Answering for ZERBER+R
with k=10 and the initial response size b=10, 20 and 50 elements in the both test collec-
tions. In this figure, the Y -Axis shows QRatioeff and the X-Axis represents the query
terms in the workload (in %), ordered by QRatioeff .
The best query efficiency distribution for the top-10 request in the both test collections
is attained using the initial response size b=10. In this case around 60% of the longest
running queries in the workload have an efficiency value QRatioeff=1and the next 20%
longest-running queries have QRatioeff=0.2 on average. The shortest running 20% of
the queries have average QRatioeff=0.1. Increasing the initial response size to 20 ele-
ments leads to the significant reduction of QRatioeff for all longest running queries. In this
case around 70% of the longest running queries in the workload have an efficiency value
QRatioeff=0.5 and the shortest running 30% of the queries have average QRatioeff=0.1.
The simulation results described above have shown that initial response size of b=10
offers very reasonable query performance for a top-10 query. Our experiments show that
using ZERBER+R the query workload cost ratio can be kept comparable to a conventional
inverted index for 60% of the queries, while preserving the r-confidentiality of the index.
3.10 Discussion
In this chapter we addressed Problem 1 of privacy-preserving sharing of distributed docu-
ments. In this situation users need an indexing facility where they can quickly locate and
select top-k relevant documents they are allowed to access, without (1) leaking information
about the remaining documents, (2) imposing a large management burden as users, groups,
and documents evolve, or (3) requiring users to trust a central authority.
To address these problems, we proposed a tunable r-confidentiality measure, as the de-
gree of information from inaccessible documents an index can leak, given an adversary
compromises the index and possesses some background knowledge on the corpus and/or
language statistics. We presented ZERBER , an r-confidential global inverted index for sen-
sitive documents. ZERBER relies on a centralized set of largely untrusted index servers
and offers resistance against inappropriate information disclosure even if k-1 index servers
are compromised. To provide tunable resistance to statistical attacks, ZERBER employs a
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novel term merging scheme that has minimal impact on index lookup costs. Our experi-
ments show that ZERBER makes economical use of network bandwidth, requires minimal
key management, and answers queries almost as fast as an ordinary inverted index.
Then, we further enhanced ZERBER and presented ZERBER+R , a ranking model that
enables top-k retrieval from an r-confidential outsourced inverted index. ZERBER+R cre-
ates a relevance score transformation function, which makes relevance scores of different
terms indistinguishable, in a way that even if they are known to an adversary they do not
reveal any information about the indexed data. This enables the server to provide the top-k
results most relevant to a user query. Our experiments on two real-world datasets show
that ZERBER+R makes economical usage of bandwidth and offers Information Retrieval
properties comparable with an ordinary inverted index while preserving the confidentiality
of the indexed data.
So far we did not focus on the access control and the impact of the number of working
groups on the index efficiency. Index partitioning, through clustering according to access
control policies, has a potential to further improve efficiency. Many clustering techniques
require the number of clusters as a parameter. In Chapter 4 we will discuss how the number
of clusters in a dataset can be estimated exploiting a diversity index as well as computation
of such diversity index for large datasets.
4
Scalable Content Diversity Analysis
Generally, inverted indexes have been shown very efficient for locating relevant documents
in large corpora such as the Web. However, this is only true under the assumption that the
searcher has access to all available documents this index is pointing to. In the case of access
control, where the user only can access particular posting elements in a large posting lists,
full scans of those list are required. These unnecessary scans can be avoided through index
partitioning according to the given access control policies. This model has two extremes.
On the one side, there is a single index where for each posting element at query time the
access policy needs to be evaluated in order to include the element into the result set. On the
other side, there are a number of indexes, one for each access control policy. Both examples
have their advantages and drawbacks. In the first case the required storage space and the
maintenance overhead are rather small, the processing overhead at the query time, however,
rather large. Oppositely, in the second case the processing at query time is minimized,
whilst the storage dramatically increases, as the number of partial indexes can be as big as
the number of working groups. Since some of the working groups may overlap in terms
of users and documents, these partial indexes will overlap as well and require additional
maintenance and synchronization. Obviously, an optimum will be somewhere in between.
Index clustering could be a natural solution of the described index partitioning problem
in the access control scenarios with a large number of overlapping user groups. Many
clustering techniques such as k-means [Jai10], k-medoids or the expectation-maximization
algorithm for clustering require the expected number of clusters as a parameter that need to
be estimated efficiently. In this chapter we present novel techniques for efficient diversity
analysis for large document corpora. We are able to show, that the diversity score has direct
relation to the number of clusters in the dataset. This score has a potential to estimate
parameters for index partitioning also with respect to the access control policies.
Diversity has been studied in different disciplines and contexts for decades. The di-
versity of a population can reveal certain cultural properties of a country [Lie69, Fea03],
e.g. with respect to religion, ethnic groups, or political orientations. In the area of ecology,
biodiversity is used as a measure of the health of biological systems [LM03]. Recently,
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diversity also drew the attention of scientists in the database and Information Retrieval
communities. For instance, Vee et al. [VSS+08] use the sum of similarities of all object
pairs to measure diversities of relational records, while Ziegler et al. [ZMKL05] employ
a similar measure for diversifying items in a recommender system. In the area of search
result diversification [GS09, ZMKL05], inter-object similarity is used to obtain a subset of
the most dissimilar results, providing an overview over the result space. However, due to
the quadratic computational complexity, the mentioned approaches are applied on relatively
small sets, limited to the number of life forms in a biosystem, or top-k objects selected in
the context of search result diversification.
4.1 Contributions
In this chapter, we address Problem 2 and focus on analyzing diversity on large-scale doc-
ument collections and in other text corpora as a whole. In order to solve the diversity
computational problem, we propose two novel algorithms which make use of random sam-
pling and Min-wise independent hashing paradigms. More specifically, we propose two
fast approximation algorithms for computing the average pair-wise Jaccard similarity of n
sets with probabilistic accuracy guarantees, coined as SampleDJ and TrackDJ. We discov-
ered that specific properties of the Jaccard coefficient as underlying measure for the pair-
wise similarities required in diversity indexes can make the computation feasible, even
for huge amounts of data. Although there exist a variety of alternative metrics, Jaccard
is still one of the most popular measures in IR due to its simplicity and high applica-
bility [MRS08, BYRN99], and provides intuitive and interesting results in our example
studies.
SampleDJ, which is based on random sampling, solves the problem in O ( 1
RDJ2
) time
independent of the dataset size, where RDJ is the diversity index value to be estimated.
TrackDJ, which is based on Min-wise independent hashing [BCFM00, Bro00b, Bro97,
Bro00a] solves the problem in O(n) time regardless of the input data distribution. Experi-
ments on real-world as well as synthetic data confirm our analytical results. Furthermore,
we show the applicability of our methods in example studies on various data collections.
4.2 Diversity Index Definition
There exists a plethora of methods for computing pair-wise similarities (e.g. cosine similar-
ity, Jaccard coefficient, Okapi BM25, inverted distances, etc.). For diversity computation in
this chapter, we employ the Jaccard coefficient, which is one of the most popular measures
in IR due to its simplicity and high applicability [MRS08, BYRN99]. We will see that
specific properties of this coefficient can make the computation of diversity values feasible
even for large datasets.
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Given two term sets Oi and Oj (e.g. sets of tags for two photos in Flickr), their Jaccard
similarity JS(Oi, Oj) is defined as follows:
JS(Oi, Oj) =
|Oi ∩Oj |
|Oi ∪Oj | .
We define our topic diversity index as Refined Diversity Jaccard-Index, which is in fact the
average Jaccard similarity of all object pairs.
Definition 4.1 (Refined DJ-Index) Given a collection of objects O1, . . . , On, where each
object is a set of elements (e.g. terms), the refined DJ-Index measuring the diversity of the
collection is defined as follows:
RDJ =
2
n(n− 1)
∑
i<j
JS(Oi, Oj),
where 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n.
We use the expression Refined DJ-Index, or RDJ index for short, to emphasize that self-
similar pairs are not included in the diversity computation. It is easy to see that the RDJ-
index can be considered as a special case of the Stirling index described in Section 2.2,
where α and β are set to 1, and both pi and pj are 1/n if self-similar pairs are included.
Note that smaller RDJ values mean larger diversities. For better visualization in plots we
do not use 1-RDJ to measure diversity because RDJ values are usually quite small, and
1-RDJ is often close to 1.
Computational Problem: There are a number of well-known indexes measuring di-
versity in ecology such as Simpson’s diversity [Sim49] and the Shannon index [Kre89]. For
applying the concept of diversity to text data, existing works use the sum of all document
pair similarities or variations based on pair-wise distances as diversity metrics [RBS10,
GS09, ZMKL05, VSS+08]. These diversity indexes are based on the computation of pair-
wise comparisons. Thus, a common problem is their computational complexity: O (n2)
comparisons are necessary for sets of n objects. While this is still feasible in scenarios
with small amounts of data as for top-k candidates in query result diversification, it be-
comes prohibitive when computing topic diversity for large datasets.
4.3 Diversity Index Computation
Having defined the RDJ-index for measuring diversity, the goal of this section is to compute
this statistic for a given text corpus.
Problem 1 (RDJ-Index Computation) Given a collection of objects O1, . . . , On, where
each object is a set of elements (e.g. terms), the objective is to compute the RDJ-index
value efficiently.
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4.3.1 The Naive Method: All-Pair
The straightforward solution for computing RDJ directly according to Definition 4.1 is 1)
to compare all object pairs and compute the size of intersection and union of each pair, and
then 2) to sum up the similarities of all pairs and to divide by the number of object pairs.
We call this algorithm All-Pair. Clearly, All-Pair takes O (n2) time, and is inefficient for
data collections with a large number of objects. Although some heuristics may improve
the efficiency of All-Pair, the time complexity will still be O (n2) since in the worst case
all pairs will have to be compared to obtain the exact value. Note that All-Pair can be
easily parallelized withO (n2/m) comparisons wherem is the number of machines, which,
however, is still not feasible for large datasets. In the following, we study approximate but
more efficient techniques to estimate the value of the RDJ diversity index.
4.3.2 Diversity Index Approximation
To increase the time efficiency of the RJD computation, we consider approximation algo-
rithms that are usually faster but provide estimated results, which are subject to errors. Our
goal is to bound these errors within a tolerable range. In the following, we define error
measures for the estimation quality of approximation algorithms.
Definition 4.2 (Absolute Error) Let Dˆ be an estimate of a statistic D, the absolute error
is defined as follows: ∣∣∣Dˆ −D∣∣∣ .
Definition 4.3 (Relative Error) Let Dˆ be an estimate of a statistic D, the relative error is
defined as: ∣∣∣Dˆ −D∣∣∣
D
.
Like many other indexes, diversity indexes are mainly used for comparisons. A single
index value alone usually cannot reveal much insight to users, and the relative error is more
appropriate than the absolute error for measuring the accuracy of index value estimates. For
the absolute error, it becomes hard for users to specify a meaningful accuracy requirement
in form of an error bound unless they approximately know the value of the indexes to be
estimated. Therefore, for both approximation algorithms described in the next subsections,
we will focus our theoretical analysis on the relative error.
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Algorithm 6: SampleDJ: An approximation algorithm estimating diversity indexes
Input: A collection of objects O1, . . . , On, each object is a set of term IDs
(assuming the term IDs in each object are sorted); relative error bound ,
accuracy confidence 1− δ, the number of consecutive trials W (e.g. 10000)
before checking the accuracy and tolerable overall running time T .
Output: Estimates of RDJ-Index of the given collection
begin
1. Load the dataset into memory;
2. r1 = 0; r2 =
⌈
log2
1
δ
⌉
;
for i = 1, . . . , r2 do
3. jsSum[i] = 0;
repeat
for i = 1, . . . , r2 do
for j = 1, . . . ,W do
4. Generate 2 distinct integers, A & B, uniformly at random
within the range [1, n];
5. jsSum[i] = jsSum[i] + JS(OA, OB);
6. r1 = r1 +W ;
7. R̂DJ = median(jsSum[1],...,jsSum[r2])
r1
;
8. ∆ =
√
1
r1
;
until ∆|R̂DJ−∆| <=  or Running time > T;
if ∆|R̂DJ−∆| <=  then
9. Return R̂DJ.
else
10. Return FAIL;
4.3.3 The SampleDJ Algorithm
A natural solution to reduce the computational cost is sampling. One approach is to take a
random sample of the input dataset, i.e. to sample r objects uniformly at random (without
replacement) from a collection of n objects, compute the sum of similarities of all object
pairs in the sample, and scale the diversity index of the sample. Another approach is to
take r objects uniformly at random but with replacement (see also [Olk93] for a general
discussion of sampling with replacement). In our context, we sample from all possible
pairs, compute the similarities of those r pairs and scale the result according to r and n as
the final estimate. The advantage of this approach is that each pair is taken independently
of other pairs, which makes the sampling analysis easier. We focus on this approach in our
work and name it SampleDJ.
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The details are shown in Algorithm 6. The input to the algorithm is a collection of
objects with each object consisting of a set of term IDs. In the Line 2 the values of r1 and
r2 are initialized depending on the desired accuracy confidence; here, r1 is the number of
trials in each of the r2 experiments. The final result is computed as the median RDJ value
obtained from the r2 independent experiments (r2 being determined by user requirement
δ); r1 increases with each iteration of the algorithm while r2 remains constant. In the Line 4
and 5 the similarity sum of all sampled pairs is computed. Line 6 keeps track of the number
of trials. Line 7 computes the current RDJ estimate. Line 8 and the “until” statement serve
to determine if the RDJ estimate is accurate enough.
Note that window size W is independent of dataset sizes, and merely corresponds to
regular accuracy checks in the algorithm; the number of windows is determined automati-
cally, and changes according to the data properties. Therefore, no tuning of W is required.
In our experiments we used the same value for W (10,000) for all of the datasets. For
practical reasons, there is also a “tolerable running time” parameter T because SampleDJ
can take more running time than the straightforward method in the worst case, and this
time is not predictable. For example, if all object pairs have zero similarity, SampleDJ
would proceed forever without a stopping condition based on T . The algorithm stops when
the estimated result is accurate enough or the running time exceeds the user-specified time
limit. We name the former case as “fail” and the latter as “succeed”. Based on our analysis
described in the next paragraph, the accuracy is determined by the absolute error bound ∆,
which can be determined based on the number of trials r1. Note that  and δ are the user
requirements for the accuracy of the diversity index computation, and r2 is determined by
user input δ.
Since SampleDJ is an approximation algorithm, it is of high practical importance to
have accuracy guarantees. The next statement specifies the time and space complexity of
the SampleDJ algorithm.
Claim 1 (Complexity of SampleDJ) If Algorithm 6 succeeds, the estimate R̂DJ is guar-
anteed to have a relative error at most  with probability at least 1− δ. That is,
Pr
[
|R̂DJ− RDJ |
RDJ
> 
]
< δ,
where RDJ is the true value of R̂DJ. The time and space costs to guarantee a success are
O
(
U ·log2 1/δ
2 RDJ2
)
and O(nU) respectively, where U is the maximum set size of all objects.
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We first prove the accuracy of SampleDJ. Let p1, . . . , pN be all possible object pairs,
where N = n(n−1)
2
. Let X be a random variable indicating the Jaccard similarity of a
pair drawn uniformly at random from p1, . . . , pN . That is, X = si (i = 1, . . . , N) with
Pr[X = si] =
1
N
, where si is the Jaccard similarity of pi. ThenE[X] = 1N
∑N
i=1 si = RDJ,
and
VAR[X] = E
[
X2
]− (E[X])2 = 1
N
N∑
i=1
s2i − RDJ2
≤ RDJ(1− RDJ).
If there are r1 identically and independently distributed random variables following the
same distribution as X , the mean of the r1 variables is also expected to be equal to RDJ
and the variance of the mean is at most RDJ(1−RDJ)
r1
. According to Chebyshev’s Inequality,
we have
Pr

∣∣∣R̂DJ− RDJ∣∣∣
RDJ
> 
 < RDJ(1− RDJ)
r12 RDJ
2 ≤
1
4r1∆2
,
where absolute error bound ∆ =  · RDJ. Let the probability bound 1
4r1∆2
= 1
4
, then ∆ =√
1
r1
. By repeating the same experiment log2
1
δ
times independently and taking the median,
the upper bound of the probability Pr
[∣∣∣R̂DJ− RDJ∣∣∣ > RDJ] is raised to 14 log2 1δ2 = δ.
Next, we show the time and space complexities. To guarantee the relative error at most
 with probability 1 − δ, it is sufficient to guarantee the absolute error at most ∆ since∣∣∣R̂DJ−∆∣∣∣ ≤ RDJ, ∆|R̂DJ−∆| ≥ ∆RDJ = . Therefore, setting r1 = 1∆2 = 12 RDJ2 guarantees
the relative error with probability 1− δ according to the accuracy analysis. Thus, the time
complexity isO
(
U ·log2 1/δ
2 RDJ2
)
. As for the space complexity, the main costs come from storing
the input, which is O(nU).
Note that the running time of SampleDJ is independent of n, but dependent on RDJ,
the value to be estimated. Thus, SampleDJ can be very efficient for large datasets if RDJ is
reasonably large. However, for smaller values of RDJ, the running time can be higher. Note
further that, similar to All-Pair, SampleDJ can be easily parallelized; this is because the
pairwise similarity computations, which correspond to the main computational overhead,
and part of the aggregation steps involved can be run independently on different machines.
4.3.4 TrackDJ: Estimating the RDJ-Index in Linear Time
Although SampleDJ can be very efficient in some cases, its performance is sensitive to the
data distribution, and it can be very slow in the worst case. Apart from that, without prior
knowledge of the input data, it is difficult to predict the running time. In this section we
present TrackDJ, another approximation technique returning an accurate estimate for the
DJ-Index in O(n) time regardless of the input data distribution, where n is the number of
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objects (term sets) in the dataset. We first briefly sketch the underlying concept of Min-wise
hashing and its application in our scenario.
Prerequisites: Min-wise Independent Hashing
Broder et al. proposed a powerful technique called Min-wise independent hashing (Min-
hash) [BCFM00, Bro00b, Bro97, Bro00a]. An interesting property of this technique is that
the hashing collision probability of two objects is exactly equal to their Jaccard similarity.
The basic idea of Min-hash mapping a term set is as follows: Min-hash picks a permutation
pi uniformly at random from all possible permutations of the term vocabulary. Given a set
of terms O, Min-hash applies pi on O and takes the term that has the minimum rank after
the permutation as the Min-hash value.
Example 1 (Min-wise Independent Hashing) Given 3 objects O1(A,B,C),
O2(B,C,D) and O3(C,E) where A, B, C, D, E are distinct terms. Assume TrackDJ uses
two min-hash functions h1 and h2 where the two permutations are: from (A,B,C,D,E)
to pi1 = (E,B,A,C,D) and pi2 = (A,C,B,D,E). Under these permutations, the terms
with minimum ranks are as follows:
h1(O1) = B, h1(O2) = B, h1(O3) = E,
h2(O1) = A, h2(O2) = C, h2(O3) = C.
The TrackDJ Algorithm
Given the Min-wise hashing property that more similar objects are more likely to have a
hash collision, TrackDJ counts the number of collisions of all object pairs and estimates
the diversity index. This is done by finding the self-join sizes1 of all min-hash values. The
self-join size of a set of items is in fact the similarity sum of all object pairs where the
similarity function returns only 1 or 0 depending on whether the pair of objects match or
not. In summary, the key idea of TrackDJ is that if there are more similar pairs, the self-join
size of the min-hash values will be higher due to the Min-wise hashing property; instead
of comparing all object pairs, the self-join size of a set of items can be computed in linear
time.
Using the above Min-wise Hashing example, the self-join sizes of min-hash values
under h1 and h2 are both 5. Accordingly, TrackDJ returns 5−33(3−1) as the RDJ-Index estimate
where the 5 in the numerator is the average of the two self-join sizes, and the 3 in the
denominator is the number of objects. In our example, the estimate is exactly the true RDJ-
Index value. Although this may not always be the case in practice, the expected value of the
estimate is equal to the true value, which we will prove below. Typically, TrackDJ needs to
use a larger number of min-hash functions to reduce the variance.
1The Self-join size of a set of items, F , is defined as
F =
∑
i f
2
i , where fi is the number of occurrences (frequency) of item i in the dataset.
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TrackDJ maps each object (e.g. a term set) to a min-hash value. The algorithm uses the
fact that two objects have a higher probability to have a min-hash collision if they have a
higher Jaccard similarity; the total number of collisions of all possible object pairs directly
approximates the sum of their pair-wise similarities. Thus, by computing the self-join size
of all min-hash values (i.e. the total number of collisions of all pairs), TrackDJ estimates
the RDJ-Index value.
The detailed approximation method is shown in Algorithm 7. In addition to the input
dataset and accuracy and confidence requirements  and 1 − δ, the user needs to specify
the maximum term set size among the n objects. Line 1 sets the number of independent
trials and experiments. For each of the L2 iterations there are L1 trials. L1 and L2 are
computed based on the accuracy and confidence requirements defined by the user. Note
that for TrackDJ the number of required iterations are known in advance; thus no checks
of error bounds are necessary at later stages. Details can be found in the algorithm analysis
part below.
Line 2 and 3 initialize a buffer storing the L2 self-join sizes. Line 4 and 5 initialize
counters, which are used later to store the number of occurrences of each ID. In each of
the L2 iterations, there is a data stream with L1 · n objects. Line 6 generates the L1 ·
L2 min-hash functions. Line 7 increments the corresponding counter based on the min-
hash value of object Oi. Line 8 and line 9 compute the accumulated self-join size so far.
Note that by maintaining a linked list of non-zero counters, TrackDJ does not need to
check all D counters which can significantly improve the efficiency if D is large. Line 10
resets non-zero counters of IdCounts[]. Line 11 computes the median, and Line 12 returns
the final result; it computes the average self-join sizes over L1 iterations and removes the
contribution from self-similar pairs.
Analysis of TrackDJ
Similar to SampleDJ, TrackDJ is a randomized algorithm which approximates the RDJ-
Index. In the following, we prove complexity and accuracy guarantees for TrackDJ.
Claim 2 The refined DJ-Index estimate from TrackDJ, R̂DJ, is expected to be equal to the
true value RDJ. The variance of R̂DJ
RDJ
is at most
VAR
[
R̂DJ
RDJ
]
≤ 2(U − 1)
K
,
where U is the maximum set size of all objects in the input object collection, and K is
the number of min-hash functions used.
We first analyze the case with only one hash function; the case with K hash functions
corresponds to repeating the same experiment K times independently, which we will dis-
cuss at the end of the proof.
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Algorithm 7: TrackDJ: Estimating the RDJ-Index in Linear Time
Input: A collection of objects O1, . . . , On, each object is a set of IDs of terms
ranging from 0 to D − 1; a user specified relative error bound  and
confidence 1− δ; maximum set size U among all objects
Output: an estimate of RDJ-Index of the given collection
begin
1. L1 =
⌈
8(U−1)
2
⌉
; L2 =
⌈
log2
1
δ
⌉
;
2. Initialize counters f [j] storing L2 self-join sizes of min-hash values;
for l = 1, . . . , L2 do
3. f [l] = 0; //to store self-join sizes
4. Initialize counters IdCounts[] storing the frequency of each min-hash values;
for l = 1, . . . , D do
// (D is the number of distinct terms in the dataset)
5. IdCounts[l] = 0; //counts of min-hash values
for k = 1, . . . , L1 · L2 do
6. Pick a min-hash function hk[] uniformly at random from a min-hash
function family;
for j = 1, . . . , L2 do
for l = 0, . . . , L1 do
for i = 1, . . . , n do
7. IdCounts[h(j−1)L1+l[Oi]] + + ;
8. sj =
∑
ID IdCounts[ID]
2; //efficiency can be improved, see the
algorithm description
9. f [j] = f [j] + sj;
10. Reset non-zero counters of IdCounts[];
11. Determine the median of f [j], j = 1, . . . , L2 and set it to fm;
12. return (fm /L1)−n
n(n−1) ;
Let Xij be a random variable indicating if a pair of objects Oi and Oj are mapped to
the same min-hash value, i.e. Xij = 1 if h(Oi) = h(Oj) and 0 otherwise. Also, let
Y =
∑
i 6=j Xij . (Note that Xij = Xji.) Thus, R̂DJ =
1
n(n−1)Y . Let sij = JS(Oi, Oj), then
Pr[Xij = 1] = sij , and E[Xij] = sij . Thus,
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E[R̂DJ] =
1
n(n− 1)
∑
i 6=j
E[Xij] =
1
n(n− 1)
∑
i 6=j
sij = RDJ .
VAR[Y ] = E
(∑
i 6=j
Xij
)2−(E [∑
i 6=j
Xij
])2
= E
[∑
i 6=j
X2ij +
∑
i 6=j 6=k
XijXik +
∑
i 6=j 6=k 6=l
XijXkl
]
−
(∑
i 6=j
sij
)2
≤
∑
i 6=j
sij(1− sij) +
∑
i 6=j 6=k
sij(1− sik) +
∑
i 6=j 6=k 6=l
sij(1− skl)
Due to the definition of Jaccard similarity (sets overlap size divided by sets union size),
if sij > 0 we have
sij ≥ 1
2U − 1 .
∴ (1− sij) ≤ 2U − 2
2U − 1 ≤ 2(U − 1)sij.
∴ VAR[Y ] ≤ 2(U − 1)
(∑
i 6=j
s2ij +
∑
i 6=j 6=k
sijsik +
∑
i 6=j 6=k 6=l
sijskl
)
= 2(U − 1)
(∑
i 6=j
sij
)2
∴ VAR
[
R̂DJ
RDJ
]
=
VAR[R̂DJ](
1
n(n−1)
∑
i 6=j sij
)2 ≤ 2(U − 1).
If TrackDJ uses K min-hash functions independently, then
VAR
[
R̂DJ
RDJ
]
≤ 2(U−1)
K
.
With this statement, we can derive the time and space complexities of TrackDJ.
Claim 3 (Complexity of TrackDJ) To estimate the refined DJ-Index and guarantee a
small relative error (at most ) with a high probability (at least 1 − δ), TrackDJ requires
O
(
log(1/δ)
2
nU
)
time and O(log(nU)nU) memory bits, where n is the number of objects in
the input dataset and U is the maximum set size among all objects.
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Knowing the variance from Claim 2, by Chebyshev’s Inequality we can observe that K
in TrackDJ should be set toO
(
U
2
)
to bound the relative error to with a constant probability
(e.g. 1
2
). To increase the success probability, we can repeat the process described before
2 log (1/δ) times independently and report the median of the outputs. In this way, the
success probability can be boosted to 1 − (1
2
)log(1/δ). Therefore, TrackDJ has a running
time of O
(
log(1/δ)
2
nU
)
. The space costs come from storing the input and ID counters are
as follows: TrackDJ needs to store O(nU) counters of all term IDs, which is equal to the
space requirement of the input. Each frequency counter in the buffer needsO(log(nU) bits,
resulting in the overall space complexity of O(log(nU)nU).
Note that TrackDJ can be easily parallelized with a complexity of O(n/m). This can
be done by partitioning the data into m parts for m machines, computing self-join sizes
separately for the subsets using TrackDJ, and aggregating the result on a central machine
accordingly.
4.4 Evaluation
We evaluated the algorithms described in this chapter using both synthetic and real world
datasets2. In this section, we first elaborate on datasets used. We then compare the three
algorithms, All-Pair, SampleDJ and TrackDJ, under different efficiency aspects including
accuracy, time and space costs, and parameters. Note that there exist no other methods for
efficiently computing the diversity of large document corpora we could compare with.
4.4.1 Data
Real Data
Our real-world datasets were obtained from Flickr3 and DBLP. DBLP [Ley] is a Computer
Science Bibliography database containing more than 1.2 million bibliographic records. The
data records in DBLP are mostly contributed by human editors and are well-structured.
From DBLP, we extracted 1,256,089 paper titles based on the publication year and venue.
We only considered conference and journal papers and removed books and other article
types. Each paper title was considered as one object for our diversity analysis. For reasons
of completeness and cleanness we focused on DBLP paper titles to mine topic diversities
of computer science papers.
Finally, we gathered tag assignments for 134 Mio Flickr photos uniformly over the time
period from 01 Jan 2005 until 05 Sept 2010. From this set we selected a subset of 25 Mio
photos where each of photo contained at least 3 English tags (though a dictionary check),
and performed stemming.
2Source code and datasets are available at www.L3S.de/~deng/diversity/.
3www.flickr.com
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Synthetic Data
We created additional synthetic datasets in order to study the performance of different
algorithms on datasets with various RDJ-index values. To this end, we generated groups of
objects with the property that 1) all objects within a group had the same number of terms
and were pair-wise similar with the same similarity, and 2) objects in different groups
had always similarity 0. By adjusting the number of groups with different sizes (i.e. the
number of objects in each group), we constructed multiple datasets with different RDJ-
index values. More specifically, we constructed the datasets as follows: 1) We set U , the
number of term IDs in each object to 10. 2) In each group, we generated a set of common
IDs shared by all objects in the group. All other IDs in the group were distinct; in this way,
by controlling the common ID numbers, we set the pair-wise similarity of all pairs in each
group to around 0.5. 3) By varying the number of groups G and group size Gs, we created
multiple synthetic datasets with n = G ·Gs = 524, 288 objects each.
4.4.2 Implementation Details
To implement the straightforward All Pair algorithm, we used an array of size n to store
the input file, with each array element being, in turn, an array containing the term IDs
of an object. To compute the RDJ-Index values, All-Pair iterates over all possible object
pairs, and computes the Jaccard similarity of each pair by linearly scanning the two sets of
sorted term IDs and counting the number of common terms and the total number of terms.
To implement SampleDJ, we used the system-provided lrand48() function to generate
random numbers within the range 1 and n. We set W , the number of consecutive trials to
10000. For TrackDJ, we used linear hashing to implement Min-Wise independent hashing
as suggested by Broder et al. [BCFM00]. We used the same settings for error bound and
confidence as for SampleDJ.
4.4.3 Performance Experiments
In this set of experiments, we compared the performances of the 3 algorithms All-Pair,
SampleDJ and TrackDJ on real-word and synthetic data.
Performance Metrics
The three metrics used to measure the performance of the algorithms were running time,
space (memory) requirements, and accuracy. In terms of memory, the primary costs of
All-Pair and SampleDJ were almost the same: namely, storing all term IDs, requiring e.g.
about 33MB for the DBLP title IDs. TrackDJ requires more space for storing the fre-
quency counters. Depending on the datasets, this cost can be as large as the input dataset
in the worst case. For the DBLP dataset, it is less than 1/10 of the input data. Because
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the space cost is relatively clear and corresponds directly to the input dataset size, we fo-
cused on running time and accuracy in our experiments. The preliminary experiments with
the synthetic data on the effect different parameters were conducted on a machine with 2x
Xeon5320 1.86GHz processors and 16GB of memory running CentOS 5.3. For experi-
ments on the real world dataset, we used one separate core on a more powerful machine
with 8x Quad-Core AMD Opteron 2.7GHz processors and 256GB of memory running the
same OS. Programs were coded in C and compiled using gcc 4.40.
Performance Results on Real-World Datasets
Experiments for the approximation algorithms were performed with an error bound  of
0.1 and a confidence value of 1 − δ = 0.95. Table 4.1 shows the running time and error
values (along with the exact RDJ values computed through All-Pair). Experimental results
are consistent with our theoretical findings described in Section 4.3.
For the naive All-Pair solution, we observe that running times are rather small for
dataset sizes of 1,000 and 10,000 but, due to its quadratic behavior, quickly become in-
feasible for larger sets.
Our SampleDJ approach shows the best running time behavior of the three tested algo-
rithms. Running times stay in the order of magnitude of minutes, and are almost constant
with respect to the input size. The shorter running times for relatively small data sizes
are an artifact of the hardware, and can be explained by L1 and L2 caching as for small
datasets a larger part of possible object pairs can be kept in the caches; for larger sizes we
observed a constant running time (approx. 5 min for the Flickr dataset), consistent with our
theoretical findings in Section 4.3.3. Also consistent with our theoretical findings, TrackDJ
shows linear behavior and outperforms All-Pair for datasets of size n larger than 1 mil-
lion. Note that for the approximation algorithms TrackDJ and SampleDJ the actual error
is clearly below the defined error bound (in most cases less than 0.001 for  = 0.1) For the
given datasets, SampleDJ shows much better performance than TrackDJ; however, in the
next paragraph we will see that TrackDJ can be more efficient for data distributions with
very high diversity.
Effect of Data Characteristics and Error Bound
We have seen that SampleDJ always provides accurate estimates within short running time.
This is because the RDJ value is still relatively large. However, Table 4.2a shows SampleDJ
degrades indeed in O( 1
RDJ2
) rate for varying RDJ values on our synthetic data as shown
in our theoretical analysis. In comparison, All-Pair and TrackDJ are not sensitive to the
RDJ values; TrackDJ outperforms SampleDJ if RDJ values are small.
In another set of experiments, we used the first 1000 lines of the DBLP data to test
the effect of the relative error bound  on running time and accuracies of SampleDJ and
TrackDJ. We set δ to a fixed vale of 0.001 and varied . Table 4.2b confirms that the
running time of both SampleDJ and TrackDJ are indeed O( 1
2
). Ideally, the errors of both
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Table 4.1 Running times, RDJ value and error for All-Pair, SampleDJ and TrackDJ for
Flickr and DBLP
(a) Flickr
Dataset Size All-Pair SampleDJ TrackDJ
n RDJ Time (seconds) Error (%) Time (seconds) Error (%) Time (seconds)
1,000 0.002060 0.08 0.017 34.30 ( 0.57 min ) 0.000 39.33 ( 0.66 min )
10,000 0.001992 8.82 0.028 40.05 ( 0.67 min ) 0.013 410 ( 6.84 min )
100,000 0.001992 912.74 ( 15.21 min ) 0.019 90.14 ( 1.50 min ) 0.043 5,253 ( 1.46 h )
1,000,000 0.001993 97,215.13 ( 27 h ) 0.080 223 ( 3.72 min ) 0.041 51,730 ( 14.37 h )
Dataset Size All-Pair SampleDJ TrackDJ
n Time (seconds) RDJ Time (seconds) RDJ Time (seconds)
10,000,000 . 113 days∗ 0.001998 350 ( 5.84 min ) 0.001997 790,016 ( 9.14 days )
20,000,000 . 450 days∗ 0.002203 246 ( 4.10 min ) 0.002206 1,613,566.20 ( 18.68 days )
∗estimated value
(b) DBLP
Dataset Size All-Pair SampleDJ TrackDJ
n RDJ Time (seconds) Error (%) Time (seconds) Error (%) Time (seconds)
1,000 0.005380 0.26 0.053 4.83 0.032 11
10,000 0.005591 7.74 0.307 5.27 0.056 152
100,000 0.005692 580 ( 10 min ) 0.197 7.50 0.078 1,869 ( 31 min )
1,000,000 0.005653 85,882 ( 24 h ) 0.007 24.64 0.036 29,155 ( 8 h )
1,256,089 0.005656 135,549 ( 38 h ) 0.061 27.04 0.036 35,879 ( 10 h )
solutions should strictly decrease when the error bound decreases, but in fact this is not the
case in our experiments and the error of both solutions fluctuate sometimes. We believe
this is because the real error is already quite small and close to the optimal. Note that even
the best possible pseudo random number generator and min-wise hashing implementation
are approximations to the theoretical ideals.
4.4.4 Summary
The main characteristics of the tested algorithms can be summarized as follows:
• All-Pair (Straightforward): Running time is predictable but can be too slow for large
datasets; directly applicable for other similarity measures; running time increases in a
quadratic rate with the number of objects in the dataset; can be still viable in practice
for smaller datasets.
• SampleDJ: Extremely fast for the real datasets we used regardless of the dataset size;
directly applicable for other similarity measures; can be too slow in some cases de-
pending on the diversity value; running time is not predictable without prior knowl-
edge about the input. A practical solution might be to try SampleDJ first and use
TrackDJ in case of failure.
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Table 4.2 Running times, RDJ value and error for All-Pair, SampleDJ and TrackDJ for
synthetic dataset to test effect of data characteristics and error bounds.
(a) Effect of RDJ value
#ofGroups:GroupSize All-Pair SampleDJ TrackDJ
n G:Gs RDJ Time(hours) Error(%) Time(seconds) Error(%) Time(hours)
524,288 32:16384 0.017 5.3 0.34 2 2.05 2.5
524,288 64:8192 0.0087 5.3 0.26 10 1.96 2.5
524,288 128:4096 0.00427 5.3 0.38 39 2.00 2.5
524,288 256:2048 0.00217 5.3 0.02 156 1.95 2.5
524,288 512:1024 0.00105 5.3 0.06 624 (10 min) 1.90 2.5
524,288 1024:512 0.00052 5.3 0.13 2,502 (42 min) 1.91 2.5
524,288 2048:256 0.00026 5.3 0.04 10,089 (3 h) 1.91 2.5
524,288 4096:128 0.00013 5.3 0.39 40,635 (11 h) 2.31 2.5
(b) Effect of error bound 
Error Bound SampleDJ TrackDJ
 Time(seconds) Error(%) Time(seconds) Error(%)
0.2 0.3 0.098 5 0.022
0.1 1 0.021 20 0.369
0.05 4 0.015 80 0.003
0.025 15 0.016 318 0.004
0.0125 58 0.003 1271 0.081
• TrackDJ: Predictable O(n) running time regardless of the input; applicable for simi-
larity measures for which there exist hash functions with the LSH property (requiring
additional analysis with respect to performance guarantees); solves the O (n2) run-
ning time problem which makes the diversity index practically computable even for
large datasets.
Note, that all three approaches can be parallelized (cf. Section 4.3).
4.5 Characterizing the Diversity in Corpora:
Example Studies
We now show the results of sample studies on a number of real world datasets. Note, that
low RDJ values correspond to high diversity.
4.5.1 Development of Flickr over Time
We also studied the temporal development of tag annotation diversity in the social photo
sharing site Flickr over the time period from 01 Jan 2005 until 05 Sept 2010 (see Sec-
tion 4.4.1 for a description of the Flickr sample).
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Figure 4.1 Flickr photo tags similarity over the time period 2005-2010, revealing a trend
towards higher annotation diversity throughout the years, as well as periodic peaks due to
recurring annual events.
Our first observation from Figure 4.1 is a year wise increase in annotation diversity
reflected by the decrease of the RDJ values. A possible explanation for the increasing topic
diversity is that the user community has broadened over the years with Flickr becoming
more and more popular for people of different ages, origins, and backgrounds.
Secondly, exploring diversity on a more fine-grained, monthly level reveals additional
interesting patterns and periodicities. In order to obtain representative tags for the most
interesting parts of the curve, we computed Mutual Information (MI) [MRS08] for each
tag, which measures how much a joint distribution of terms and categories deviates from
a hypothetical distribution in which terms and categories (time period for a peak and the
rest of the year in our case) are independent of each other. Note that the number of photos
captured for this figure remains rather constant over time, amounting to approx. 10,000
images per day. The RDJ value curve starts at its minimum at the beginning of each year
(January) and remains at the lowest level till the end of March, reflecting high topic di-
versity. Photos in this time period are mainly described by tags for a rather broad range
of topics like winter, snow, vacation, or house. In summer, the curve starts to increase
steadily, and reaches its maximum in mid-July before it decreases steadily until the end of
September, with the most representative tags in this time period being graduation, wedding
and beach. In October the RDJ value increases sharply, reaching a peak by the end of that
month. Our term analysis reveals that this is due to the popular holidays halloween and
thanksgiving. Finally, the RDJ curve reaches its maximum at the end of December where
Christmas is the dominating topic.
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Figure 4.2 Topic Diversity vs. 5-year Interval
4.5.2 DBLP Bibliography
To study diversity in the DBLP dataset, we classified Computer Science (CS) paper ti-
tles into groups based on publication year and publication venue. We intended to explore
how topic diversities of Computer Science papers change with time and research area. We
picked well-known publication venues to represent four research areas: Databases (DB),
Artificial Intelligence (AI), Computing Theory and Computer Networks. The venues rep-
resenting the areas are as follows: DB: SIGMOD, VLDB, AI: AAAI, IJCAI, Theory: STOC,
FOCS, and Computer Networking: SIGCOMM, INFOCOM. Figure 4.2 shows how topic
diversity changes with time. The figures indicate that the topic diversities of CS papers in-
creased gradually over time with the exception of Network papers within the past 5 years.
Also, curiosity driven papers (Theory, AI) seem to have higher topic diversities than appli-
cation driven ones (DB, Networking).
4.5.3 Diversity in Clustered Data
Cluster analysis or “clustering” refers to the division of a set of objects into subsets (called
clusters) so that objects in the same cluster are more similar and objects in different clusters
are less similar. In many contexts unsupervised machine learning techniques like hierar-
chical, partitional or spectral clustering are employed to achieve this goal. Intuitively, the
higher the number of clusters in a particular dataset, the higher its diversity. In this section
we want to verify if this property is reflected by the RDJ index. To this end, we analyzed
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Table 4.3 Size, title and RDJ value (in percent) per category in Reuters Corpus, per group
in Flickr-Groups collection, and per cluster in US-Census data
(a) Reuters RCV1 Cate-
gories
Size News Category RDJ
299,612 Corporate/Industrial 4.31
204,820 Markets 4.79
66,339 Economics 4.69
35,769 Government/Social 5.73
35,279 Sports 3.45
33,969 Domestic Politics 5.21
31,328 War, Civil War 5.81
(b) Flickr Groups
Size Group Title RDJ
139,344 Pictures Of England 1.63
121,391 Dark Art 0.57
98,901 Aircraft Photos 1.99
89,606 Absolutely beautiful 0.51
76,265 Visual Arts!! 0.61
73,632 Lonely Planet:’Leaving’ 0.48
71,158 Lighthouse Lovers 4.56
(c) UCI US-Census Education
Based Clusters
Size Educational Background RDJ
562,837 High School, Diploma or Ged 49.41
366,116 Some College, But No Degree 49.22
273,281 5th, 6th, 7th, or 8th Grade 51.63
213,941 Bachelors Degree 51.36
174,653 1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th Grade 70.97
109,834 N/a Less Than 3 Yrs. Old 84.55
107,142 10th Grade 47.56
three real world datasets:
1. RCV1: The “Reuters Corpus Volume 1” (RCV1) is a corpus of news feeds released
for public research in 2000 [LYRL04], and employed in several works on cluster-
ing and classification of text documents [SCK+06, MRS08, PSF10]. RCV1 consists
of text documents divided into news categories like “sports”, “politics” and “eco-
nomics” which we used as cluster ID’s.
2. Flickr Groups: The second dataset consists of tagged photos from different interest
groups in Flickr like “Pictures of England” or “Aircraft Photos” and general groups
like “Absolutely Beautiful” or ‘Visual Arts”. Here we used the group IDs as cluster
IDs and image tags as textual content.
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Figure 4.3 Diversity increases with a growing number of categories in Reuters Corpus,
groups in Flickr-Groups, and educational levels in US-Census datasets
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3. US Census 1990: In demographics clustering is defined as the gathering of various
populations based on factors such as ethnicity, economics, or religion. For our exper-
iments we used the US Census Data from 1990 [MTH02] consisting of details from
around 2.5 millions US citizens4. Attributes include, for instance, income, dedication
and educational background. We selected the latter for obtaining the clusters, with
examples of cluster IDs being “High School Graduate”, “Diploma”, or “Bachelor
Degree”.
Table 4.3 provides an overview over the topics in the datasets and the number of in-
stances per topic. For each dataset we selected the top n = 7 largest clusters. We computed
sets of all
(
n
k
)
possible cluster combinations for k = 1, . . . , n clusters. In order to obtain
balanced cluster sizes, we restricted the number of instances, s, per combination to the size
of the smallest cluster, and randomly selected s
k
instances from each cluster in the sample.
For the RCV1, Flickr and UCI Census datasets we obtained 31,328, 71,158 and 107,142
instances, respectively. Finally, for each number of clusters k we computed the average
RDJ index value across all cluster combinations.
Figure 4.3 shows the RDJ index vs. the number k of clusters contained in the sample
sets. The key observation is that the RDJ value indeed decreases with the number of clus-
ters. This shows that topic diversity in the sample sets is mirrored by the Jaccard-based
RDJ index. Despite of the large structural and conceptual differences between the distinct
corpora and the large differences between the absolute RDJ values, the decreasing pattern
observed is remarkably similar across corpora.
A comparison of diversity values in different corpora and for specific clusters reveals
further interesting insights (cf. Table 4.3). Generally, the diversity in the Flickr dataset
is highest (corresponding to lower RDJ values) as the tags used for diversity computation
can be defined by users and are not restricted. The Reuters dataset contains more restricted
vocabulary, and is less diverse. Finally, attributes in the UCI Dataset are well defined, the
number of possible terms per instance is small (68), and the “vocabulary” limited, which
results in high RDJ values. We also studied the correspondence of RDJ diversity values to
different topics. For example in Table 4.3a the first five categories including “Industrial”
(RDJ=4.31) or “Markets” (4.79) are more general and therefore more diverse (an exception
being “Government/Social” with (RDJ=5.73 )). “Domestic Politics” (5.21) and “War, Civil
War” (5.81) are sub-categories that are more specific and less diverse. The Flickr groups
“Visual Arts” (0.61) and “Absolutely beautiful” (0.51) are more general than “Lighthouse
Lovers” (4.56) and “Aircraft Photos” (1.99). Finally, for the census data, we observe that
the group “N/a Less Than 3 Yrs. Old” (84.55), which mainly represents babies, has the
lowest diversity.
4The set is available in the UCI machine learning repository (http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/index.html).
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4.6 Discussion
In this chapter we addressed Problem 2 of efficient analysis of topical diversity in very large
collections of data. The topical diversity measure enables comparison of such datasets
in terms of their topical similarity and can additionally be used to gain insights into the
structure of a particular collection. Existing state-of-the-art methods are performing with
quadratic complexity, making analysis of large corpora impossible.
As a solution we proposed two novel, efficient algorithms for estimating the diversity
of whole corpora with probabilistic guarantees, and provided illustrative example studies
on different datasets. Our first method TrackDJ makes use of a min wise hashing properties
and can be executed in a linear time. The second method SampleDJ even requires constant
time with respect to the dataset size. In this context we are the first tackling the problem
of efficiently computing the diversity of whole corpora. We evaluated our methods on real
world datasets such as scientific publication directory DBLP with over one million paper
titles and metadata from 144 million Flickr images. Additionally, we constructed synthetic
datasets with different diversity values. The conducted experiments confirm our theoretical
findings; for example, SampleDJ was able to accurately compute the diversity value for
20,000,000 records in about four minutes whereas the state-of-the-art algorithms would
spend more than a year for this computation.
Additionally, the proposed RDJ index can be used for computing efficient heuristics
for determining the number of clusters in large datasets, which is required as a parame-
ter in many clustering techniques such as k-means [Jai10], k-medoids or the expectation-
maximization algorithm for clustering. The increased efficiency make more real-time ap-
plications possible such as diversity computation in large streaming scenarios or handling
large datasets not fitting into memory. It may be interesting to adapt proposed algorithms
to different similarity measures like Euclidean distance and cosine similarity by using LSH
and its variants. Furthermore, it would be interesting to study properties of distributed ver-
sions of the described algorithms. Multiple machines provide more resources for solving
the problem, but how to partition the dataset so that running time and network communi-
cation is minimized may require further study. Further, we aim to extend our techniques to
other multimedia types such as videos or photos, where diversity based on visual properties
(e.g. color distributions or shapes) may reveal further insights about social content shar-
ing environments such as Flickr or YouTube. Finally, as discussed at the beginning of the
chapter, careful clustering of an inverted index according to access policies can improve
the retrieval efficiency under privacy constrains.

5
Privacy-Oriented Content Analysis
In the previous chapters we assumed that the sensitivity of a particular document depends
only on its frequency in the dataset. In this chapter we address Problem 3 and show how
the sensitivity can be estimated not only for textual, but also for multimedia content using
machine learning techniques. In this chapter we tackle the problem of supporting users in
making privacy decisions in the context of document sharing (especially for large batch
uploads of multimedia documents). User uploaded contents are typically very topically
diverse. Obviously decisions about privacy degree of each object can be done in two steps:
first identify the object type and topic context - was this photo taken at the beach or in a
house, does it show a sport event or a wedding. and second - estimate the sensitivity degree
of those topic context. Since each of those steps can introduce certain error, we propose a
machine learning algorithm to directly estimate the privacy degree based on textual and vi-
sual features of a multimedia object. Moreover, we develop algorithms for privacy-oriented
search and privacy-based diversification. We are aware that building alarm systems to sup-
port sharing decisions of private content and enabling privacy-oriented search can be seen
as contradicting goals; privacy-oriented search is not negative per se, as it can be used for
retrieving private content users are comfortable to share, and, more importantly, can help
with the early discovery of privacy breaches. However, as with almost every technology, it
requires sensible handling and constructive usage.
5.1 Contributions
Our first goal in this chapter is to provide techniques to automatically determine adequate
privacy settings for newly shared documents. To this extent, we exploit an average com-
munity notion of privacy gathered through a large-scale social annotation game. We then
employ the obtained community feedback to build classification models on selected visual
features and textual metadata, and apply these models to estimate adequate privacy set-
tings for newly uploaded images and search results. Such alert systems could be directly
integrated into social photo sharing applications like Flickr or Facebook, or provided as a
browser plugin.
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The second aspect that we study in this chapter is privacy-oriented search. Existing
systems do not enable users to directly search for private content in a systematic way. The
motivation for enabling privacy-oriented search is two-fold: First, users should be able to
retrieve resources about themselves (or about their children or other relatives) published
by third parties at an early stage, so that measures such as contacting owners of servers
or providers can be taken. Second, the degree of privacy of the information need behind
a query can be ambiguous for a search engine. For example, a user querying “ronaldo”
could be interested in photos showing either professional or private life of this football star.
In this work, we use classifier outputs to conduct privacy-oriented search, which enables
users to directly discover private information about a specific topic (see Figure 1.1 for an
example).
Finally, we develop algorithms to perform privacy-based diversification of search re-
sults (i.e. retrieving a “mixture” of private and public content) to minimize the risk of
user dissatisfaction in cases where queries are ambiguous with respect to the privacy aspect
of the information need. The motivation for this is analogous to topic-related diversifica-
tion [GS09]: to cover different information needs and provide an overview over the whole
search result space rather than just a list of top-ranked results.
5.2 Data
An individual’s notion of privacy is prone to continuous change. For example, something
a 16 year old youth may not consider sensitive may later lead to a rejection of his job ap-
plication. Therefore, independent opinions can be very useful in order to support the user
for adequate privacy judgment, and we build on an average community notion of privacy
collected in this study. Our intent is to automatically suggest images with potentially sen-
sitive content (and leave the final decision to the user), rather than images that a particular
person would not share with the world.
In order to obtain an appropriate dataset with labeled private and public image exam-
ples, we performed a user study in which we asked external viewers to judge the privacy
of the photos available online. To this end, we crawled 90,000 images from Flickr1, us-
ing the “most recently uploaded” option to gather photos uploaded in the time period from
January to April 2010. As we planned to investigate whether textual annotations can help
us automatically selecting suitable privacy settings for an image, we only crawled images
annotated with at least five English tags.
Of course, Flickr does not provide access to photos explicitly declared as private by
other users; therefore, in this work we focus on private images that are publicly available
on the Web. However, we think that classification and feature engineering techniques em-
ployed in this work are general enough to be also applied to learn classification models
from hidden private content.
1until 2011
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Figure 5.1 User interface of the privacy game. The user marks each photo as either
“private”, “public” or “undecidable”. The system displays the current score of the user
and the scores of the competing user teams.
As labeling a large-scale image dataset requires considerable manual effort, we con-
ducted the user study as an annotation game (cf. Figure 5.1). Social annotation games are
popular tools for solving tasks that are difficult for machines, and easy for human users,
such as image labeling [vAD04]. At each step of the game we presented five photos to a
participant of the study. For each photo, the participants had to decide if, in their opinion,
the photos belonged to the private sphere of the photographer. To this end, we asked the
participants to imagine that images presented to them were photos they took with their own
cameras, and mark these images as “private”, “public”, or “undecidable”. We provided the
following guidance for selecting the label: “Private are photos which have to do with the
private sphere (like self portraits, family, friends, your home) or contain objects that you
would not share with the entire world (like a private email). The rest is public. In case no
decision can be made, the picture should be marked as undecidable.” 2 If the user could
not decide at first glance, she could choose to display metadata of the photo or use a link
to see the photo in its original context on Flickr. To obtain sufficient evidence for the pri-
vacy label assignments, each photo was shown to at least two different users. In case of a
disagreement, the photo was queued to be shown to additional users. Users gathered points
for each classified photo. As incentive for providing accurate answers, credit was not just
given for the number of labeled images, but also for inter-user agreement. The more similar
the choices of the user and the other players (their assessments, of course, not being visible
to the user in advance), the higher was the score of the user. Our privacy game had an
unlimited number of levels and was online over the course of two weeks.
2All rights on pictures published in this document are reserved to the image owners. The pictures were
available on Flickr in May 2012. The pictures are supplied with their Flickr ids. These ids can be used for
obtaining further legal information.
94 Chapter 5 Privacy-Oriented Content Analysis
We asked our participants to complete at least one level of the game with 1000 pictures;
in addition, the users could continue playing to gather more points for themselves and
their teams. Over the course of the experiment, 81 users between ten and 59 years of
age worked in six teams. For example, one of the teams consisted of graduate computer
science students working together at a research center; other teams contained users of social
platforms including Facebook and some online forums3. Altogether 83,820 images were
annotated4. After cleaning (remove unregistered users and photos annotated by less than
two different people) 37,535 images remained. This set was used for our experiments.
Our analysis revealed that in the cleaned dataset around 70% of photos were labeled
as public or undecidable by all of the participating judges. This relatively high percentage
is expected as we originally crawled only images publicly available on the Web. Around
13% of the images were labeled as “private” by all the judges, and 28% received “private”
votes from at least one of the judges. Overall the dataset contained 4,701 images labeled as
private, and 27,405 ones labeled as public by 75% of the judges, which we use as ground
truth for our classification experiments in Section 5.5.1. Thus, depending on the voting-
based threshold applied, our sample indicates that a publicly available set of images from
Flickr can contain 13-28% of private images.
We computed the inter-rater agreement using the Fleiss κ-measure [Gwe10], a statisti-
cal measure of agreement between individuals for qualitative ratings. Note that according
to Fleiss’ definition, κ < 0 corresponds to no agreement, κ = 0 to agreement by chance,
and 0 < κ ≤ 1 to agreement beyond chance. We measured κ on a randomly selected subset
of 100 images from the ground truth set labeled by 36 users, where every user rated each
of those images, and obtained κ=0.6.
5.3 Features
Image privacy is a very subjective concept. It is influenced by a number of different factors
such as place, objects and persons on the photo as well as the point in time the photo was
taken.
Content-based features of an image like the presence of edges, faces, or other objects
may give some insights about its degree of privacy. In particular, in this work, apart from
textual features such as title and tags, we have selected image features which can help dis-
criminate between natural and man-made objects/scenes (the EDCV feature) and features
that can indicate the presence or absence of particular objects (SIFT). We have also se-
lected features that measure the colors within the image (color-histograms), and a feature
that measures the presence or absence of faces within the image.
Visual features and associated metadata are later used for training of models for privacy
classification. Note that, similar to other machine learning scenarios, “hints” provided
3facebook.com, forum.vingrad.ru, forum.sbnt.ru and others.
4The anonymized data as well as some of the applications based on the described classification techniques
are presented at http://l3s.de/picalert
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Figure 5.2 The distribution of human faces among private and public photos
by individual features do not suffice for predicting the privacy character of all photos;
however, in Section 5.5.1 we will show that the combined evidence of multiple features
yields applicable results.
5.3.1 Visual Image Privacy Features
Digital images are internally represented as two-dimensional arrays of color pixels. This
representation is difficult to use directly for classification because it is highly multidimen-
sional and subject to noise. Instead, a process known as feature extraction is typically used
to make measurements about the image content. Image features come in many forms, from
the very low-level, to so-called high-level features. Low-level features are typically formed
from statistical descriptions of pixels, whilst high-level features are those that have a di-
rectly attributable semantic meaning. For this study, we have selected a range of image
features that could potentially be used in building a classifier that can discriminate public
and private images automatically.
In the following descriptions of the visual features, we attempt to discuss theoretical
motivations for the use of the particular feature, and also describe some observations from
the use of the features for classification experiments within our privacy image dataset.
Please note that many of the illustrations need to be viewed in color (with a quality printer
or as PDF) in order to understand them fully.
Face detection
We first study the hypothesis that there might be a relationship between the occurrence
of faces in an image and the background of the scene with respect to privacy. Figure 5.2
denotes the correlation between the number of detected faces in a photo and its privacy
value in our dataset.
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We observe that the occurrence of faces in a picture is strongly associated with a high
degree of privacy although a considerable number of faces also can be found in public im-
ages. The detection of faces within an image is a high-level feature extraction operation.
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Figure 5.3 Example of a public photo with a few dominant colors and a private photo.
Figure 5.4 The top row show the most discriminative colors for public images and the
bottom row for private images from our dataset. The colors have been arranged by hue to
aid visualization. It can be seen that the discriminative colors of public images are more
saturated (i.e. more vibrant) than for private images.
In order to find faces in images we used an implementation of the Viola-Jones face
detector [VJ02], which uses a boosted cascade of weak classifiers to detect frontal and
profile faces within the image. Two types of summary feature were generated using the
face detector; the first is a single numeric feature that counts the number of faces detected
within the image. The second is a variable-length vector that encodes the relative area of the
bounding box around each detected face. Note that private photos do not necessarily show
persons (e.g. photos of letters and private workspaces); furthermore, faces are partially not
recognized from certain angles or if parts of the faces are hidden.
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Figure 5.5 Example of a public photo dominated by incoherent edges and a private photo
of a working place with a mix of coherent and incoherent edges.
Color Histograms
Intuitively, color may be an indicator for certain types of public and private image. For
example, public images of landscape scenes are very likely to have a specific color distri-
bution.
The global color histogram of an image is one of the simplest forms of image feature.
The histogram is constructed by assigning each pixel in the image to a histogram bin based
on its color. The global color histogram completely discards all information about how the
colors appear spatially within the image.
In this study, the histogram was calculated in the HS (Hue, Saturation) color space with
each color-dimension split evenly into four segments, resulting in a histogram consisting
of 16 bins.
Previous studies have shown that skin-tones across ethnicities are tightly clustered in
HS space [RMG98], so HS histograms should be particularly good at efficiently modeling
skin tones and predicting the presence or absence of people, which can be observed to be
a high indicator of privacy. We also observed, as shown in Figure 5.3 that public photos
often contain a few very strong discrete colors (resulting in a spiky histogram) whereas
in private photos the colors are distributed more uniformly. The former might correspond
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to artistic make up and an artificial environment, whilst the latter is typical for amateur
photos. More specifically, as shown in Figure 5.4, which was generated from the weights
of the classifiers discussed in Section 5.4.1, we perceive that public images tend to contain
more fully saturated colors (vibrant colors), whilst the colors in private images tend to be
more desaturated. We also observed that black and white photos correspond to private
portraits in most cases.
Edge-Direction Coherence Vector
The edges within an image are a very powerful feature for discriminating between different
types of scene, and thus might be useful for privacy classification.
In particular it has been shown previously that edge-based features can be a particu-
larly good discriminator of indoor and outdoor images [KPK10]. Images taken in artificial
environments tend to be dominated by strong, straight, near-vertical lines, whilst those of
natural environment tend to predominantly contain shorter and weaker edges in all direc-
tions [VJZ98]. The check of the top 100 positive and negative images, correctly classified
using the edge feature revealed that just 20% of private photos were taken outdoor whereas
11% of public ones were taken indoor.
The edge-direction coherence vector (EDCV) [VJZ98] consists of a pair of histograms
that encode the lengths and directions of edges within the image. The first histogram en-
codes incoherent edges, whilst the second histogram encodes coherent edges. Coherent
edges are edges within the image that are relatively straight and long, whilst incoherent
edges are short and/or non-straight. Each bin of the histograms represents a small range
of edge directions, whilst the magnitude of the bin is proportional to the summed lengths
of all the coherent (or incoherent) edges with that particular direction in the image. We
implemented the algorithm described in [THD+06], where edges and their directions are
found using the Canny edge detector. Coherent edges are those that deviate in direction by
less than five degrees over their length, and have a pixel length greater than 0.002% of the
image area. In terms of privacy classification, the EDCV feature of public images depicting
landscape scenes is likely to be dominated by incoherent edges. Private images are much
more likely to contain a mixture of both coherent and incoherent edges from a mixture of
the presence of people (mostly incoherent) and the background (coherent).
This is illustrated in Figure 5.5 where the two histograms are shown as one larger histogram
with the incoherent vector on the left and coherent vector on the right. Public images of
cityscapes, that contain some natural features (i.e. trees or people) would also contain a
mix of both coherent and incoherent edges, however, there might be some changes in the
distribution of these edges with respect to their orientation.
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(a) Public photo (b) Private photo
Figure 5.6 Examples of public and private photos. The most dominating features are
surrounded with boxes; the brightness of the boxes is proportional to the strength of the
features.
(a) Public features (b) Private features
Figure 5.7 Some discriminative public and private SIFT features along with example
snippets from the original images.
(a) Public features (b) Private features
Figure 5.8 Top-30 discriminative public and private SIFT features
Quantized SIFT Features
Private and public photos typically tend to be taken in specific contexts. For example, pic-
tures can be taken in public places like stadiums, supermarkets and airports, or in private
places like home, car, or garden. Accordingly the objects contained in a photo, like sport
equipment, furniture, human and animal body parts could be different and thus give us
some insights about an image’s privacy. Examples of features dominating the classification
decision using the machine learning model described in Section 5.4.1 are visualized in Fig-
ure 5.6. Recent advancements in low-level image description have led to approaches that
are based on the detection and description of locally interesting or salient regions depict-
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Table 5.1 Top-50 stemmed terms according to their Mutual Information values for “Pub-
lic” vs. “Private” photos in Flickr
Terms for Private photos
studio photograph sexi strobist februari
blond kid hat love woman
year smile black eye famili
white fun portrait selfportr peopl
dress valentin day friend parti
femal boy birthday face model
fashion daughter children coupl self
babi cute child girl beauti
me nikon pretti hair man
photographi young lip happi wed
Terms for Public photos
craft mountain natur rock draw
sky tree snow jan flower
januari art paint lake winter
view citi car moon landscap
anim cat road north build
frozen island full ice bridg
water abstract hdr park sea
hous boat fire bird handmad
architectur sunset sunris cloud macro
night dog illustr design river
ing objects and textured regions. Many region detection and description approaches have
been proposed, however, the SIFT [Low04] descriptor remains the most popular descriptor
currently. The SIFT descriptor is a 128 dimensional vector that describes local texture.
Because the application of an interest point detector can lead to a variable number of SIFT
features for different images, a popular technique for using SIFT features for classification
is to quantize the features into a small vocabulary of “visual terms”, and to create sparse,
fixed length vectors for each image that encode the number of occurrences of each type of
visual term. In this study, we detected interest regions in each image by detecting peaks in
a difference-of-Gaussian pyramid [Low04]. Approximate k-means [PCI+07] was used to
learn a 12000 term codebook for vector quantization from a random sample of one million
SIFT features from the dataset.
SIFT-based features are commonly used for generic object recognition because similar
combinations of SIFT features will often occur in different images of the same class of
object. As public and private images often have very different types of objects depicted
in them, SIFT-based features have the potential to be a powerful discriminator. Figure 5.7
shows some examples of the discriminative public and private visual terms within the con-
text of an image from which the term occurs. In order to obtain the most discriminative
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features, we computed the Mutual Information (MI) measure [MRS08] from information
theory, which measures how much the joint distribution of features (visual terms) and cate-
gories deviates from a hypothetical distribution in which features and categories (“private”
and “public” in our case) are independent of each other. Figure 5.8 visualizes the top-
30 discriminative SIFT features for public and private images. Typically, SIFT features
correlated to public images are observed to be of highly textured regions, whilst those
corresponding to private images tend to depict more linear features such as edges. More
specifically, as can be seen from Figure 5.7, SIFT features corresponding to public features
tend to come from regions containing text and symbolic shapes, and also from patterns like
in the case of an image containing flowers. Conversely, many SIFT features associated with
private features correspond to human body parts or items like furniture, typically occurring
in private environments.
Brightness and Sharpness
We also studied features like brightness and sharpness that have been shown to be an indi-
cator of photo attractiveness [SPS09]. In the same study, private amateur photos were also
not found very attractive by a community of users. Our brightness feature is a single valued
number that is calculated by averaging the luminance values of all the pixels in the image.
5.3.2 Textual Image Privacy Features
In addition to visual features, the textual annotation of images available in Web 2.0 folk-
sonomies such as Flickr can provide additional clues on the privacy of photos. This holds
partly due to correlations of topics with privacy-related image content.
Table 5.1 shows the top-50 stemmed tags automatically extracted from our labeled
dataset of private and public photos described in Section 5.2 using MI in a similar way as
in Section 5.3.1. Obviously the majority of tags used in images falling into the private cat-
egory describe personal concepts like family (babi, famili, child), emotions and sentiment
(happi, love, beauti), and concepts related to the human body (hair, face, eye), whereas
tags in the public category mostly refer to nature motives (snow, sunset, tree), architecture
(bridg, build, architect), and inanimate objects (car, rock). This result indicates that privacy
decisions can be correlated with specific terms found in tag annotations, and illustrates the
potential merit of additional textual metadata for privacy prediction tasks.
5.4 Privacy Explorer
In this section we describe the Privacy Explorer system, which provides two types of
privacy-based search mechanisms: 1) privacy-oriented search retrieving the most private
search results, and 2) privacy-based search result diversification providing an overview of
search results with varying degree of privacy.
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5.4.1 Classification Model
In order to predict the privacy of photos we use a supervised learning paradigm which is
based on training items (photos in our case) that need to be provided for each category. Both
training and test items, which are later given to the classifier, are represented as multidimen-
sional feature vectors. These vectors can be constructed using TF or TF · IDF weights of
tags or titles, and the visual features described above. Photos labeled as “private” or “pub-
lic” are used to train a classification model, using probabilistic or discriminative models
(e.g., SVMs).
In our classification experiments we use linear support vector machines (SVMs) clas-
sifiers. SVMs construct a hyperplane −→ω ∗ −→x + b = 0 that separates the set of positive
training examples (photos manually tagged as “private” in our case) from a set of negative
examples (photos tagged as “public”) with maximum margin. SVMs have been shown to
perform very well for various classification tasks [MRS08].
For combining multiple features, a normalization step for the input vectors is needed,
since the ranges of absolute values for different features can vary and are not directly com-
parable. One possible normalization technique is to employ a trained sigmoid function
which maps feature values from arbitrary range into the range [0, 1]. After this transfor-
mation the dimensions of the different input vectors are in the same range and can be
combined. SVMs provide as output a value which determines the distance of a new test
image from the separating hyper plane. We used Platt’s method [Pla99] to transform this
output into a probability value.
5.4.2 Privacy-Oriented Search
In order to enable users to get an overview of the most private images relevant to a query,
privacy-oriented search retrieves a set of relevant images, and re-orders them according to
descending degree of privacy (see Figure 1.1 in the Introduction). In order to create a list
of images ranked by privacy, we can estimate the likelihood of image privacy using the
output of the SVM classifier trained on a set of images labeled as “public” or “private”
by the users. We described the training process of the classifier and feature selection in
Section 5.3.
5.4.3 Privacy-Based Diversification
A privacy-aware image search engine should provide an overview of the available search
results, taking into account their privacy. For example, for a query “wedding make-up
pictures”, users might want to retrieve some professional images from wedding catalogs,
examples of private wedding photos, or recent wedding photos of the user’s personal friends
available on Web 2.0 platforms. In contrast to Web image search, which focuses on a few
relevant results, privacy-based diversification can minimize the risk of user’s dissatisfaction
in such scenarios. In what follows, we describe a framework to handle diversity in image
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search with respect to the privacy dimension. This framework enables us to obtain result
sets of images covering a broad range of privacy degrees from publicly available images to
private photos of personal friends.
Diversification Quality and Estimates
α-nDCG presented in Section 2.1.4 is the standard evaluation measure in the context of
topic-based search result diversification. We now describe how α-nDCG can be adapted to
the privacy-based diversification. In topic-based diversification, information nuggets rep-
resent some mutually independent binary properties of documents [CKC+08]. In contrast,
probability of image privacy has a continuous range of values. In our context, we inter-
pret the notion of information nugget ni ∈ [0, 1] as a numeric property of the image with
ni = 1 being the most private. In our user study the values of the privacy nuggets are
directly judged by the users. For the automatic diversification we used the classifier output
described in Section 5.4.1 as estimate for the privacy nuggets values.
A document can contain information nuggets related to different topics. In the context
of image privacy, a nugget ni represents the privacy degree of an image. For example, let
n1 = 0.8, n2 = 0.9, and n3 = 0.3 be three such privacy nuggets. Intuitively, the similarity
between n1 and n2 is higher, than the similarity between n1 and n3. Then, the gain of
viewing the sequence of images containing the nuggets n1, n2 is lower than the gain of
viewing n1, n3.
In this scenario we cannot assume privacy-related information nuggets in different
search results to be mutually independent. Therefore, we propose a more general α-nDCG-
G measure that takes into account similarity of the information nuggets contained in the kth
result to the information nuggets contained in the higher ranked search results:
G[k] =
∑
ni∈N
J(dk, ni)× (1− α)
∑k−1
j=1
∑
ny∈N J(dj ,ny)×sim(ni,ny), (5.1)
where in the equation G[k] is the kth element of the gain vector, N = {n1, . . . , nm} is the
space of the possible nuggets, J(dk, ni) is a binary judgment of containment of nugget ni in
search result dk, α ∈ (0, 1] is a factor to trade-off relevance and novelty of a search result,
and sim(ni, ny) is the similarity between the nuggets ni and ny.
In general, Equation 5.1 relaxes the nugget independence assumption of the standard
α-nDCG. This equation can be applied to estimate quality of a search result in presence of
information nuggets with continuous range of values. As in this work we perform diversifi-
cation only with respect to the privacy dimension and image dk only contains one particular
privacy nugget nk, we can simplify Equation 5.1 for this particular scenario as follows:
G[k] = (1− α)
∑k−1
j=1 sim(nk,nj), (5.2)
where nk and nj are the privacy nuggets in images dk and dj respectively. A possible
estimate for similarity of the privacy nuggets nk and nj is the difference in their privacy
values: sim(nk, nj) = 1− |nk − nj|.
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Figure 5.9 Precision-recall curves for textual and visual features.
Diversification Algorithm
For automatic diversification, nugget privacy values nk and nj required for the gain com-
putation in Equation 5.2 are computed with probability estimates obtained through the
classification methods described in Section 5.4.1.
Let L be the list of top-k images sorted by the probability of their relevance to the
user’s information need. Analogous to [AGHI09, GS09] Algorithm 8 starts with the most
relevant image at the top of L, and selects subsequent candidates by greedily optimizing
the estimated gain in Equation 5.2. The worst case complexity of Algorithm 8 is O(l × r),
where l is the number of images in L and r is the number of images to be selected for the
result list.
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Algorithm 8: Proc Select Diverse Images
Require: list L of top-k images ranked by relevance, number r of diverse images to be
selected.
Ensure: list R of the relevant and diverse images.
R← ∅
while |R| < r do {less than r elements selected}
i∗ ← argmaxi∈L\RG[i]
L← L\{i∗}
R← R ∪ {i∗}
end while
5.5 Evaluation
We now elaborate on the quantitative results of different experiments for classification,
privacy-oriented search, and diversification using the visual and textual features motivated
in the previous sections.
5.5.1 Classification
For our classification experiments, we used the SVMlight [Joa99] implementation of linear
support vector machines (SVMs) with default parameterization.
Our dataset described in Section 5.2 contained 4,701 images labeled as private, and
27,405 ones labeled as public by 75% of the judges. In order to obtain a balanced set, we
randomly restricted the set of public photos to a subset of 4,701 images, so that the number
of private images was equal to the number of public ones. From this set, we randomly
selected 60% as training data for building our classifiers, and 40% as test data, with each
dataset containing an equal proportion of public and private instances.
We conducted our classification experiments on balanced datasets, which is commonly
done the literature (see e.g. [YHBO10, SPS09]) in order to capture general classifier prop-
erties independent of the a-priory class probabilities on a particular dataset. Our quality
measures are the precision-recall curves as well as the precision-recall break-even points
for these curves. The break-even point (BEP) is the precision/recall value at the point where
precision equals recall, which is equal to the F1 measure, the harmonic mean of precision
and recall, in that case. The results of the classification experiments for selected visual fea-
tures described in Section 5.3 and the combination of visual and textual features are shown
in Figure 5.9. The main observations are:
• Visual features like sharpness, brightness and color histograms that have been shown
to be relevant in the context of photo attractiveness classification in previous work [SPS09]
do not achieve significant discriminative performance in our scenario.
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• Experiments with object related visual features, however, presented in the second
row, show a substantial improvement. The occurrence of faces in photos is an intu-
itive indicator for privacy, reflected by a BEP of 0.63 for the face feature. The edge-
direction coherence feature performs slightly better, and achieves a BEP of 0.65. In
our experiments, SIFT features outperform all of the other visual features (BEP =
0.70).
• The combination of all available visual features further increases the BEP to 0.74.
• The pictures we used for classification experiments, contained good quality textual
metadata (e.g titles and at least three English tags). Thus the text features could
provide a short but concise summary of the image content and result in a BEP of
0.78.
• Finally, the combination of the visual and textual features leads to an additional per-
formance boost with a BEP of 0.80, showing that textual and visual features can
complement each other in the privacy classification task. However, classification
with only visual features alone also produces promising results, and can be useful if
no or insufficient textual annotations are available as is the case for many photos on
the web.
Note, that it is possible to trade recall against precision for sensitive applications. For in-
stance, we obtain prec=0.88 for recall=0.6, and prec=0.93 for recall=0.4 for a combination
of textual and visual features; even when restricting ourselves to only visual features we
still obtain practically applicable results (prec=0.82 for recall=0.6, and prec=0.89 for re-
call=0.4). This is useful for finding specifically strong candidates of private photos in large
photo sets. In the context of photo sharing applications this might allow for tuning the
sensitivity of personal “privacy warning” systems according to individual preferences.
Although privacy is a subjective concept, our data annotation captures an aggregated
community perception of privacy, which turns out to be correlated to textual and visual
features in a plausible way, and can be predicted.
5.5.2 Ranking and Diversification
Query Set
In order to obtain queries for ranking and diversification experiments, we filtered a set of
image-related queries from an MSN search engine query log5 based on their target URLs.
To this end, we considered only queries containing the term “image” or “photo” in these
URLs.
We manually filtered out queries related to adult content, and randomly selected 50
queries for our experiments (examples being “picture of a power plant”, or “fall pictures”).
For each of these, we retrieved photos and corresponding metadata from the top-1000 Flickr
search results.
5http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/um/people/nickcr/wscd09/
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To assess the quality of privacy-based ranking and diversification in a real-world sce-
nario, we performed a user study with 30 participants. We presented the keyword queries
and their top-10 results retrieved by different ranking methods to the users in random order.
Users were asked to judge the privacy level for each image on a 4-point Likert scale, with
1 corresponding to “clearly public” and 4 to “clearly private”. Apart from the modified
Likert scale the user assessment was a replication of the game described in Section 5.2.
Ranking by Privacy
For each query, we computed privacy-oriented rankings as described in Section 5.4.2. The
list of test photos in descending order of their user-assigned privacy value was considered
as ground truth for our experiments. We compared the order of the automatically generated
rankings using Kendall’s Tau-b [Kru58]. We chose the Tau-b version in order to avoid a
systematic advantage of our methods due to many ties produced by the high number of
photos with equal user ratings.
The main observations are:
• The original Flickr ranking does not consider the privacy of the images in the search
results. This was reflected by a small τb value of -0.04. In contrast, our methods
show a clear correlation with the user-based privacy ranking.
• Since not all of the photos in the set contained usable metadata, ranking based on
text with (τb= 0.26) is outperformed by ranking using visual features (τb=0.31).
• Finally the combination of textual and visual features provides the best ranking per-
formance (τb=0.33). However, ranking with only visual features can still be useful for
cases and applications where no or insufficient textual photo annotation is available.
The results of the pairwise t-test between the different ranking types confirm their sta-
tistical significance for a confidence level of 95%. We obtained good classification results
with default parameters for SVM. Although the tuning options such as soft-margin param-
eter C or alternative kernels might lead to further improvements, this is outside of the focus
of this work.
Diversification
We used α-nDCG-G in order to measure the quality of privacy-based image diversification
described in Section 5.4.3. In our experiments we used an α value of 0.5 to balance the
amount of re-ranking of the original search result with respect to the privacy dimension.
The (hypothetical) optimal ranking for normalizing DCG was obtained through diversify-
ing images directly by their user defined privacy scores.
The main result observations shown in Figure 5.10 are:
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Figure 5.10 alpha-nDCG-G for the initial Flickr ranking and top-10 diversified search
results using textual and visual image features for classification
• Our diversification approaches clearly help to diversify Flickr query results accord-
ing to the privacy dimension, and, compared to the original Flickr rank, achieve an
improvement of 8.7% using textual and 9.8% using visual features.
• The combination of visual and textual features leads to a further average improve-
ment (10.5%).
For each ranking position k ≥ 2 we conducted pairwise t-tests between the different
ranking methods for a confidence level of 95%. The tests between the original rank and
other methods confirm the statistical result significance. The difference between the textual
features and the combination of the textual and visual features is significant for k ≥ 5.
5.6 Discussion
In this chapter we addressed Problem 3 to automatically determine adequate privacy set-
tings for photos newly shared at social applications and applied classification using various
visual and textual features to estimate the privacy degree of images.
Classification models were trained on a large-scale dataset with privacy assignments
obtained through a social annotation game. We made use of classifier outputs to compute
ranked lists of private images as well as search results diversified according to the privacy
dimension. Our classification and ranking experiments show the best performance for a
hybrid combination of textual and visual information. However, the approach of using only
visual features shows applicable results as well and can be applied in scenarios where no
textual annotation is available (e.g. personal photo collections or mobile phone pictures).
One additional result from our privacy game was that although there exist a common notion
of privacy in the community such as higher privacy for family photos, some aspects still
vary. For example, people who own pets see a picture of a dog as private whereas other
do not. Thus an interesting future research direction is personalization of our techniques to
better reflect privacy preferences of individual users and user groups.
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Additionally, in future work we aim to study other enhanced features in the privacy
context such as color-SIFT, or applying and testing various alternative machine learning
approaches for classification and ranking. Furthermore, due the complexity of the task,
it makes sense to consider gathering even larger training sets for performance boosting.
For gathering additional training data, techniques like active learning algorithms, which
take intermediate user feedback into account, might help to further optimize the choice
of sample images presented to human assessors. As the perception of “privacy” is highly
subjective and user-dependent, we would like to study recommender mechanisms, such
as collaborative filtering, to account for individual user preferences, and to provide per-
sonalized results. Most of the mobile devices nowadays are equipped with high definition
cameras. Photos taken with smartphones or tablets can differ from the pictures available by
Flickr. We plan to experiment with a dataset of pictures taken with mobile phones where we
expect a larger proportion of private images. We further plan to include new features like
context recognition which is possible due to recently released powerful operation systems
for smartphones.

6
Discussion and Future Work
6.1 Summary of Contributions
Advances in networking infrastructure and increased popularity of Web 2.0 platforms en-
abled support in sharing of large amount of data for individual users as well as social and
professional communities. However, this development calls for mechanisms enabling effi-
cient and at the same time privacy preserving data exchange. In this thesis we addressed
three important challenges in this context, namely: (1) Efficient privacy-preserving index-
ing and retrieval of shared documents; (2) Scalable content diversity analysis for large
document corpora suitable for supporting efficient access control to an inverted index; and
(3) Privacy-oriented content analysis of shared content to automatically distinguish public
from potentially sensitive content.
6.1.1 Privacy Preserving Content Indexing and Retrieval
First, we addressed the problem of efficient and privacy-preserving sharing of distributed
documents within working groups in an enterprise or the Web by introducing ZERBER+R -
an indexing facility, which can efficiently locate and select top-k relevant documents the
user is allowed to access. ZERBER+R provides probabilistic guarantees for document
confidentiality and enables efficient document management and index maintenance. This
r-confidential index does not require users to trust a central authority and is tunable with an
r parameter to trade between efficiency and confidentiality protection, bounding the amount
of information that can be leaked from the index taking into account the background knowl-
edge of the potential adversary. To this extent, the index relies on a centralized set of largely
untrusted index servers and offers resistance against inappropriate information disclosure
even if k-1 index servers are compromised (where k is a parameter). To provide tunable re-
sistance to statistical attacks, ZERBER employs a novel term merging scheme that has min-
imal impact on the index lookup costs. Our experiments have shown that ZERBER makes
economical use of network bandwidth, requires minimal key management, and answers
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queries almost as fast as an ordinary inverted index. Whereas ZERBER+R supports ef-
ficient retrieval and ranking of search results, an interesting direction for future work in
this area is related to an incremental enhancement of the index by integrating advanced
retrieval features, e.g. proximity search or phrase search, while maintaining confidentiality
guarantees for the indexed data.
6.1.2 Scalable Content Diversity Analysis
Secondly we proposed two novel, efficient algorithms for content analysis of large docu-
ment corporas to estimate their topical diversity with probabilistic guarantees. This diver-
sity measure can be employed to study structural properties of large data structures such as
inverted index and is potentially useful to improve access control properties by partitioning
the index. Whilst state-of-the-art diversity measurement algorithms require quadratic com-
putational time with respect to the dataset size, our first method, called TrackDJ, can be
executed in a linear time and the second method, called SampleDJ, even in constant time.
We evaluated our methods on real world datasets such as scientific publication directory
DBLP with over one million paper titles and metadata from 144 million Flickr images as
well as on synthetic datasets with different diversity properties and were able to practically
prove our theoretical findings and revealed interesting insights into temporal development
of communities, periodicities, and trends on Flickr.
6.1.3 Privacy-Oriented Content Analysis
Finally, we applied image classification using various visual and textual features to esti-
mate the privacy degree of photos. Our Support Vector Machines - based classification
models were trained on a large-scale dataset with privacy assignments obtained through
a social annotation game. Furthermore, we provided privacy-oriented search and privacy-
based search result diversification capabilities. In this context, we made use of the classifier
outputs to compute ranked lists of private images as well as search results diversified ac-
cording to the privacy dimension. Moreover, we analysed the usefulness of textual and
visual information in the context of privacy-oriented image classification. Our classifica-
tion and ranking experiments have shown the best performance for a hybrid combination of
textual and visual information. Nevertheless, the classification approach using only visual
features has shown promising results as well. This approach can be applied in scenarios
where no textual annotation is available (e.g. personal photo collections or mobile phone
pictures). Overall, our results have confirmed that classification with Support Vector Ma-
chines, in particular using the combination of textual and visual information, is a suitable
and effective approach to automatically determine sensitivity degree of images to support
users in selecting adequate privacy settings. We have also observed that although there
exist a common notion of privacy in the community, some aspects vary. Thus an interest-
ing future research direction is personalization of our techniques to better reflect specific
privacy preferences of individual users and user groups.
6.2 Open Research Directions 113
6.2 Open Research Directions
Security and privacy in modern information systems gained increased importance not only
in enterprises or social web communities but also in cloud computing, where the function-
ality of data management and sharing is not possible without privacy protection guarantees.
The results presented in this thesis can be directly applied in these scenarios and open var-
ious research directions.
A promising direction for further research is privacy-preserving multi-keyword ranked
search over encrypted cloud data. It would be interesting to examine how far structured and
semi-structured data such as graphs or relational data can be handled, especially employing
various access control policies and possible trust negotiations in dynamic sharing environ-
ments. For structured data, query rewriting and result filtering mechanisms need to be
adjusted to bind the possible leakage of information. For semi-structured data, adaptation
of the state-of-the-art information retrieval approaches like synonym queries, proximity
search and query suggestions to privacy-preserving indexing proposed in Chapter 3 are
further interesting research directions.
Additionally, the RDJ index proposed in Chapter 4 can be used for computing effi-
cient heuristics for determining the number of clusters in large datasets, which is required
as a parameter in many clustering algorithms such as k-means [Jai10], k-medoids or the
expectation-maximization algorithm. Clustering of an inverted index according to the ac-
cess control policies can provide a tunable trade-off between the retrieval efficiency and
the storage space usage. On the one hand, cluster-per-community indexes can be highly
efficient but space consuming. On the other hand, a single index, though saving storage
space, is limited in its retrieval efficiency due to a necessary scan of a posting list checking
access right for every user query and each posting element. Moreover, the techniques for
automatic classification of documents according to their sensitivity proposed in this thesis
can enable further fine tuning of the system such that more sensitive documents receive
better protection.
Finally, as the perception of “sensitivity” can be highly subjective and user-dependent,
in the future we would suggest to employ personalization techniques and study recom-
mender mechanisms, such as content-based or collaborative filtering, to account for indi-
vidual user preferences, and to enable personalized settings with respect to the sensitivity
estimation and privacy protection. Different object types such as video, audio or micro-blog
entries will require adjustments or further development of methods for sensitivity estima-
tion investigated in Chapter 5 so far. Especially appealing is to study distributed systems,
where the data of different privacy degree is shared among different servers (including
cluster and P2P scenarios). Furthermore, interdisciplinary multicultural studies would po-
tentially reveal additional insights into privacy perception of different communities. The
concept of “privacy” can be further changing over time, opening interesting directions for
temporal analysis on such perceptions for individuals as well as for user groups.
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